ERBIL,— Faruq Rafiq, a prominent Kurdish philosopher and writer widely known for his work on liberalism and political thought, died Tuesday at his home in Erbil, the capital of the Iraqi Kurdistan Region. He was 65.

Faruq Rafiq Hama Karim was born in 1961 in Sulaimani. He earned a doctorate in philosophy from a university in Canada, where he spent part of his academic career before returning to the Kurdistan Region.

He later served as editor-in-chief of Awaz magazine, a publication devoted to philosophy and science.

During his career, Rafiq wrote several books that shaped intellectual debate in the region. One of his most noted works is “Reconciliation of Reason and Love.” The book examines liberal education and civic ethics.

He also wrote “The Art of Philosophy,” described as a metaphysical lecture. Another major title is “Pax Americana: The Era of American Hegemony.”

In 2010, he published “The Art of Love.” A year later, in 2011, he released “A Station in a Philosophical Journey.” His other title is “One Hour Before Midnight.”

He was considered part of a generation of Kurdish intellectuals who combined academic philosophy with public commentary and regularly appeared in televised debates on Kurdish television channels.

His views on politics, Islam, and religion were at times the subject of public controversy.

Writing in an opinion piece published on April 28, 2026 in Awene Newspaper, commentator Samira Ali described Rafiq as an intellectual “who, in a sea of silence, gave his life with a cry for modernity and rational thinking.”

Ali wrote that Rafiq was not just a person who died, but a voice that had already been silenced by a closed-minded society.

She said that when he tried, through the “Ava” platform, to bring meaning back to public life and civilization, society did not listen and instead attacked him.

Ali said attacks by Islamist extremist groups against Rafiq, particularly when he criticized conditions at the Sulaimani International Book Exhibition, reflected what she called the intellectual failure of that society.

She said those who insulted him in the name of religion and tradition did not understand that his criticism was intended to protect the dignity of the city.

She wrote that a society unable to accept criticism about a book exhibition cannot be expected to accept philosophy, adding that Rafiq lived among people who tolerate insults but fear the word reason.

Ali further noted that even after his death, hostile language directed at Rafiq continued from some quarters, which she described as a deep moral failure.

She wrote that Rafiq was not killed by illness but by the feeling of not belonging in his own country, becoming a victim of the struggle between what she called darkness and light.

Ali warned that until society learns to hold open discussions and confronts religious extremism, future thinkers will face the same fate.

Ali concluded that Rafiq was like a mirror reflecting problems within society’s thinking, and instead of addressing those problems, society chose to break the mirror.

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Ali Ashouri | Exclusive to iKurd.net 

Hêmin Mukriyanî occupies a liminal position in the history of modern Kurdish literature — not merely as a poet, but as a mediator between the oral tradition and the emerging modern written form.

He wrote at a time when Kurdish poetry still hovered between collective memory and individual expression; a time when language was crossing from orality to writing, and the poet stood precariously in-between.

It is precisely this in-betweenness that renders his poetry a threshold text — neither wholly traditional nor entirely modern, but a restless search for a language capable of expressing memory without being confined by it.

Linguistically, Hemin sought to liberate Sorani Kurdish from the rigidity of classical prosody and syntax, bringing it closer to the living rhythm of speech. Yet this liberation was never complete. The resonance of classical diction and metrical cadence remains present in his lines — a voice that desires to move beyond the past while still drawing nourishment from it.

This tension between fidelity and freedom constitutes the core of his aesthetic. Compared with his contemporaries such as Abdullah Goran or Sherko Bekas, Hemin was less preoccupied with political rupture or revolutionary diction and more with rescuing the beauty and integrity of the Kurdish language itself. Instead of deconstructing the historical order of poetry, he sought to heal it from within — transforming the poem into a vessel of cultural memory rather than a field of ideological revolt.

In matters of rhythm and sound, Hemin found a subtle balance between classical meter and spoken cadence. Though he never fully abandoned the traditional structure, his flexible use of rhythm softened its rigidity, creating a more intimate and collective tone.

The music of his poetry is not grand or heroic but human and communal — a sound that belongs to the ear of the people rather than to the palace of tradition. His poems are “audible” in the truest sense: not because of their outer melody, but because they echo the deep, historical listening of a language long denied its voice.

Visually and imagistically, Hemin was among the first Kurdish poets to elevate the image from mere ornament to meaning. Nature in his poetry is not a decorative backdrop but a living text — a symbolic landscape where mountains, rivers, and horses embody a collective existence on the edge of erasure.

Yet his imagery does not reach abstraction or philosophical reflection; it remains sensory rather than conceptual. In this sense, Hemin’s work drifts away from modernism and toward a kind of national romanticism — a poetics of mourning that seeks to preserve rather than reinvent the past. His verse oscillates between remembrance and renewal, awakening and dream.

Historically, however, Hemin’s role in the institutionalization of the Sorani dialect cannot be overstated. As a teacher and scholar at a time when Kurdish lacked formal educational support, he worked tirelessly to make it a language of learning, writing, and thought.

Through editing texts, collecting folklore, and developing linguistic materials, he built a bridge between speech and writing — between the living voice of the people and the emerging discipline of literacy. His cultural project was thus profoundly political: an act of resistance against oblivion.

Yet within this cultural labor lies an inner contradiction. As an educator, Hemin sought standardization; as a poet, he longed for freedom. He stood between grammar and song, between the law of language and the dream of its dissolution. This paradox is the source of his enduring vitality: in his work, language itself becomes a site of struggle — between history and the present, between discipline and imagination.

Hemin Mukriyanî, then, is the poet of continuity amid rupture. He does not break tradition but transforms it from within, keeping alive the voices, idioms, and affections of a people on the verge of silence. His innovation lies precisely in his restraint, in his refusal to forget. He may not have reached the full horizon of Kurdish poetic modernism, yet he illuminated its path — as one lights a lamp without seeing the end of the road.

The true significance of Hemin Mukriyanî lies not in the overthrow of tradition but in making tradition self-aware. He taught the Kurdish language to listen to itself, and in that act of listening, thinking began. He stands, therefore, as a poet between history and dream — one who transformed the incompleteness of Kurdish modernity into a language of persistence and reflection.

1. Hassanpour, Amir. Nationalism and Language in Kurdistan, 1918–1985. Mellen Press, 1992.
2. Blau, Joyce. Manuel de kurde (dialecte Sorani). L’Institut Kurde de Paris, 1999.
3. Omarkhali, Khanna. The Yezidi Religious Textual Tradition: From Oral to Written. Harrassowitz Verlag, 2017.
4. Ali, Haidar. “From Orality to Modernity: The Reconfiguration of Kurdish Literary Identity.” Journal of Kurdish Studies, vol. 8, no. 2, 2021, pp. 45–

Ali Ashouri, a contributing writer for iKurd.net based in San Diego, California, U.S.

The views expressed are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of iKurd.net or its editorial team.

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ERBIL,— The Kurdistan Peshmerga forces have gone through several historical transitions throughout their history. One of these transformations was the transition from a resistance movement to an organized and professional army.

The Australian journalist Manish Rai is the author of the upcoming book titled “Peshmerga: A Remarkable Journey from Guerrilla to Soldier”; this book focuses on the shifts that have taken place.

During the course of the book, an in-depth analysis of the complex procedure that led to this shift has been discussed.

The Peshmerga transformation from being a guerrilla group to becoming a formal military organization that adheres to international principles and standards has been explained at length.

The author stresses that the Peshmerga has changed a lot, allowing them to better handle new threats. The author emphasized the institutional shifts that enhanced the Peshmerga’s ability to confront new threats.

Another important topic that is discussed in this book is an analysis of the significant role that the Peshmerga played in the fight against ISIS from 2014 to 2016, also ongoing counter terrorism operations of Peshmerga forces.

This period from 2014 to 2016 is presented by the author as a historical test of the professional modifications that the Peshmerga have undergone because of the difficult circumstances.

Furthermore, the author offers an objective review of the strategic challenges and tactical effectiveness that the Peshmerga are facing, in addition to addressing the wins that they have achieved.

The Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs (MOPA) in a statement mentioned that the author of the aforementioned book spent a considerable amount of time conducting significant field research in the Kurdistan Region prior to writing the book.

This study, according to the ministry, provides a new and more complete view on modern Kurdish and Iraqi issues, those related to the training of armed organizations and the difficulties of building security institutions in conflict zones.

Specifically, the ministry finds that this work offers a novel perspective on these areas. The ministry believes that it fills a substantial void in the collection of security and military studies that is accessible through the English library.

• Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs (MOPA)
• https://www.instagram.com/p/DQWRrX-CLpC/
• Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), Weekly Newsletter
• Zagros TV
• Kurdistan TV
• Rudaw TV

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Nemat Sharif | Exclusive to iKurd.net

Reviewed by: Nemat Sharif
Author: Sabri Silaivanayi
Book: 496 pages
Language: Kurdish Kurmanji
First Edition, Duhok, Kurdistan Region, 2016

“The Kurdish Mind” is a truly unique book, if not the first of its kind in the contemporary Kurdish library, especially in the Northern Kurmanji dialect. Two characteristics distinguish this book: the first is its subject (philosophy), which is rarely addressed by writers and readers alike, and is almost exclusively confined to academic circles. This in itself limits the number of readers and those interested in it, despite the fact that it is a vital subject that comes at the forefront of topics that push not only thought but also the language that expresses it forward.

For this reason, the philosopher needs a language with a degree of development, different from the language of narrative and poetic literature, to be able to communicate his ideas to his readers. This is also what another Kurdish thinker, Mohsen Osman, points out in his introduction to this valuable book.

The second is to gradually move from the generalities of philosophy and its European roots, deriving what is compatible with Kurdish thought and comparing them in a way that clarifies the position of the Kurdish mind and reveals the weak points and their causes through adequate comparison and explanation in a smooth and engaging manner for the academic and non-academic alike.

Perhaps this review and others will encourage others, especially non-academics, to read and contemplate its profound ideas, and how much it is need today in the circumstances that bring us to the threshold of great changes if we make good use of it to catch up with other nations.

The book is divided into 18 chapters with a valuable introduction. A review like this cannot fully encompass all its content. These are quick notes to highlight some important ideas. We encourage reading the entire book to appreciate its contents as a shining beacon of Kurdish thought and culture at this juncture in the history of the Kurdish people. Unfortunately, there is no English or Arabic translations of this book.

In the first chapter, the author traces the roots of Western philosophies and their main schools, as if he were writing the first chapter for philosophy students, ‘Philosophy 101’, written to familiarize readers in general with what is to come.

In the second chapter, he moves to the intellectual background of the Middle East through the religious and philosophical heritage. Then, he deduces some important concepts used to clarify the nature of Middle Eastern regimes. He also addresses some of the features of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), including the concept of criticism and its absence.

He says, “The absence of criticism does not create dialogue and discussion, and the absence of dialogue leads to the emergence of some violent means and consequently the emergence of violence. The emergence of a character who sees only two colors, black and white, and among people sees only himself and those who oppose him, and does not see a friend. And this represents the spirit of the Middle Eastern identity that becomes a prisoner of rigid beliefs under the influence and pressure of religion and culture, and this in turn forms a basis for creating A fundamentalist and extremist personality.” (p. 87)

From there, he touches on the concept of psychological complexes, defining them as a psychological state whose source is unknown, but which is built on ideas, positions, and previous events, all of which constitute a driving force for a person to take some strange or contradictory positions.

Among its characteristics is that it does not depend on facts, but rather on names and people, and its belief in them more than its belief in principles, such as believing in a party leader more than its principles. It transfers its problems to the outside by projecting them onto others. He believes that psychologists can treat it, but he overlooks the fact that those in positions of power do not undergo psychological treatment and do not accept it at all because it is considered part of the inferiority complex that Easterners feel regarding mental health and psychological treatment, which, unlike their great interest in physical health, Easterners consider it a personality defect.

On page 93, he applies these two ideas to Kurdish society, saying, “Criticism as a philosophical concept, and as a language and performance can serve society, but Kurdish society, with its morals and upbringing, can manage, perhaps in disguise, these concepts. It is not strange to say that it did not “A concept or component remains unless it falls under the control of authority.” Here, it seems as if the author is excluding Kurdish society from the rule he set for himself (criticism and its function in society), perhaps to avoid other issues.

Here he falls in the ‘management’ of criticism, or what may be called ‘the polite society.’ Alienation (as a result of psychological complexes) comes into play and he attributes this to the fact that a personal, incorrect experience with truth and its essence drives one to estrangement from reality. Thus, the error begins with the misreading and mismanagement of events. As a consequence, and in the absence of scholars and intellectuals in Kurdish society (perhaps he means the greater Kurdish society, not just in Iraq), people turn to clerics.

Therefore, we see the common refrain being, “The imam said,” or “Ask the sheikh or mullah.” He undoubtedly compares the current state of Kurdish society to the pre-Renaissance period in Europe and the conflict between religion and reason (or science). (p. 108) He concludes by saying, “Behavior and events lead religion to a historical and materialistic concept, and then the function of religion becomes questionable. The wrong analysis of religious texts has become a means for the ignorant to believe that one religion is better than another. This is a wrong assessment and a danger to tolerance… Perhaps the problem is not with religion, but some clerics are unable to discover the meanings and viewpoints in religious texts, to ultimately arrive at the true meaning of the text.”

Softening the tone is perhaps to avoid exclusion and clash with clerics as well as society, which still clings to the reins of religion. This compromise is not only to avoid clashing, perhaps it is the nature of reformers. This is at odds with many Western philosophers who have declared their bias towards reason and science over religion and its mystical aspects. Some indeed sacrificed their lives for the sake of change.

This is not a call for such strict behavior, but only to highlight the choices every person and society make at any time. In his analysis, he concludes that “linking the problems of authority to heaven is not in the interest of the people, but in the interest of the authority itself. Truth and accountability in this world are different in the afterlife. Thus, reason refers to the afterlife for the authority, saying, why does it not say… And I ask: Which is in the interest of the people, for the authority to go to hell or to court?” (page 115).

In the chapter on Reason and Identity, the author traces Kurdish identity from the time of the Sumerians and the spread of the Kurds from the Zagros Mountains to the present day, including the genocidal wars they have been subjected to. He concludes by saying, “Despite the [dividing] countries’ use of all means and methods, political and military, against the Kurds, to the point of Anfal (1) and genocide, now they have nothing left but politics and engagement.

Therefore, it is logical that they will not rule out at any time requesting negotiations with the Kurds, and it is best for the Kurds to prepare for that.” Isn’t this happening in northern Kurdistan now! (pp. 150-160). On page 181, he says, “As long as we have not been able to liberate ourselves over the years, we must have a serious reading of our struggle, our means, and our methods, otherwise we will remain backward forever.”

He explains, “For us, the state is a historical process, and it is a right, and a right needs an owner just as much as the owner of the right needs his right. A state built on the law of reason is best, but rational law is also only administered by philosophers and scientists, as Plato and Socrates say.” (p. 226) From this we understand that the state must be built on the basis of the law established by scholars and thinkers, and the authorities must govern in accordance with it.

Once again, the author pauses before reaching a judgment on the KRG. However, we can infer his opinion to some extent when he speaks about Qazi Mohammad’s reliance on tribal leaders and clerics and his failure to enact necessary laws. Does this apply to the current situation, in addition to the corruption and reliance on tribal leaders, some of whom cooperated with the former regime of Iraq?

Among the effects of occupation, the author points to the cultural, intellectual and linguistic effects that left their mark on the Kurdish personality, as happened with the Algerian people under the French occupation, despite its limitations compared to the occupation of Kurdistan, especially in northern Kurdistan.

He says: “The influence of the occupiers of Kurdistan on us reached such an extent that even if we were liberated from them and established our own state, we would not be able to detach from them because of their presence within us through their language and thought. Their thought and language represent two pillars in building the Kurdish personality, and if there is no national strategy, it is not unlikely that they will remain for a long time.” (p. 239) From this standpoint, perhaps the Kurdish person does not feel completely free like other peoples of the world for reasons that control his self and his subconscious mind, and among these reasons: the division of Kurdistan and the long period of occupation until the trait of ‘surrender’ became entrenched in us, or what is called learned helplessness (2) (i.e., a lack of self-efficacy) in clinical psychology.

The tribal social system, which imposed obedience to the tribal leader, as well as the religious ideology used by clerics to enforce their obedience by linking it to heaven (3). Among the manifestations associated with acquired helplessness are pathological manifestations such as depression and domestic violence.

Despite the Kurdish people’s reputation for their harsh mountainous nature and their love of freedom and independence, despite the social and political constraints that bind them, some say about each other that the Kurd fights his neighbor but helps a stranger, a metaphor for tribal conflicts and, in the present era, for party conflicts.

The author devotes two chapters to reason and religion, discussing at length the ideas of renewal and reform in the Middle East and the influence of Europe on Middle Eastern societies, emphasizing religious institutions such as Al-Azhar. He then concludes that “no part of Kurdish society can develop a distinct and independent mind and philosophy because it leaves its fate to the traditional mind” (p. 308).

He continues his research by saying, “Dealing with dialectics is sufficient to ensure that everyone gets what they deserve, but in return, the individual does not reach complete conviction… Before the Renaissance in Europe, religion was related to politics, and the Church had become a source of political will, but now in the Middle East, religion is not only related to politics, but religion has become politics” (p. 310).

We deduce from this that the author, despite his inclination toward materialistic philosophies, is not completely convinced by them, just as is the case with his lack of belief in radical change. He takes the path of reform to achieve his goal of bringing about social change.

This perhaps explains his statement on page 333, “Society does not allow the individual to use his individual mind, but dictates that he uses the traditional mind. Therefore, the individual tries to harmonize with it because he believes that harmony is better than alienation, especially intellectual alienation, and this in itself is a disease from which a large part of Kurdish society groans.”

In the next two chapters, the author discusses in some detail the concepts of nature and matter and stimulating the mind to understand them, saying, “For example, only after the congregational prayer ends at that time, and each worshiper goes his own way, and this is natural, but it is unnatural for each element (spirit, mind, thought, soul) to detach to go its own way and for each worshiper to go his own way (disconnection of selves equals disconnection of elements).

The inner unity of the Kurdish individual has not yet been achieved for him to be able to believe in it objectively. Presence or non-presence in a time, place, and occasion (prayer, meeting, or appointment, etc.) is only the meeting of the body (matter). When two meet, they are physically close, but in thought, each one is in another place.” (p. 346)

On page 357, the author discusses the concepts of divine command and divine will and links them, similar to what Dr. Sadiq Jalal al-Azm did in his book, Critique of Religious Thought (4), in the chapter on the tragedy of Lucifer, and he expands the concept of Lucifer to include, for example, a dictator or someone similar to him in inhuman behavior.

For example: Dictators use religion as a pretext for domination, as ISIS did, and they use clerics for this, as was the case in Europe before the Renaissance and is still prevalent in the Middle East. If we say that it is God’s will, this exonerates the dictator from his crimes on the Day of Judgment, and his defense is that he was performing a divine mission.

In this case, it is similar to the case of Lucifer, according to Dr. Sadiq Al-Azm, who points out that all verses of the Quran that curse Satan are limited to, for example, “until the Day of Judgment, or to the Day of Judgment…” In other words, his divine mission ends with the coming of the Day of Judgment, and he returns to God’s mercy, innocent because he was acting according to His will and desire.

His refusal to prostrate to Adam was nothing but disobedience to a divine command, not a departure from God’s will. This is impossible because it goes against God’s beautiful attributes, including the attributes of justice and power (meaning strength and dominance) over the universe. God Almighty cannot be unjust, and there are no limits to His power and might. But if neither the devil nor the dictator is performing a divine mission, then the entire pretext falls apart.

The last two chapters on culture, writing, reason, and politics are the important chapters, and anyone interested in culture and politics and their role in Kurdish society should read them carefully, although I recommend reading the entire book. On page 371, the author says, “The loss of privacy and the lack of identity are the reasons why the Kurdish writers have not yet made a healthy presence in institutional structures (perhaps referring to professional organizations or government forums),”since writing has a vital and direct relationship with society.

He continues on page 373, “We need readers because we see ourselves in them. But if he also needed us and our writings, and saw himself in them, he would not have withdrawn so easily from the world of reading as a reaction or self-defense, nor would he have been defeated by writing.” Here we cannot but agree with the author about the role of Kurdish intellectuals and writers after the 1991 uprising.

After more than thirty years, the Kurdish intellectuals and writers have not only been unable to assume a leading role in educating the masses and mobilizing them for the requirements of this phase, but their role has noticeably diminished in terms of interacting with society, educating and mobilizing it for the next phase.

Without mentioning names, there are those who neigh with their poems, reap the profits of their writings, but ignore the suffering of their people. They are, as the Arab proverb says, ‘As deaf in a rowdy procession’. They condemn themselves to death while still alive. “…the responsible elite, the one with principles and morals, can, with their strength (science and knowledge), determine some directions for their people and draw a road-map for them.” (p. 390).

On pages 407 and 410 he says, “The individual is not free to resort to supernatural forces or culture. In most cases, he resorts to active forces, and so far, supernatural forces are the active forces in the East. Therefore, culture has not become an independent force and is perhaps in the beginning of its formation… In the past twenty-five years, in my opinion, culture has been dead asleep, unaware of what the winds of time will bring, and in conjunction with the political and social changes that have taken place in the Middle East, we have not heard the voice of our culture to know that it is ready.”

The author begins the chapter on reason and politics with a frankness not seen in other chapters. He declares that as a people we have not read our history enough because any people who understand their history must learn from their mistakes, or at least not repeat them.

He continues, “…It is regrettable that our politicians have not been able to keep up with the politics of the contemporary international community. They practice politics with the mentality of power and not with the power of reason, which has no relation to thought, philosophy, or science… If we had a correct political thought, we would be able to understand politics correctly. Politics as thought, philosophy, and science has not yet been consolidated. This does not diminish our value as human beings, but it affects our relations as a region and a people with politics and political players. History proves that we have not become a political player at a political level. We are still a political card.” (Page 416)

The author continues to list the schools of thought, including the Islamic one, on managing the reins of government and its goals, and then compares them to the practices of Kurdish politicians, both inside and outside the Region.

To conclude this quick review is best with the author’s own words: “…the goal of politics is stability, growth, development, and serving the people. But in our world, people are always wary and fearful that a politician will come along and cause them problems because the goal is different… Politics is not the same as party affiliation. A person can belong to a party, but that doesn’t mean he is a politician. This has confounded the practical Kurdish mind. This is also the case with the issue of culture, as if every intellectual is a writer or journalist! It is clear that knowledge is one thing and pretending to know it is another. It is time to move away from pretending to know all fields, especially politics, and to learn diligently so that we don’t get behind any further as we are already behind.”

Before concluding, I must make a few quick technical observations: The author skillfully organizes his main ideas by numbering the main paragraphs of each idea, and then uses footnotes to identify the philosophers and thinkers whose ideas he drew upon in his research.

This contributes to the organization of the content for easy reading and . As for the rest, I think it’s up to the publishing house, including editors, technicians, artists, and others. What particularly caught my attention was the book’s lack of indexes, as they are important, especially for readers, researchers, and others, to help them refer to names, ideas they wish to review, especially in a book of this length, including tables of contents, media, and others.

We hope that we shed some light on this valuable effort in serving the Kurdish library and the Kurdish people, and in encouraging more conscious young people to read this valuable book.

Notes:

(1) Anfal operations: Iraqi military campaign led by Saddam Hussein’s cousin against Kurdish civilians to depopulated major strategic areas of Kurdistan. It lasted from February to September of 1988. The Ba’athist regime committed atrocities killing an estimated 180 thousand Kurdish civilians. The campaign’s name was taken from the title of the eighth chapter of the Qur’an (al-anfal).

(2) Learned helplessness is related to the concept of self-efficacy, the individual’s belief in their innate ability to achieve goals. Learned helplessness theory is the view that clinical depression and related mental illnesses may result from a real or perceived lack of control over the outcome of a situation.

(3) In psychoanalysis (Freudian), the flow of self-energy, driving liberation and perhaps even anarchy, is domesticated, as society requires, by a component called the “ego.” In Islamic terminology, this corresponds to the spirit, which defines what the human soul considers to be evil.

(4) Azm, Sadiq Jalal Al-, Dr, Criticism of Religious Thought, Second Edition 1970, Al-Tali’ah House, Beirut, Lebanon. Dr. Al-Azm, (1934 – 2016), a Syrian professor, was tried in Lebanon where he taught at the time because of his writings.

Nemat Sharif, a political analyst, a contributing writer and columnist for iKurd.net.

The opinions are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent the views of iKurd.net or its editors.

Copyright © 2025 iKurd.net. All rights reserved

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Nemat Sharif | Exclusive to iKurd.net

Author: Saber Mamaseini, Attorney at Law and legal advisor
Review and Commentary by: Nemat Sharif
Language: Kurdish; 670 pages

In this valuable book, the writer provides several different definitions for diplomacy based on opinions of authors as dictated by their circumstances and events. Here is a more comprehensive definition is summed up. Diplomacy is the study and practice of a set of formally organized relations between countries or entities that are linked in peace or in war.

A diplomat is then responsible for clarifying and explaining these relations and policies that link his country to the host nation, as well as theirs to his own. He must certainly be a well-informed, well-cultured person who is familiar with political, economic and government affairs of his country and the host nation. Therefore, a successful diplomat is the one who reflects the position of his country to the host country and reflects theirs to his country so that officials can manage changes and improve their ties.

He must deal with developments in light of his country’s policy and come up with solutions that satisfy both nations in the event of problems arise between them. Neither party should feel wronged in order to reach a sustainable solution between them.

When speaking of diplomacy, the ambassador is the first one to come to mind for he is the first person responsible for a team of specialists and experts in international relations, in addition to his other administrative responsibilities. He is not as erroneously thought of as a postman who conveys messages between two nations.

For example, diplomacy at the advent of Islam was nothing but the call to Islam, otherwise they would face war or pay tribute in submission. Diplomacy plays a role when two or more parties are at equal rights, responsibilities, politics and sovereignty regardless of disparity in military power and will to use it.

Unfortunately modern diplomacy uses power to support diplomacy to submit one party to the conditions of the stronger. But as early as the Kurdish Dostaki (AKA: Marwanids 982-1086) state used in its diplomatic relations gifts and financial offerings, perhaps the first of its kind, with the Byzantine Empire. The Dostaki Prince sent gifts and large sums with the goal to support his diplomatic work to consolidate the relationship between his country and the Byzantine Empire (page 83).

We believe this is better in supporting diplomatic action than military force, although financial backing and offerings still have a role in modern diplomacy. Since WWI occupation diplomacy has appeared; that is occupier’s will and terms are imposed through negotiations. Sadly, humanity still pays for the its aggressive instinct to subjugate others and to seize what rightfully belongs to others.

The author concluded that Baathist regime’s diplomacy was lagging behind for using diplomatic channels and pouches for operational purposes against the opposition. This is illegal, but it is common among other diplomatic missions. Iraq had a hyper-active diplomacy in Europe and America in defending Saddam Hussein’s dictatorship and war efforts against Iran, the Kurds and Kuwait.

This was clear under Tariq Aziz as the foreign minister and when Nizar Hamdoun was Iraq’s Ambassador in Washington. For example Saddam Hussein’s meeting with April Glaspy, the American ambassador to Iraq, before invading Kuwait.

The author also censures Jalal Talabani for using his diplomatic skills for the benefit of Iraq but not the Kurds. It is believed that perhaps was done not to benefit his rival Kurds. Another reason was perhaps that Talabani, despite his claim to democracy, wanted to memorialize his name in history as the first Kurdish president of Iraq (PP. 48–56).

The Hittite Empire

The empire was far-flung and ruled for more than 1000 years. Due to the vastness of their empire, they had three official languages and several local ones, Indo-European, Akkadian (Semitic), and Hamitic languages. They enjoyed religious freedom and became known as “the land of the thousand gods”. They had a legal system that remained the best until the time of the Romans.

Their penal code was no different from the Jewish penal code except that it was more tolerant. Judaism brought along the principle of revenge, “an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth”, which was in contrast to the tolerance of the Hittites. They gained their historical greatness by using their army. They were compared to the Pharaonic Egypt, as they applied universal military training to all their armies. They discovered iron and used it in the manufacturing of weapons 300 years before the spread of the Iron Age in the world. Their cities were fortified and their castles were famous.

Their capital was in Hattusa (near modern day Bogazkale, Turkey) for more than 600 years and then moved to southern Kurdistan, especially in the Bahdinan region, and their name survived in a village named ‘Hititi’ near Duhok. Their civilization continued after the fall of the empire for more than 100 years in seven independent city-states. Contemporary biblical studies indicate that the Prophet Abraham (pbuh), lived in peace and security among the Hittites and many followed him.

During the era of the Prophet David (pbuh) there were units of the Hittites in his army and two great generals who served with devotion and loyalty. Biblical historians believe that the Hittite Empire was most similar in ancient history to the United States in its laws and personal freedoms and its liberal system that is most similar to the constitutional monarchy.

Researchers confirm that the empire was an Indo-European state and its people in general were Indo-European. Despite that, Kurdish historians still avoid accepting them as one of the ancient roots of the Kurds, and they were the ones who destroyed the Mitanni state and absorbed its entire population into their own.

The role of intellectuals and politicians

In democracy, major political mistakes must be identified and made public to be discussed, reconciled and avoid their dire results. This is what living peoples who practice democracy correctly do. In the absence of democratic practices, we see revolts of peoples against their rulers, most of which are violent.

Only few may bring about change peacefully or with few losses. In the case of the Kurds, they’ve been distinguished by their legitimate cause for more than a century. They are undoubtedly very active who often offer sacrifices for their freedom.

Kurdistan’s important strategic location and abundant resources that attracts neighbors and world powers to find a foothold. Kurdistan, with its picturesque beauty and peaceful people, often targeted for its natural resources and strategic importance.

Why are the Kurds still without a country of their own, as our intellectuals, academics and politicians tell us? We are divided among four countries, and scattered minorities from central Asia to the caucuses, and several western countries. Cooperating with countries occupying Kurdistan must be identified as treason. As the author says “Turkish officials occupy Kurdistan and execute its leaders whenever they have the opportunity.

Therefore we see that this old trait is rooted in the Turks. Hence, our current leaders must understand this fact that Turkish officials one after another are the real enemies of the Kurds and supporting the Turks is a great historical betrayal.” (Page 109) For comparison, the author cites some examples Mustafa Barzani’s assistance to the Armenians and unlike them when Sheikh Ahmed Barzani took refuge in Turkey, they were transferred to Ankara and less than a year later handed over to Iraq to be exiled to southern Iraq until 1943.

It seems that we are not good at practicing constructive criticism, especially our intellectuals and politicians. We practice praise and flattery, and those who do not praise us, we tend to throw them in prison or in the category of enemies. We create reasons and justifications for our infallibility and innocence.

There is no need for another definitions of culture, as thinkers know it when they see it. But in a broad sense it is a systematic set of beliefs, actions and behaviors that are formed within a human group. The culture of the individual has a strong and direct impact on his behavior.

Therefore, culture is a set of features that distinguish societies from each other, and its components include language, arts, religion, customs, traditions and prevailing values. They are cumulative and continue dynamically. (See: Reham Abu Warda, Culture of Peoples, June 9, 2020, mawdoo3.com). From this point of view, we see that the bloody history of the Kurdish people constitutes an important part of their general culture and necessarily plays an important role in the behavior of individuals.

This fact in itself determines the extent of the individual’s feeling of freedom and exercise of public expression, as one of the important duties of the individual is self-preservation, and avoiding risks and problems. This is clearly evident in “semi-democratic” societies. Intellectuals and writers in particular are characterized by caution about the consequences of their thought processes and expression, verbal or written.

This is evident in their work and they know the risks of disclosing their ideas freely if they anger politicians. This is one side of the equation; the other side is the politicians in power who, like the rest of us, can make mistakes. Hence the fear of intellectuals leads to reluctance to tell the truth.

Many turn to praise the politicians, so they become a part of their mistakes. It is no secret that politicians and those in power in any society understand this fact. Thus, we see them in particular inclined to dictatorial behavior not only to instill fear, but also through rewards such as handouts and privileges to those who praise and flatter, or at least justify their undemocratic practices.

Fear begins when the intellectual or writer hesitates to say or write and then think about what will happen to him and his privileges if he writes, even in the choice of words if he decides to speak or write. He ascertains that he would not be misunderstood. The heroes are those who say and write with the understanding that their thought processes would be scrutinized. They are prepared to bear the consequences for the stance in their words and writings.

“As long as the three tents are here, this revolution will not succeed” Saleh Al-Yousifi

It seems that the discussion of Yousifi’s leftist thought during the days of the September Revolution (1961-1970) and in isolation of the Cold War atmosphere in the sixties of the last century (pp. 141-143) was short and incomplete. The Soviet Union (USSR) was not the best application of Marxism after Lenin died. But it was the other pole opposed to the capitalist camp. They claimed supporting self-determination for the oppressed people, which earned them legitimacy in the eyes of oppressed peoples.

Marxism does not claim validity for all societies and all classes at all times and places. It is an ideology specific to the working class in industrialized societies, toilers and farmers in agrarian societies. Thus, it emphasizes the unity of the working class and the unity of its struggle to achieve the desired goal of freedom and happiness of peoples. Marxism politically offers ‘solutions’ that provide developing societies with a roadmap for progress to achieve their goals to bring the proletariat to power. Along these political lines are:

1. Pursued a policy of world peace and preventing a third world war during the cold war. On this intellectual basis, Salih al-Yousifi opposed the existence of the three tents as a symbol of the West, and at the same time, he was a sincere nationalist in his belief in the legitimate rights of the Kurdish people.
2. Pursuing the policy of the right of peoples to self-determination through Marxism will eventually lead to remove the bourgeoisie. In other words a recipe for civil war. Most nationalist movements were interested in liberation thought, rather than Marxism including Yousifi. Here is the break in his thought. His interest lied in the Kurdish liberation movement. In the Cold War atmosphere, it was imperative for some to take a stand at times, as in Yousifi quote above.

In democracies, the advantage for the Kurds and other oppressed peoples is the convergence of interests and concepts of democracy and human rights accorded by the west, in contrast to the dictatorship of the proletariat. The west dealt with governments and not peoples (as the Eastern bloc claimed) and the United Nations is a group of governments. Today’s Russia is not the USSR, as Russia has become a capitalist country, although democracy is lagging behind. The USA and Russia can become friendlier for the sake of world peace, democracy and economic benefits for both.

Ramzi Nafie and Diplomacy:

The story of Ramz Nafi’ is a sad adventure of a young man who was passionate about the cause of his people but not diplomacy. Unfortunately he was caught in the maze of international intelligence during World War II. He lost his young life in his adventure.

How did he give himself the right to single-handedly trust the Germans? He did not inform his family, the leaders of the Kurdish parties or the professional organizations at the time? How only four people could control the oil fields in Kirkuk! This is closer to fiction than reality; more so, passing through the Shabak area and notables of Bazwaya to help them.

Their guide left them halfway out of fear for his life. Obviously, no ill intention as in contrast to the smugglers who turned them in. As for their passage through “Wadi Shur”, it is called “Darah Shur”, which means “salty valley”, and it did not need an Arabic translation because the book is in Kurdish. (pp. 184-195).

Fear and democracy:

There is no doubt that fear is a basic factor in the formation of the human psyche. This is clearly reflected in democratic regimes and dictatorships; perhaps the extent it runs in any regime that claims it. It is often said that democracy in the Middle East, especially in Iraq, is different from democracy elsewhere. Then, Iraq was still under one of the most notorious dictators in the world, of Saddam Hussein, who ruled Iraq with fire and chemical weapons for three decades.

Baath Party ideologues at the time spoke of ‘guided democracy’. This in itself denotes a dichotomy. How do you direct a people who are supposed to govern themselves? It is assumed that democracy in the middle east will cause chaos as people have no experience with democracy; and other peoples (i.e. the West) have been practicing it for hundreds of years? This rationalization is cause for fear as it might justify and pave the way for undemocratic governing.

Why do leaders impose their views on the people when they know the truth about democracy? Jawaharlal Nehru once said: “The problems of democracy could only be solved by more democracy, rather than through more institutionalization and laws”

Guided democracy is nothing but taming the people to accept a certain style of leadership and teaching them that leadership over time becomes limited to ‘one leader who knows best of their interests’. Hence, people must obey him. This is usually accompanied by instilling fear in people. Individuals become disengaged from the process of democracy and unwilling to express their opinions lest this be consistent with the official path.

The motto becomes ‘let others speak or oppose, so I do not need headaches’. In fact, on the timeline of dictatorship, it does not take long for this to become the position of many, and hence opposition begins to form in small numbers easy to punish at first as compared to the society.

Punishment is justified by ‘standing against the interests of the people’. In fact, the opposition is a few bold citizens who ‘see’ the government behavior and link it to those who represent the regime. When the opposition begins to act collectively it becomes a struggle for reform as in demonstrations and other means of peaceful expression or even resort to violence such as coups.

Jalal Talabani and diplomacy

Obviously, there is more than one way to write diplomatic history. There are those who want to focus on an issue(s) and track their progress in a certain period of time. And there are those who wish to focus on the timeline, and discuss issues of the time. Hence, the effectiveness of diplomacy for that period. Or choose to track the people who play a diplomatic role. Dr. Mamaseni chose this to accomplish his valuable book under review here.

His book includes many leaders and officials in the Kurdistan region, including President Massoud Barzani, Nechirvan Barzani, Adnan Al-Mufti, President Jalal Talabani, among others. For the purpose of this review, we chose Talabani, first because he played an important role in Kurdish diplomacy and leadership in the Kurdish liberation movement, and second, for some difficult situations that shed light on his diplomatic skills, successes and failures. A diplomat swims a rough sea, sometimes riding the wave and sometimes drifting with the current.

Talabani was an active diplomat, an intellectual, a tactful human rights defender. Although he descended from a prominent religious family, he chose the risky path of politics to go down in history as the first Kurdish president of Iraq. Diplomacy is part of the great political game between nations as well as aspiring peoples for a place among nations such as the Kurds.

Like other professions, diplomacy also has its successes and failures, and does not necessarily reflect on the diplomat’s skills or personality. Writing about them is also risky and takes audacity to dive in. This review and remarks are not meant to reflect on the author. This huge undertaking is a testimony to his great effort and service to this and generations to come to benefit from the lessons contained therein, as well as a testimony to what diplomats can do for their country.

Perhaps the circumstances of the Kurdish movements may not favor much criticism of Kurdish diplomacy, if it is mentioned, it is for the sake of historical honesty, expect the criticism to be clear and constructive. Any diplomat of Talabani’s stature, energy and activity must have faced difficulties at times, but a successful diplomat does not back down, but learns the lesson and moves on as he did. Let us consider the following paragraph translated from the Kurdish text:

“Before the 1991 uprising and at the end of the Gulf War, when a group of senior Iraqi Kurdish diplomats were waiting in the reception hall of the U.S. State Department on the Second Street in Washington, D.C., they were not received by a high-ranking diplomat. They were scheduled to be received by Richard Jeffrey, assistant secretary of state for humanitarian affairs, and now at the National Security Council, but he backed down for some reason in the last hour.

A secretarial [employee] of the Department was appointed to receive the Kurdish delegation. He told them that he would like to have a cup of coffee with them outside the State Department. But then, when Talabani visited America, all the staff of President Clinton’s administration at the State Department stood in due respect to welcome him and rolled out the red carpet for him.” (PP 232-233)

In both cases, we believe that the delegation was headed by Mr. Talabani. The reluctance to receive him in the first does not reflect on the delegation, but rather on the political atmosphere at the time and America’s policy of not receiving any of the Iraqi opposition at that time.

The warm reception and appreciation of the Kurdish delegation the second time was a reflection of the change in US policy at that time and an appreciation of Talabani’s status. His frequent meetings with the United Nations certainly reflect Talabani’s competence.

Certainly, the Kurdish people lost with his death a seasoned diplomat and a prominent leader who left his mark on the Kurdish movement not only in Iraq but in other parts of Kurdistan as well. Diplomatic relations reflect by and large the political atmosphere between any two sides.

Communities, Parties and Institutional Thought:

On pages (487-489), the author discusses, albeit briefly, three important topics at the heart of the KRG’s diplomacy: He appreciates the role of Kurdish communities abroad and benefiting from their experiences in representing successive Kurdish revolutions, and their relations in the countries in which they live.

The representatives of Kurdish revolutions all along were neither trained professionally, nor holders of degrees in diplomacy or political science. They believed in the just cause of their people, were led by circumstances to the countries in which they worked and learned by experience over time. They were linked to the Public Relations offices of their parties, exchanged information and received guidance to perform their tasks in their respective positions.

Contemporary diplomacy requires the move from individual representation of parties to institutional diplomatic decision-making, behind which stands an ‘army’ of trained diplomats familiar with politics and international relations, especially as Kurdish universities have begun to train and graduate a new generation of diplomatic enthusiasts who are dedicated to serving their country.

With the emergence of the KRG, Kurdish diplomacy evolved from representatives linked to parties to representation offices of the KRG, most of which performs diplomatic functions as well as some consular services. They are centrally overseen by the Office of Relations and are managed by a KRG minister-level official. We believe that there is a period of several months to prepare new diplomats before they are appointed to their posts.

However, despite the teaching of political sciences and diplomacy, the Kurds collectively are still at the beginning of the road. Diplomatic successes mostly lie in the legitimacy of the Kurdish cause, as it is the cause of the largest stateless people, and the third largest nationality in the Middle East.

It seems that Kurdish diplomacy is in transformation, rather than institutional. In other words, it depends on a limited number of experienced people by virtue of their positions and truly, they are the driving force behind the Kurdish diplomacy.

Institutional thought has two main pillars, the first is full democracy, and the second is the enactment of laws under which institutions operate. Both rely on the people and following the democratic decision-making. Thus, we find that institutional thought necessarily requires faith in democracy and commitment to legislated laws.

Otherwise institutions will turn into institutions that rely on dictatorial thought and style. The difference between democratic institutions and dictatorships is that the first is dynamic and effective, and the second serves a specific person or group, and the examples are many around the world.

The fault is not the existence of two or more competing parties, but the absence of democracy and non-compliance with existing laws. Doesn’t democracy necessarily mean that there are two (or more) groups competing and correcting each other so that the majority opinion prevails? A joint goal does not necessarily mean the absence of democratic competition, and reaching it does not necessarily mean that it is accomplished by one team.

Often resolving conflicts through war can create a dominant single party, while small parties only get dragged along the winning party. So the presence of a large party may not contradict the multi-party system because there are other parties on the scene, but it weakens democracy to a large extent.

Concern for democracy, consolidating the foundations of its institutions, adhering to laws and serving the common goal should not incite the hegemony of one over other groups, even if the goal is the same.

Institutional thought precedes its application. The Kurdistan Region is not independent, and the KRG has limited practice of institutional diplomacy for a long time. This has resulted in depending mainly on individuals, their ideas and vitality.

Therefore, Kurdish diplomacy suffers from ebbs and flows depending on the constantly changing regional and international politics. The importance of institutionalism lies in the process of collective decision making; that is the main flow of discussions, meetings, conferences, and sometimes through communication in writing by preparing studies, directives and correspondence.

Hence, everyone moves within this main flow of the process, from the minister to the ambassador. From within this process comes the role of the active diplomat such as the minister, ambassador or any other position to move to achieve the desired goal.

Not ‘separating party and state’: Party politics set and run elections, however, once elections are over and a new government is in place, all government decisions including diplomacy should be made by government officials, i.e. the parliament, the ministers etc.

As the case in most Middle East democracies, the lines between the state and party are often blurred, and perhaps there are also blocs within the parties that influence the decision making. Thus, state and party legitimize each other, especially in light of a turbulent opposition that blurs coalition and opposition.

As the comparison goes, Kurdish diplomatic decisions are often more transparent and clear than other governments in the Middle East as evidenced by statements and positions of Kurdish officials.

The author follows the biographies of individuals and their roles in Kurdish diplomacy. This approach exists and is followed, but sometimes falls into the boring narrative as if it reproduces the agenda of these people. This allows the chronological tracking of their activities and their achievements.

What is missing is the tracking and development of an issue over a time period, regardless of the politician or diplomat. That is, the writer provides diplomacy through individuals as opposed to an institutional view of it, i.e. tracking and presenting the subject and its developments in periods of time that may be prolonged to cover the periods of work of a number of diplomats who took office and worked on that issue and what has been achieved.

This approach allows first to understand the subject in its historical path on the one hand and draw lessons, including the behavior of the other party and projecting them onto the present and the future. In other words institutional memory v. individual one, second this scientific method of research and investigation instead of biography.

Concluding Remarks:

As mentioned earlier, this book is of importance, moral value and information richness as it establishes the history of Kurdish diplomacy. It merits translation into other languages to be accessible to researchers, and those interested in the Kurdish issue. The following notes may proof useful for the new editions. With the progress of printing technologies and the book industry, publishing and printing houses often assume responsibility for editing, indexing and other technical aspects.

1) There are more than twenty important documents that can be numbered and included in an appendices section to allow the reader to focus on the body of the text and its analyses while providing appendices for those who are interested in more information.

2) It is important to include some historical maps in a special appendix if it is translated into other languages, although it is useful even in the current Kurdish edition, although it is not informationally necessary for the Kurdish reader who is supposed to be familiar with Kurdish history.

Nemat Sharif, a political analyst, a contributing writer and columnist for iKurd.net.

The opinions are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent the views of iKurd.net or its editors.

Copyright © 2025 iKurd.net. All rights reserved

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ERBIL, Iraqi Kurdistan region,—Dr. Kamal Ghamabar, a celebrated Kurdish writer, translator, and literary critic, has died on Monday at the age of 87, the Kurdistan Writers Union announced. He passed away in Erbil following a prolonged illness, according to the union’s Erbil branch.

“It is with profound sorrow that we announce the passing of the esteemed Kurdish writer, Professor Kamal Ghamabar,” the statement read.

Born in 1937 in Koya, Ghamabar was widely regarded as one of the foremost critics in Kurdish literature.

He authored 10 books and numerous articles, offering literary critiques in both Kurdish and Arabic. His career in critique began in the late 1950s, with his first Arabic piece published in Al-Thaqafa magazine in 1973, analyzing the works of renowned poet Abdullah Pashew.

Ghamabar’s contributions extended beyond literature. He served as a teacher for over 40 years, initially working in schools across southern Iraq before moving to Erbil, where he taught in secondary schools and the Teachers Training Institute. In 2006, he was appointed an educational advisor to the Council of Ministers.

The late writer completed his primary education in Koya, graduated from Erbil’s intermediate schools in 1957, and earned a bachelor’s degree in Arabic Language and Literature from the University of Baghdad in 1964.

Ghamabar was also a member of the editorial team for Asoy Parwardayi magazine, and his first publication appeared in Galawêzh magazine in 1950. He was a long-serving member of the management committee of the Kurdistan Writers Union’s Erbil branch.

He will be laid to rest at Kakoon Cemetery in Koya, where many prominent Kurdish literary figures, including the poet Dildar, are also buried. A funeral ceremony is scheduled for noon on Monday.

Kurdish cultural officials expressed their condolences, highlighting his lifelong dedication to literature, education, and Kurdish heritage.

Ghamabar is survived by his wife, Zina Zaher, whom he married in 1967, as well as their five sons and one daughter.

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KERMASHAN ,— Mansour Yaghouti, a renowned Kurdish writer from Kermashan Province in Iranian Kurdistan (Rojhelat) and a literary critic, died on Saturday at the age of 75 after a prolonged battle with cancer, Iranian state media reported.

“The passing of Professor Mansour Yaghouti, a distinguished storyteller, poet, and critic, is a profound loss for contemporary literature in Iran and Kermanshah Province,” said Manuchehr Habibi, governor of Kermanshah, according to the IRNA news agency.

In August 2024, Yaghouti’s wife publicly highlighted difficulties in obtaining necessary cancer treatments due to medical shortages in Iran. The artistic community had called for improved care for the ailing writer.

Yaghouti, often referred to as “Iran’s Anton Chekhov,” was acclaimed for his sharp, evocative prose and a unique realist style. His works, including The Song of the Mountain, Stories of Deer Valley, Tales of Zagros, and Yarsan Ritual in the Myths of the Kurdish People, remain cornerstones of Kurdish literature.

Born on February 24, 1949, in the village of Keyouhnan in Sonqor County, Yaghouti grew up in a Kurdish-speaking family. His family relocated to Kermashan (Kermanshah) when he was seven.

He attended Dariush Elementary School and Kazazi High School, earning a diploma in literature before joining the Literacy Corps. In 1971, he officially began teaching under the Ministry of Education.

Yaghouti’s career faced significant challenges. In 1979, he was abruptly dismissed from the Ministry of Education without explanation. Over the years, he took on various jobs, including laborer, building security guard, and caretaker, while pursuing his writing.

He was also deeply involved in political activism. His first arrest occurred in 1967 while he was still a high school student. Arrested again in 1978 during martial law under Prime Minister Azhari, Yaghouti spent time in prison until the Iranian Revolution.

His activism continued under the Islamic Republic, leading to years in hiding and eventual imprisonment in 1985. He served a five-year sentence in Dieselabad Prison, Kermashan.

In his later years, Yaghouti focused on preserving Kurdish folklore and literary traditions, including research on the Kurdish Shahnameh.

Yaghouti’s legacy endures through his literary contributions and his advocacy for Kurdish culture and history.

(With files from IRNA | Wikipedia)

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Nemat Sharif | Exclusive to iKurd.net

Author: Lieutenant Muhammad Talab Hilal
Head of the Political Division in Hasaka
Review and commentary: Nemat Sharif

Some may wonder why review an old book that was written decades ago. This book was the cornerstone of the Baath Party’s ideology vis-a-vie the Kurds and their liberation movement in both Iraq and Syria. The Kurds continue to suffer even today from its sway on Arab mentality. The Assad regime denied any right for the Kurds in Syria whatsoever to the minute it toppled.

The Baath Party, in power or out, continues to dream of ruling the Kurds and other minorities with an iron fist. To this day, there is no published edition of this book available to the readers to learn the Baath Party’s policy regarding Kurds and other minorities.

What is available are scattered copies of the limited Baathist edition for Baath Party members only. Limited references are made to this book are made by a few Kurdish writers. Limited German translation was made available several years ago. This quick review, includes a 12 point program erase Kurdish national identity in Syria.

Muhammad Talab Hilal admits in his introduction to the book that “the few sources he obtained, despite their scarcity, are reports rather than studies” and that his book is [the study] “more of personal impression than an objective and focused study.

However, the motive that prompted rushing it is the special circumstances that Al-Jazeera Province is going through today and the serious impact of the events taking place in the north of our beloved Iraq, and their impact on this Province.” In this paragraph Hilal admits, that his study “Lacks the characteristics of an objective scientific study”, one can rely on.

He acknowledged his bias, as he is a Baathist who poured out his wrath on the Kurdish people to satisfy his racist tendency, and to flatter his masters with the aim of promotion (1), as his book has despicable political goals. It maliciously spread division, discord and hatred between the Kurds and Arabs first, urges his fascist Bath masters to exterminate the peaceful Kurds in Syria and elsewhere.

Second, the book is a complete program to exterminate the Kurdish people in Syria. Third, this review includes the 12 point program verbatim from the book, to show the reader the chauvinism of Hilal and the party he represented. It is important to mention that this program was unprovoked, and the Kurdish population lived peacefully on their own land.

The writer’s view of the Kurds and Kurdistan:

On the origin of the Kurds and their homeland, he ignored history facts, their culture, and contributions to human civilizations, especially to the Islamic (2). On pages 4 and 5 he stated”…that there is no people in the sense of a Kurdish people, nor a whole nation in the sense of a Kurdish nation…because they lack all characteristics of a nation. Thus, there is no national homeland for the Kurds either.

There are mountain dwellers whom nature has given special characteristic like any inhabitants of any region that impresses its inhabitants…the Kurds are no more than this. They have no history, no civilization, no language, and no race, except for traits of strength, brutality, and harshness. These are the traits of mountain dwellers. If we follow this logic, then we must apply it to other nations. As narrow as this view is, there will be many more nations.…”

In this brief presentation, we will not attempt to respond to his nonsense because the facts are too obvious to obscure with his demagoguery. His thoughts throughout the book suggest that Kurdistan is Arab land. He begins on the first page by saying “This piece of our dear homeland – meaning Kurdistan is Arab land- …” and concludes by again saying that Kurdistan is part of the Arab homeland and that the Kurds are “homeless people” whom no one knows of their origin. He did not attribute them to any neighboring ethnic group, as Turks do, because that would lead him to acknowledge that the parts of Kurdistan in Iraq and Syria are Turkish or Iranian if he attributes them to either one.

Therefore, he suggests that the Kurds are “mountain Arabs” (4), and mountains have distorted their Arab character (page 5). He reasons that “successive conquests of their region” (p.3) have made them lose their language. Because of his arrogance and racism he withholds the name “mountain Arabs”; first to satisfy his national vanity and then to justify his call to exterminate the Kurds. He defines the Kurds as “mountain dwellers” who have nothing “but the traits of strength, brutality and harshness.”

The writer’s racism and limited knowledge are clear in the vagueness with which he spoke about the origin of the Kurds and their history. On page 38, the writer acknowledges that “the Kurds as a race are completely different from the Arabs. There is no psychological, physiological, or anthropological similarity.” This was not spontaneous or a finding of his study.

His acknowledgment came to justify accusing the Kurdish liberation movement of ‘populism’ (4), as he says on page 38, “Where religion (meaning Islam) cannot be called a religion in the correct sense among the Kurds, mostly Sufi orders that are widespread…we know that populism itself is the one that created those orders that are foreign to Islam or used them as cover to attack Arab nationalism.”

Not only the Kurds, but even some Arab figures did not escape the charge of populism. For example, the same writer accused the then Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser (P. 22) of “populism, opportunism and egoism” for no reason other than his support for the Kurds’ right to life. He said the same thing about the then Iraqi president Abdul Karim Qasim for allowing Barzani to return to Iraq in 1959.

The writer must have suffered from fear and inferiority complex (P.39). He feels that every word spoken by the Kurds is a stab in the back, even if the word is a call for friendship and brotherhood. He cites Article 5 of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) charter, which stated: “Strive to strengthen the relations of brotherhood and friendship among all ethnicities that make up the Iraqi people, e.g. Arabs, Kurds, Turkmen, Assyrians, Armenians, and all other minorities in Iraq…” He explained: “It is very clear from the text of that article the populist and communist tendencies of the KDP.

This party, in addition to working for Kurdish nationalism, is also working to destroy Arab nationalism by reviving a new nationalism, based on the same communist logic.” The question here is: What does the writer want the KDP to say? Does he want the KDP to be chauvinistic and deny the right to life for others, like the writer himself? And why does he see the revival of other nationalities as destruction of Arab nationalism? This is the fear of the racist in its most obvious form. He also confuses populism with communism.

He considers the communist parties in the region then to be populist movements directed against Arab nationalism. Despite Baath party’s confession of socialism, his fear of communism is two-fold: 1) the call for self-determination for all stabs his racist pride in the core. He fails to see that nationalist movements are not communists. 2) Solidarity of the working class is another stab for he knows for certain that the solidarity of the worker regardless of ethnicity is a threat to his racist Baath pan-Arabism.

Hilal takes his Baathist position entirely because he is keenly aware of the justifications for his existence. He continues to justify his fear of and hostility towards the Kurdish liberation movement where he says on page (40): “…they – the Kurds – are trying with all their energy and possessions to establish their imaginary homeland. This view results in them being enemies and there is no difference between them and Israel despite the religious bond. Judaism and Kurdistan are two sides of a coin.

Add to that all the colonial considerations and the intense work against Arab nationalism… If, God forbid, their dream comes true [the Kurds’ dream of establishing their state] they will immediately reveal their true face and become a communist state affiliated with the Soviet Union in the future.” The writer reaches his “prophecy!” again on page 88 after an extensive study of KDP’s program and charter.

The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP)

One of the ironies of this “study” is that the author accuses the Kurds of agents of the west once and of communism another time (p.14) for no reason other than their resistance to genocidal campaigns against them. On page (9) he cites non-sequential paragraphs from “Brief History of the Kurds and Kurdistan” (pp 274 – 276), exploiting the honesty and truthfulness of the late scholar Muhammad Amin Zaki in his description of what the Kurds suffer as a result of their deprivation of the two ‘treasures’, “knowledge and money.”

The author ignores that their deprivation of both is a direct result of Baathist colonialism. Following a policy of ignorance is a primary means that facilitates the usurpers’ theft of the wealth of Kurdistan, thus, the second deprivation of money is achieved.

The writer’s proposals regarding the Kurds

The following are Hilal’s the proposals to end the Kurdish problem, included in his alleged “study” (pp 46-48), His proposal are translated verbatim as a living example of racism against the Kurds in Syria and elsewhere:

“In light of all that was mentioned, we must, in the midst of the turmoil, deal with the issues with a cool mind and the flame of faith, not to become the echo of or reaction to daily events, get side-tracked or trapped in plans drawn up by others. We must first avoid the slippery slopes in order to establish the foundations of plans on science and a comprehensive study at this this historical juncture.

It is clear and obvious to us today that we are waging a war of dogmas and weapons in the north of our Arab Iraqi state. We must immediately begin to match plans with the operations carried out in northern Iraq at this phase in particular. What is the benefit of ending [the Kurd] there and remaining here pampered or close to that in the name of citizenship?

Everything is clear and all card are exposed here and there [Syria and Iraq] and in Turkey and Iran as well regarding the Kurds. Therefore, we suggest that a comprehensive and radical plan be implemented in al-Jazeera Province. So that the problem does not occur again after a period of time.

The entire region, as we learned in Turkey, Iraq, Syria and even Iran, is connected along the borders. We must exploit Turkey’s policy now because it may change in the future according to the whims of colonial policy. They are now moving the dangerous elements to the interior parts of their country. Therefore, we suggest that the state should:

(1) Adopt internal relocation operations with geographical distribution inside the country considering the dangerous elements first. There is no problem if the plan extends over two or three years, starting with the dangerous elements moved first to the less dangerous elements and so on.

(2) Adopt a policy of keeping them in ignorance; that is not establishing schools or science institutes in the region because education has proven the opposite of what is needed in a blatant and bold way.

(3) The overwhelming majority of Kurds residing in al-Jazeera province enjoy Turkish citizenship. Civil records must be corrected, and this is happening now. We request that this results in clearing all whose citizenship has not been proven, and transferring them to their original countries. Furthermore, all those whose nationality has been proven must be reviewed reasonably and how they acquired them.

Citizenship is acquired by a presidential decree only. Any certificate that is not issued by a decree must be discussed. Those remaining, i.e. the least dangerous, are stripped of their citizenship and then returned to their countries. Then there is citizenship conflict, as you find some holding citizenship from two or three countries at the same time. In this case, such a person must be returned to his original country. In any case, what is important is to begin to reach the desired outcome of this census and review, Evacuation operations should begin immediately.

(4) Close employment opportunities: As a contribution to the success of the plan, no employment opportunities should be made available to the Kurds so that we put them in an unstable situation, ready to leave at any moment. The agrarian reform in al-Jazeera must consider this first, so that Kurds can’t rent or own. Arab elements are abundantly available, thank God.

(5) Launch a propaganda campaign among the Arab elements to prepare them for a cause and focusing on the Kurds to destabilize them so that they are anxious and unstable.

(6) Strip their clerics of their religious role and replace them with pure Arab sheikhs based on a plan. Or transfer them early on instead of others. Their gatherings are not religious at all, indeed, they Kurdish gatherings. In their statements, when they call on us, not against Barzani, rather they call against shedding Muslim blood. What a ridiculous statement!

(7) Instigate the Kurds against each other. This is easy, and likely by inciting those who claim Arab descent against the dangerous elements. This also will reveal the truth of those who claim to be Arabs.
(8) Settle Arab and nationalist elements in the Kurdish areas on the borders.

They are the future fort, and watchdogs until all Kurds are removed. We suggest that Arab elements of Shammar tribe. First they are the poorest tribe on earth and second they are guaranteed nationally one hundred percent.

(9) Make the northern strip of al-Jazeerah a military zone just as a war front. Military units are stationed in the zone. Their mission is to settle Arabs and evacuate the Kurds according to the State plan.

(10) Establish Arab communal farms for those resettled by the state in the northern strip, provided that they are trained and armed, just like the Jewish colonies on the borders.

(11) Don’t allow non-Arabic speakers to vote or run for office in the aforementioned areas.

(12) Absolutely ban granting Syrian citizenship to anyone who wants to reside in that area, regardless of his original citizenship (except Arab, etc.).

These proposals are not enough, as they are meant to alert officials, based on our experience, so that they would be the start of a comprehensive radical plan to be taken, a lesson never to be forgotten.”

Most of these proposals were implemented, while the Baath Party was in power in Syria, and continued to uphold this racist policy against the Kurdish rights until the Baath party was removed from power.

There are many examples of this, including, but not limited to: the abhorrent Arab belt project for the Syrian Al-Jazeera Province, and the revocation of Syrian citizenship of more than a hundred thousand Kurds, in addition to restricting the Kurdish language, literature and heritage.

It is our duty to expose this book continuously, and it was best said by the late Ismat Sharif Wanli in the introduction he added to this book “in order to combat its poisons and correct this distortion of Arab and Kurdish nationalism and humanity.”

Notes:
(1) Ismat Sharif Wanli stated in his added brief introduction to this book “The Baath regime did not dare to publish and distribute it to libraries and bookstores, contenting itself with trying to implement it…to erase the Kurds of Syria from existence. The author of this book was rewarded for his ‘creativity’ by promoting him to be the governor of Hama, and then a minister.”

(2) The limited scope of this article does not allow more details.

(3) To this extent, the readers can easily see the writer’s viewpoint matches that of Turkish racists against the Kurds. Turkey called the Kurds there “Mountain Turks” and the words Kurds and Kurdistan were banned in Turkey until the 1990’s.

(4) Populism: A political and literary movement with roots extending to the early days of Islam. Like our modern day political opposition, those subject to Arab rule of non-Arab, Muslim and non-Muslim origins, aimed to oppose the Arab rule and the benchmarks of authority, and its rulers because of the injustice and oppression they were suffering,

Nemat Sharif, a political analyst, a contributing writer and columnist for iKurd.net.

The opinions are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent the views of iKurd.net or its editors.

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BERLIN,— Renowned Iraqi Kurdish writer Bakhtyar Ali has achieved a significant literary milestone as his novel “The Last Pomegranate of the World” “Duwahêmîn Hênarî Dunîya” has been named among the top 100 books of the 21st century by Switzerland’s respected daily newspaper, Neue Zürcher Zeitung (NZZ).

The book secured the 80th spot on the prestigious list, which highlights some of the most influential literary works from the past 25 years.

This recognition has sparked pride and excitement in Ali’s supporters. In a statement shared on social media, the author expressed his gratitude and described the inclusion of his novel as a “historic pride” for both the present and the enduring legacy of Kurdish literature.

He also noted that the NZZ’s list is often compared to the New York Times best-sellers list, making this acknowledgment even more significant in the global literary landscape.

The Last Pomegranate of the World is a gripping novel set against the backdrop of Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq. It delves into the harrowing experiences of the Kurdish people, focusing on a father-son relationship forged amidst the violence and oppression of the 20th century.

The book’s deeply emotional narrative and exploration of war, family, and survival have resonated with readers worldwide, leading to translations in multiple languages, including German, English, French, Italian, and Persian.

Bakhtyar Ali, born in 1960, is one of the most prominent literary figures in Iraqi Kurdistan. Over the course of his illustrious career, spanning more than five decades, he has authored numerous novels, essays, and plays, establishing himself as both an influential intellectual and a storyteller.

Though he initially gained recognition as a poet and essayist, Ali’s transition to fiction writing in the mid-1990s cemented his place in global literature.

Currently residing in Germany, Ali continues to contribute to intellectual discussions on various issues, including the Kurdish struggle, the Anfal genocide of 1988, and the relationship between power and intellectuals.

His academic work often incorporates Western philosophical concepts, which he adapts to the unique cultural and political context of his native Kurdistan.

Ali’s inclusion on the NZZ list further underscores his impact on both Kurdish and world literature, solidifying his place as a powerful voice in contemporary fiction.

(With files from Rudaw)

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DIYARBAKIR-AMED, Turkey’s Kurdish region,— In a remarkable display of literary collaboration, a jailed Kurdish leader and a Turkish author have turned their pen-pal correspondence into one of Turkey’s best-selling novels.

The crime thriller “Duet in Purgatory,” featuring a retired left-wing lawyer and a disillusioned, aging general with a complicated past, has captivated readers across the nation.

The unique partnership between the writers unfolded over an exchange of letters, never once discussing the storyline in advance. This innovative approach to storytelling has paid off handsomely, with the novel resonating deeply with readers.

Selahattin Demirtas, the imprisoned Kurdish leader, who is serving a 42-year sentence, discussed the unconventional writing process in an interview from prison. “We decided to write the novel like a game of chess, move by move, without agreeing on the plot, characters, or style—absolutely nothing,” he explained.

The collaboration began when author and translator Yigit Bener sent Demirtas a copy of Louis-Ferdinand Celine’s “Journey to the End of the Night,” including a note expressing his solidarity.

Demirtas, a former co-president of Turkey’s third-largest political party, was imprisoned in 2016. The European Court of Human Rights has since condemned his detention as political, calling for his release.

“I couldn’t accept that a man I voted for, along with six million others, was behind bars while I was free,” said Bener, who lived in exile during the 1980s. Admiring Demirtas’s collection of short stories, “Dawn,” Bener initiated a correspondence through Demirtas’s lawyer.

Following President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s re-election in May 2023, which dashed Demirtas’s hopes for early release, Bener proposed they write a novel together.

“How about we co-author a novel?” Bener suggested, initially viewing it as a way to keep Demirtas occupied. Despite having no plot or characters in mind, the idea quickly took shape, and the two soon completed 13 chapters.

The pair took turns writing, though Bener declined to specify who began the project. “We had a lot of fun, but eventually we had to finish,” he recounted. “We set it aside for two months before having a few friends review it.”

Demirtas’s publishing house, Dipnot, which has previously published his novels and short stories, initially printed 55,000 copies last month, with additional prints expected in September.

“Our personal experiences and trajectories significantly influenced the novel,” Demirtas noted. “Yigit provided the motivation I needed at critical moments.”

Bener believes the novel’s success lies in its timely relevance. “The book delves into the theme of reconciliation through the experiences of two characters from the same generation who both feel a profound sense of defeat,” Bener remarked. “This resonates strongly in today’s deeply polarized Turkey.”

The collaboration culminated in an emotional meeting between Bener and Demirtas at Edirne prison, northwest Turkey, on the day of the book’s release.

Demirtas, who is held in isolation and typically only allowed weekly visits from his lawyer or family, was exceptionally permitted to meet Bener.

He shares his cell with Adnan Selcuk Mizrakli, the former mayor of the Kurdish city of Diyarbakir (Amed) in Turkish Kurdistan (Bakur).

Critics have lauded the novel for its “funny, fast-paced, and spirited narrative,” with readers eager to meet Bener as he tours bookshops.

The partnership between Demirtas and Bener stands as a testament to the power of creativity and collaboration, transcending the walls of imprisonment and capturing the imagination of a nation.

(With files from AFP)

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