Sheri Laizer | Exclusive to iKurd.net

Former investment banker for US bank, Morgan Stanley, one time journalist for the BBC and ITN Granada, multi-millionaire security official, Jonathan Powell is linked with bringing Abu Mohamed al-Jolani, the former Al Qaeda affiliate leader to power through back channel negotiations approved by MI6, and the British SAS.

Jonathan Powell, as Chief of Staff to former Labour Prime Minister, Tony Blair, (1997 to 2007), was linked to attempts to sex up the dossier against Saddam Hussein as a pretext for the war on Iraq.

As I wrote in an article on the Blair cabinet’s false ’45 minutes’ claim against Iraq and the untimely death of former weapons inspector, Dr. David Kelly:

“Journalist Richard Norton-Taylor had observed in the Guardian in September 2003, “There is a dark cabal around Tony Blair” – perhaps the same ‘dark actors’ that Dr Kelly referred to in his email? He observed, “What has already emerged – but been largely ignored – from the Hutton inquiry is the existence of a dark, almost Jacobean, cabal at the core of the Blair administration…It is a group of powerful, unelected people few would have heard of were it not for the evidence given to Hutton: Sir David Manning, the prime minister’s foreign policy adviser; Sir David Omand, his security coordinator; and John Scarlett, chairman of the joint intelligence committee. Until he resigned, the group also included Alastair Campbell, Blair’s communications director. Indeed, he was a prime mover in establishing this inner circle. 3

Norton-Taylor didn’t explicitly refer to Jonathan Powell in this context although he was central to the decision-making, but added: “Above all, they allowed themselves to be embraced by Campbell and opened the door to the tainting of intelligence by politics.”

“You could hear it in their calculating treatment of Kelly who, in Scarlett’s chilling words, should have been subjected to a “security style interview.”

“It seems that he was”…I had opined.

Syria is just a repeat performance. It is immaterial to British interests how many Syrians pay the price of having a jihadist for a president.

Talking with terrorists: Enter Jonathan Powell

In 2014, Jonathan Powell had been the UK Conservative Party leader, David Cameron’s special envoy to Libya – another disaster zone owing to the Arab Spring and foreign interference. Powell also took on negotiating roles in Northern Ireland, North Korea, Afghanistan, with FARC in Colombia and ETA in the Basque country, among other assignments. He went on a decade later to be appointed by Labour PM, Keir Starmer as his ‘Special Security Advisor. Now, the secrets about British intelligence interference in Syria and Powell’s significant role are out in the open.

Jonathan Powell brokered meetings between MI6 and Abu Mohamed al-Jolani (Ahmed al-Shara’a) while working as Chief Executive of his NGO, Inter Mediate. His counterpart was still designated as a terrorist as the leader of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham. The National News claims Powell he had first met al-Sharaa back in 2015. 4

The conservative mainstream UK newspaper, the Telegraph ran a heading on 21 November 2025, Starmer’s security chief ran secret backchannel to Syrian terror group. Tony Diver, the Telegraph’s associate political editor claimed that Powell’s Inter Mediate had been founded back in 2011. Powell ‘has had a significant presence in Syria since 2012.’

If so, this was when the Syrian conflict was just a year old and dressed up by the mainstream media for Western audiences as a revolution for democracy against the dictator, Bashar al-Assad. As I wrote at the time it was very clear from early footage that the bearded jihadists crying “AllahuAkhbar” when they launched their attacks were not democracy seeking rebels.

Powell was indeed ‘given responsibility (by MI6) for establishing contact between the intelligence agency and HTS in 2023 yet he had already been active there to sculpt a path for UK interests.

British officials reportedly obtained legal advice that cleared Powell to arrange contact with these terrorist groups on behalf of the UK, “using a defence in counter-terror legislation that permits “genuinely benign” meetings with terrorists, according to sources familiar with the situation.

Al Majalla claimed Powell first met Al Sharaa in May 2021.5 His organisation had been overlapping with another British NGO, the White Helmets, massively funded by the UK Foreign Office with a murky reputation for staging chemical weapons scenes as evidence against Bashar al-Assad’s government. Its CEO, James Le Mesurier had not lived to see the fruits of this labour and met a nasty end in Istanbul in 2019. See, The West’s ‘Red Line’ Fiction: Think Tanks, Jihadists and the White Helmets.

US fingers in the Syrian pie

Jonathan Powell teamed up with Robert Ford, the former US ambassador to Syria (2011-2014).

“Olive-branch carrying peaceful protestors!”

Back in 2011, Ford had visited the Sunni stronghold of Hama and stirred up further resentment against Assad He posted a tirade on Facebook in English and Arabic, saying “how ironic that the Syrian Government lets an anti-U.S. demonstration proceed freely while their security thugs beat down olive branch-carrying peaceful protesters elsewhere.”

He declared, “Hama and the Syrian crisis is not about the U.S. at all. This is a crisis the Syrian people are in the process of solving. It is a crisis about dignity, human rights, and the rule of law.” 7

Ford would later claim that he had met al-Sharaa personally and that al-Sharaa had refused to apologise “for terror attacks his group had committed in Iraq and Syria, which killed scores of civilians between 2017 and 2024, “He claims to have met al-Sharaa twice, once in Idlib under the group’s control in 2023. 8

Powell invited Ford into Inter Mediate to help their Syrian influence project. But al Sharaa denied he had met Ford under such circumstances claiming he only met international delegations. Other accounts say that Ford travelled with Inter Mediate in March and September 2023 and again in January 2024. Powell had taken up his post with Starmer’s government as his National Security Advisor after standing down as the chair of Inter Mediate just six days before the fall of Syria. They knew of course how things were headed and had helped set the conquest in motion.

(Sir) Richard Moore who was head of MI6 at the time of the backchannel operations made similar public revelations from the British Embassy in Istanbul in his farewell speech. 9 He has been a staunch supporter of autocratic Turkish president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, including backing him over the 2016 (false flag) coup.

Moore has also acknowledged that the relationship that had begun with al-Sharaa in May 2023 opened the door to the UK being able “to return to the country within weeks” of al-Sharaa seizing power: He did not refer to Powell or Inter Mediate, although sources said Powell’s organisation effectively functioned as an unofficial branch of the UK intelligence services in Damascus. 10

Wikileaks had revealed that Powell had spoken with Hillary Clinton’s office as early as 2012 over his ‘starting work in Syria’ operating closely with the UK Foreign Office and MI6. Her campaign advisor, Sid Blumenthal emailed her saying Powell had ‘initiated some very interesting work below the radar.’ Powell’s email, reproduced for her, added:

‘We work closely with FCO, NSC and SIS in London but this is our first visit to the US to talk about what we do. I have a meeting with Bill Burns, an old friend, but would be grateful for guidance on who else I should see in DC and in New York. I will be in Washington from 18 to 21 March and then in New York from 21-23 March. I will be accompanied by my deputy, Arabella Phillimore, ex UN and ex FCO (Afghanistan).

These manoeuvres so early into the Syrian conflict confirm Bashar al-Assad’s claim that foreign forces were trying to take over his country.

The Wikipedia leaks emails then revealed that visiting Washington the same year, Powell met Hillary Clinton, her deputy secretary, Bill Burns, (who later became director of the CIA), and her adviser Jake Sullivan, who later served as Joe Biden’s national security adviser. He is remembered for his famous 2012 claim that ‘Al Qaeda is on our side in Syria.’

Powell and the plotted demise of the PKK and PYD – A boost to the KDP

Jonathan Powell remains in office as the Labour government’s National Security Advisor (although speaking of imminent departure on health grounds). He was also fielded to engage the PKK and PYD on their disarmament in favour of Erdoğan’s ‘terror Free’ Turkey policy that nowhere uses the word ‘Kurd.’ 12 Powell is said by Al Majalla to have been in Istanbul when PKK captive leader, Abdullah Öcalan spoke at a state organised news conference to declare that the PKK was to lay down its arms.13

The National reported that “working with the UK-based think tank Democratic Progress Institute, Powell and his team developed a program drawing on lessons from Northern Ireland.

The team briefed MPs from the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP). An unnamed source said that “The American thinking was that one day there would be a withdrawal from Syria. When that day came, they did not want the Kurds in Syria to enter into conflict with Turkey. They wanted to prepare the ground for that.” 14

The Biden administration had reportedly reached out to Erdoğan to propose a deal with the PYD which then extended into a so-called wider ‘peace’ process. The UK became involved in these talks, and Powell’s company, Inter Mediate, also had long-standing contact with the PYD as well as Turkey under a state assignment dating back to 2017, and with the Turkish Kurds in focus with Erdoğan’s 2013 peace posturing.

Kurdish and Turkish MPs had travelled to the UK and Ireland that year looking at ways of resolving the long running Kurdish problem. It was not sincere on either the UK or Erdoğan’s ‘ part but aimed at ending Kurdish opposition to Turkification historically posited as ‘integration.’

According to the Kurdish “authorities” running Iraqi Kurdistan via the enduring duopoly, “Powell reaffirmed London’s commitment to supporting Iraq and the Kurdistan Region, praising the Region’s role in promoting peace and stability. The statement noted that the meeting underscored shared priorities in strengthening cooperation and addressing common security concerns.”

Wither headed?

In his most recent position as two UK Labour Party PMs, National Security Advisor, (successively to Keir Starmer), and Tony Blair’s decade-long Chief of Staff, Powell had to step down from Inter Mediate that he had co-founded with Martin Griffiths – the former UN Special Envoy to Yemen and UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator until 2024 when al-Sharaa was helped to power.

Afrique-Asie in a French translation of a Vanessa Beeley article spoke critically of the role Jonathan Powell and Inter Mediate had played also claiming that his NGO benefited from GBP 4 million funding from the UK Foreign Office between 2011-2020. 15 The White Helmets also benefitted and continues to benefit from massive funding in the name of relief and training etc. while its deeper political role was masked.

Inter Mediate remains in the Presidential Palace with Ahmed al-Sharaa

Just four days before al-Sharaa seized power, Claire Hajaj was appointed as Inter Mediate’s new executive director. She has a background in the UN Security Council’s Counter Terrorism Committee from the period leading up to the war against Iraq. Haaj then worked with the UN Special Representative for Iraq following the US invasion during the peak of the violent backlash by various resistance forces the occupying parties chose ever to denigrate as an ‘insurgency’. It was in fact a legitimate response by Iraqis to the war unleashed upon them.

Long term projects director in Inter Mediate’s Damascus setting is someone named Lucy Stuart, credited by her organisation as speaking Arabic and Farsi. 16 She is reported to be advising another former US-designated terrorist, Asaad Hassan al-Shibani – a co-founder of al-Nusra.

Stuart is said to have written for Al Arabiya’s London bureau during the Syrian conflict, but I could only find one article with her name to it on search engines. That article is entirely based on citations from an Amnesty International report accusing the Assad government of severe human rights abuses back in July 2011. 17 The final citation from their report reads: “However, Mr. Luther concludes that despite President Bashar Al Assad’s talk of reform, there is little evidence so far that the Syrian authorities will respond to anything but concrete international measures.”

Lucy Stuart is now dubiously credited with coaching al-Shibani for his meeting with Tony Blair at Davos of January 22, 2025. See the Tony Blair Institute for Global Change video.

Foreign fingers

Accounts filed for Inter Mediate with the Charity Commission in 2025 reveal that its assets rose to £1,625,316 from £668,745 the previous year. The number of its employees increased dramatically from two to 13 people, and it had adopted an investment plan of up to £1.75 million over five years exceeding its fundraising targets. It had profited from a “greater commitment from the [Foreign Office] through a new partnership agreement with the Office of Conflict and Stabilisation.” 18

Jonathan Powell’s elder brother is none other than Lord Charles Powell, a former Conservative and administrator of the Said Foundation established by British-Syrian national, Wafic Said. Said soon travelled to the seat of al-Jolani once he seated himself in the Presidential Palace in Damascus.

Hamish de Bretton-Gordon, a former British Army officer and an expert on bio-chemical weapons was also immediately seen to be present in Damascus after the seizure of power by HTS. He visited the new Ministry of Health and further promoted the role of the White Helmets ‘incubated’ by MI6 and the CIA. He wrote glowingly of the new regime for the Telegraph.

Al Sharaa is now ‘the President’, not an interim president, fully endorsed by those that helped put him there. “ The Syrian president was in London this week, and he is an example of how regime change should happen: from within, but with just enough external support to tip the balance.

According to Russia Today, I had a hand in Assad’s downfall. That’s nonsense, of course. If I did play even a small role, I’d take quiet satisfaction in it. But the truth is, the fall of Assad was the work of Syrians themselves, groups like the White Helmets, the Idlib Health Directorate, and countless other ordinary citizens who laid the groundwork for change over many brutal years…” 19

Underlining is my emphasis.

Ordinary Syrians? Well!

Emerald Solutions is also named by anti-establishment reporter, Vanessa Beeley as yet another British military/mercenary group backing al-Sharaa in the ‘new’ Syria.

In October 2025, Declassifed UK, another investigative news website revealed how: “Keir Starmer’s special representative to Syria, Ann Snow, met defence minister Murhaf Abu Qasra in Damascus. This followed a meeting between Qasra and Britain’s chief military adviser in the Middle East, Vice Admiral Edward Ahlgren, in July:

“The meetings indicate the UK is deepening relations with Syrian military forces that took power in Damascus in December last year, overthrowing the regime of Bashar Assad which had ruled since 2000. Snow posted that her meeting with Qasra was “to exchange views on the Syrian army’s internal reform and restructuring and the evolving security situation including in the north east and Sweida.” 20

Human Rights Watch – A Counter View of the new regime

Despite all the gloss, a Human Rights Watch report dated September 23, 2025 headed, “Are you Alawi?” Identity-based Killings during Syria’s Transition documented how just two weeks before Snow’s visit: “government forces, comprising Defense and Interior Ministry units, alongside government-aligned armed groups and armed volunteers swept through Alawi-majority neighborhoods, towns, and villages in Tartous, Latakia, and Hama governorates leaving behind torched homes, piled bodies, mass graves, and broken communities.

The answer to one question repeated during methodical house-to-house raids and before brutal executions often determined whether you lived or died: “Are you Alawi?”…Interviews with fighters and volunteers reveal that men unaffiliated with the security forces were actively recruited, armed, organized, and deployed alongside formal units by Defense Ministry representatives… Efforts to vet fighters and commanders lagged, allowing previously unaccountable units to rebrand as state forces and act with impunity. 21

Last laugh

British, American, French, German, Turkish and Iraqi Kurdish leaders have all shaken hands with the jihadist leader whose philosophy is expressed in Islamist utterances at street level they calmly choose to ignore.

Posters and messages discriminate between fundamentalist Muslims and the ‘infidels.’

For example, a recent decision issued by the Municipality of Douma prohibits the entry of a groom to the hall where the females are celebrating the wedding under a legal penalty of accountability/guilt. The bride must only celebrate with women and the groom elsewhere with men.

The Brothers are laughing up their sleeves.

The post Stealing Syria: The Dirty Hands of British Infiltration appeared first on iKurd News.

Dr. Kamal Sido | Exclusive to iKurd.net
Middle East expert at the Society for Threatened Peoples (GfbV).

In early June 2026, as U.S. attacks against Iran were underway, U.S. President Trump—as always—sought a way out of the dilemma of how to end his war against Iran, which violated international law, and declared himself the victor.

For none of the promises he had made at the start of the U.S.-Israeli war on February 28, 2026, had been fulfilled by this brutal war. Above all, the criminal Iranian regime was still in power. At the time, Trump spoke of regime change. To justify the disaster and his failure, Trump tried to shift the blame onto others, including the Kurds.

About 12 million Kurds live in Iran, accounting for about 10 to 15% of the 93 million Iranian population. Many in the U.S. and Israel assumed that an active role by the Kurds in Iran—especially their armed forces—could help the U.S. and Israel topple the regime in Iran.

In this context, comparisons were drawn with the Kurds’ struggle against Saddam Hussein in Iraq—who was overthrown in 2003 with the help of the Kurds—or with the fight against Assad and the “Islamic State” (IS) in Syria.

In Syria, the Kurds were supported against both ISIS and Assad until 2024, when that support was cut off. However, since the Kurds in Iraq and Syria have had bitter experiences with U.S. policy—they were always abandoned at the crucial moment and subjected to massacres by Iraq, Turkey, or Syria—the promised U.S. aid either failed to materialize or arrived too late.

For this reason, the Kurds in Iran did not want to react hastily and demanded guarantees from the U.S. that it was genuinely interested in regime change and democratization in Iran. The Kurds made their active role against the regime contingent on these guarantees. President Trump omitted all of this in his statement. He claims that the Kurds received weapons from the U.S. but kept them for themselves and did not use them against the regime in Tehran.

Did the Kurds steal U.S. weapons?

Trump stated verbatim: “We sent weapons to the Kurds. (…) The Kurds let us down. I didn’t agree with that decision. I said, ‘No, I don’t think they’ll pass them on. I think they kept them for themselves.’” “I think that’s a shame. But I’ll remember that, you Kurds, I’ll remember that.” (thenewregion.com, June 11, 2026).

It is well known that Trump repeatedly seizes on fake news to advance his political agenda or justify his failures. But his accusation that the Kurds had “stolen” the weapons was new. No one in either the U.S. or Israel could prove that the Kurds in Iran had received weapons from the U.S.

Rather, there were indications that the Trump administration had betrayed joint plans between the Kurds, Israel, and the U.S. to Turkish President Erdogan. The international press has reported on this extensively. (libnanews.com, June 7, 2026)

Whether or not the U.S. betrayed the plans is irrelevant here. In any case, there is no evidence to support Trump’s claim that the Kurds stole U.S. weapons.

Such spectacular statements from Trump are nothing new when it comes to the Kurds. In 2019, when Trump ordered the withdrawal of U.S. troops from parts of northern Syria that had been fighting alongside the Kurds against ISIS, thereby leaving the Kurds defenseless against attacks by both ISIS and Turkey, Trump attempted to justify his misguided decision—which had drawn widespread criticism in the U.S.—by claiming that the Kurds had provided no assistance to the U.S. during World War II. (The Guardian, October 9)

This claim by Trump was also false. Kurds were very actively involved in the fight against Nazi Germany in various countries. My father was among them. When Trump accused the Kurds of not having supported the U.S. in the war against Hitler’s Germany, I responded to his claim on social media.

In doing so, I jokingly pointed out my father’s involvement in World War II. Incidentally, Trump should have known that the Kurds did not have their own state back then—just as they do not today—and therefore could not actively participate in international affairs as a state actor.

My Father in World War II

How did my father come to be involved in this war? After World War I, the Middle East was divided between the French and the British. The Kurds in Syria—including those in Afrin in the northwest of the country—found themselves within a territory that was henceforth known as Syria. This area became a French colony. My father was born in 1916, right in the midst of World War I, when the secret partition of the Middle East between Great Britain and France took place. Born.

When World War II began in 1939, he was 23 years old. As a young man, he joined the Syrian units of the French Army stationed in Syria. From that point on, he was a member of the French military in Syria. When German troops occupied Paris and large parts of France on June 14, 1940, and the so-called Vichy government was formed in southern France, British troops marched into Syria from Iraq and Jordan in June and July to prevent Nazi Germany from using the territory of Syria controlled by Vichy France.

As a result, Syria effectively came under British rule, and the existing military units became part of the British military. Thus, from that point on, my father was also a British soldier. He later became a member of an auxiliary unit of the 8th British Army.

My Father and the Desert Fox

The British 8th Army was a legendary unit of the British Army during World War II. As a multinational and multiethnic Commonwealth force in North Africa, it played a decisive role in the liberation of Europe and the defeat of Nazi Germany. The story of my father (1916–2000) is well known throughout our village in Afrin. As a result, I was exposed to stories from World War II even as a child. In my father’s conversations and stories, terms like “Desert War,” “Desert Fox,” Erwin Rommel, Bernard Montgomery, and El Alamein came up time and again.

The term “Desert War” primarily refers to the war against the German Afrika Korps, led by General Erwin Rommel (1891–1944), in North Africa—specifically in what is now Egypt and Libya. German General Rommel became known as the “Desert Fox” because he repeatedly eluded the British and successfully held his own against British General Bernard Montgomery (1887–1976).

El Alamein is a town in Egypt where, in November 1942, a decisive battle of World War II took place between the German-Italian African Panzer Army under the command of Field Marshal Erwin Rommel and the British 8th Army under the command of Lieutenant General Bernard Montgomery.

In November 1942, a decisive battle of World War II took place near El Alamein between the German-Italian Afrika Panzer Army under the command of Field Marshal Erwin Rommel and the British 8th Army under the command of Lieutenant General Bernard Montgomery.

When the British 8th Army, in which my father was fighting, was preparing its advance in Italy in the summer of 1943, the High Command gave the members of the auxiliary forces a choice: either they would continue on to Europe, or they would remain in North Africa and return to their home countries later. My father decided against continuing on to Sicily, Italy, Europe, and Germany.

And so it happened that in 1945 he missed the opportunity to come to Germany. It wasn’t until 1991 that he came to Germany—not as a British soldier, but to visit his son, whom he hadn’t seen in ten years and who had found refuge in Germany a year earlier. At the time, we were living in Marburg, where we happened to meet a member of the German Africa Corps who struck up a conversation with my father.

Kurds in the Red Army

The largest group of Kurds who actively participated in World War II came primarily from the former Soviet Union.

During World War II, thousands of Soviet Kurds, Muslims, and Yazidis—primarily from the republics of Armenia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan—fought in the Red Army against Nazi Germany. Figures such as the Kurdish-Yazidi commander Samand Siabandov (1909–1989) were awarded the title “Hero of the Soviet Union.”

Like many other ethnic groups, the Kurds also suffered under Stalin in the 1930s. Many of them, especially Muslim Kurds, were deported from their homeland in the South Caucasus to Central Asia, specifically to the republics of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. These Kurds, too, fought against Nazi Germany after Hitler’s invasion of the USSR and advanced as far as Berlin.

A number of publications have been written about the role of the Kurds in World War II. These are available not only in Russian but also in English. (kulturnistudia.cz/, 2-2023)

Trump should have known all of this before he spread his fake news. Politicians—especially those who play a major role in world politics—should also seek advice from experts, particularly when it comes to history and the past. After all: “Those who do not know history are doomed to repeat the mistakes of the past.”

Dr. Kamal Sido, a prominent Syrian Kurdish intellectual. He is a Middle East Consultant for ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities at the German Society for Threatened Peoples (STP).

The article was published in “Vielfalt,” the journal of the Society for Threatened Peoples, in German, in 2026, Issue 3.

The opinions are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent the views of iKurd.net or its editors.

Copyright © 2026 iKurd.net. All rights reserved.

The post Trump, My Father, and the Kurds appeared first on iKurd News.

Sacrificing the Kurds: How the West Traded Heroic Anti-ISIS Allies for Political Convenience

Nick Kossovan | iKurd.net

In March 2019, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) raised their flag over the rubble of Baghouz, marking a symbolic victory that Western capitals hailed as the collapse of the Islamic State’s terror regime.

Yet behind the glossy press releases, the truth about those who endured and those who lost their lives in the 2014–2019 conflict remained hidden.

It wasn’t American or European boots on the ground sweeping through the desert dust. It was young Kurdish women and men, fighting alongside local Syriac Christians, Assyrians, and Sunni Arab tribesmen, doing the brutal, door-to-door groundwork Western armies simply lacked the stomach to execute themselves.

The price of that victory, which gave the West a semblance of security, was that more than 11,000 Kurdish and allied fighters lost their lives fighting ISIS, sacrificing themselves to protect the so-called “free world” only to be abandoned in the desert.

Western countries, including Washington and European nations, shifted responsibility for detaining tens of thousands of hardened jihadist prisoners to the Kurds because they lacked the political resolve to repatriate their own radicalized citizens. This arrangement exemplifies Western hypocrisy: let the Kurds bleed for Western security today, then turn a blind eye when regional enemies come for them tomorrow.

Fast-forward to August 2026, and that blood-bought self-governance in Rojava—the autonomous, democratic sanctuary carved out of war-torn northern Syria—has been systematically dismantled. Formally governed by the Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (DAANES), a decentralized, secular administrative framework that explicitly prioritized women’s leadership, multi-ethnic pluralism, and local self-determination, the region no longer exists.

Trapped in a vice grip between relentless foreign air strikes, aggressive demands from Damascus, and backroom arm-twisting by Western diplomats, DAANES was officially dissolved. Self-defence forces were disarmed, and its institutions were absorbed into the Syrian central government.

This forced surrender exposes a callous, recurring pattern in Western foreign policy. As Washington recruited and then abandoned Hmong fighters in Laos, using them as shields during the Cold War, Western nations continue to repeat the same ‘throw them back to the wolves’ approach in the Middle East.

When Western nations need a dirty job done, they deem secular, heroic partners indispensable. But when the threat recedes, those same allies become an inconvenience, prompting Western diplomats to quickly negotiate with whichever rebranded regime promises central control.

Blood Equity and the Disposable Alliance

The Western-SDF alliance was always an asymmetric marriage of convenience. When ISIS swept across Iraq and Syria, capturing Mosul, threatening Western interests, and destabilizing NATO’s doorstep, Washington urgently needed a reliable local force with real grit on the ground.

The Kurds answered the call. They fought block by bloody block through Kobanî, Raqqa, and Dêrazor, all while building a pioneering governance model grounded in direct democracy, gender equality, and secular pluralism. Yet as the immediate threat from ISIS receded, Western priorities shifted back to calculated self-interest.

The abandonment was gradual, not sudden. In 2018, Turkey, a NATO ally, invaded Afrin, a Kurdish-controlled region, forcing hundreds of thousands of civilians to flee to make way for extremist proxies. By October 2019, President Donald Trump abruptly ordered U.S. troops to withdraw after a single phone call with Turkish President Erdoğan. Trump claimed the withdrawal was to end an ‘endless war’ and save money, but he knowingly green-lighted Turkey to attack local ground partners of the U.S. and the Western coalition.

By late 2026, Western envoys had stopped standing by as Rojava’s autonomous institutions were dismantled to appease central state authorities and regional powers. The core message: Kurdish blood was essential to crushing terrorists, but Kurdish self-governance was a diplomatic inconvenience.

The Rebranding of Extreme Ideology

Perhaps the most troubling aspect of this geopolitical realignment is how quickly Western capitals embraced rebranded warlords, to the detriment of their secular allies.

At the centre of this whitewashing campaign are figures such as Ahmad al-Sharaa. Under his former nom de guerre, Abu Mohammad al-Julani, al-Sharaa led Jabhat al-Nusra—al-Qaeda’s official Syrian franchise—and later commanded Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), an armed group forged in the same ideological furnace as ISIS.

That Western power brokers now court former extremist commanders simply because they traded battle fatigues for tailored suits reveals a glaring double standard: radicalism isn’t the deal-breaker in Western foreign policy; disobedience is.

Washington’s quick willingness to lift terror designations and warmly welcome former warlords highlights a recurring hypocrisy. Changing appearance—trimming beards, wearing Western suits, and using diplomatic language—doesn’t erase a person’s core ideology. Yet Western diplomats eagerly accept these surface-level makeovers in the name of centralized order, while demanding total capitulation from the Kurdish forces who spent a decade taking bullets to stop those same extremists.

Paper Concessions Versus Structural Autonomy

Western rationalizers highlight symbolic gestures from Damascus, such as formal acknowledgment of Kurdish language rights, restored citizenship, and official decrees marking Newroz. But these paper concessions are an insultingly cheap trade. Ink on parchment in Damascus doesn’t compensate for the deliberate destruction of living, self-governing institutions, nor does it shield a population when political winds shift, as they inevitably will.

In a centralized security state, language rights and cultural crumbs granted by decree don’t ensure physical security. Without independent military capabilities or enforceable federal structures under DAANES, regional minorities, including Kurds, Christians, Druze, and Alawites, are left entirely defenceless against state reprisal and violence from local militias. Liquidating the SDF didn’t bring stability; it destroyed the only credible check on centralized dictatorship in northern Syria.

The Broader Precedent

What happened to Rojava and DAANES in August 2026 transcends regional borders; it’s a repeated warning to any future ally naive enough to trust Western promises. By abandoning the very people who crushed ISIS to satisfy the immediate whims of Middle Eastern authoritarian warlords, Western leaders are sending a message to freedom fighters everywhere that shouldn’t be ignored: dying for Western security earns warm gratitude while the bullets are flying, but those fighters are disposable once the smoke clears.

Rojava’s destruction underscores the need to challenge the superficial morality of Western diplomacy. Sustainable regional stability cannot come at the cost of sacrificing vibrant, pluralistic democracies to appease autocrats. By trading away the DAANES secular experiment for short-term political gains, Western leaders didn’t secure peace; they merely demonstrated the lethal price local allies pay when Western commitments are treated as disposable currency.

Nick Kossovan, a self-described connoisseur of human psychology, writes about what’s on his mind from Toronto. You can follow Nick on Twitter and Instagram @NKossovan. He is an occasional contributing writer for iKurd.net.

The opinions are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent the views of iKurd.net or its editors.

Copyright © 2026 iKurd.net. All rights reserved

The post Sacrificing the Kurds, the West abandoned its anti-ISIS allies for politics appeared first on iKurd News.

The Rape Of Raqqa: How The City Became The Capital Of ISIS In Al Sham (The Levant).

Sheri Laizer | Exclusive to iKurd.net

One would do well to ask what the fight against ISIS was ultimately for and how much it cost in blood as well as economically – for it to be surrendered to Ahmed al-Sharaa’s Salafists anew.

Sheri Laizer, September 28, 2026

Introduction

This analysis is not intended to be exhaustive but to provide an overall digest focused on Raqqa’s suffering since the Arab Spring began to ignite in Syria on March 15, 2011.

With the passing of time, it is too easy to overlook and/or forget key developments from the period in question and view them instead through the distorted lens of hindsight. By the time the ‘Arab Spring’ touched Syria, it had gathered enormous popular momentum as a springboard for the overthrow of potentates too long in power that had failed to deliver on promises of change.

Demands of demonstrators focused on decentralisation, revenue sharing, democratic openings, human rights and societal benefits beyond the privileges enjoyed by the ruling establishment and the structures of governance largely dependent on patronage, and nepotism.

At the outset of the Arab Spring in Syria, the demands were much the same, but the movement was swiftly infiltrated and then overtaken by Islamic extremists. Their goal was the establishment of an Islamic state and the imposition of Sharia law, not a civil state. The call to jihad was not a beckoning to help create any kind or liberal democracy or achieve social equalities. It aimed at the overthrow of the secular order.

Syria had been secular throughout the Assad dynasty. Even the fierce crushing of the 1980s rebellions in Homs and Hama had been about ensuring the Muslim Brotherhood did not gain traction as it was doing in Egypt – its erstwhile partner in the short-lived United Arab Republic (UAR – February 22, 1958- September 28, 1961).

Egypt had been sliding into Islamic terrorism under the Muslim Brotherhood in the early 1980s threatening its tourism-based economy. The revolt in Hama of February 2, 1983, was launched by the Muslim Brotherhood in the Sunni majority city. Brotherhood commandos attacked Ba’ath government institutions, party offices and military personnel. The army fought the Brothers for almost three weeks leaving much of the town destroyed and between 10,000 – 40,000 people killed and disappeared.

The rebellion was put down with extreme force and the secular government then carried on as before. Although now, the Assad dynast is too often referred to as ‘Alawite’, religion and sect were not prevailing influences. Bashar al-Assad was highly educated, Westernised, and married to Asma Fawaz al-Assad, of Sunni origin but born to professional Syrians, her father a diplomat and her mother a cardiologist, living in London. Their children’s upbringing was secular and academic.

Bashar had come to power unwillingly in the year 2000. His late brother, Basel, had been groomed for the role but had been killed when his fast car wrapped itself around a tree in January 1994. Political billboards before his death had shown Hafez al-Assad flanked by his two eldest sons.

At the time of Basel’s demise, Bashar was training as an ophthalmologist in London whereas his brother was part of the security apparatus running the country. When Bashar was named successor, he brought optimism over technological reform and a short-lived Damascus Spring ensued, long forgotten ever since as the promises withered like blossom in the heat of the sun.

Basel would most likely have maintained military power. So too, their youngest brother, Maher, already part of the military. The least politically involved brother, Majd, was never part of state or military affairs, and their sister, Bushra, a trained pharmacist was married off to the former Chief of Staff in the consolidation of family power. That said, no member of the ruling elite exhibited any religious sympathies in public. Religion and state were kept separate, and faith remained a private matter.

The Arab Spring was swiftly hijacked by religious extremists taking advantage of the popular momentum for democratic change. Democratic values are being trampled underfoot by the ‘new’ regime.

Raqqa

Syria’s 6^th largest city, Raqqa, was a bustling place that sits astride the Euphrates River, some 80 km south of the Turkish border. Turkish acquiescence in the filtration of would-be jihadists throughout the conflict played a highly significant role in the territorial gains ISIS (and other jihadist groups) enjoyed at the time.

In November 2011, eight months into the wider revolt, Bashar al-Assad had paid a comfortable visit to Raqqa and received the support of the sheikhs from the 14 major clans who were paid handsomely. However, that support eroded soon after the militias moved into the city who also paid the Sheikhs for support. An article written retrospectively recalled the previous warnings:

Assad led the Eid prayer, then listened to a sermon by Sheikh Abdul Azim Shekho at Raqqa’s Rehab al-Nour mosque. Shekho delivered a political sermon exhorting Assad and the people of Syria to resist the same international intervention that had “destroyed” Iraq, “burned” Libya, and split Sudan into two states. He then turned to Assad: “The secret is to go forward with all the people behind you,” he urged. “God will guide your footsteps.”¹⁰ Shekho, a Sufi, would be murdered by ISIS in Raqqa two and a half years after those remarks…¹

Raqqa city lies on both banks of the river. It had been a Hellenistic, Roman, then Byzantian city before becoming the capital of the Abbasid Caliphate under Harun al-Rashid between 796 and 809 CE after he moved the capital from Baghdad in 796. It developed from a twin city, Rafiqa.

Their strength largely arose through Raqqa’s proximity to the Byzantine frontier. He cultivated strong relations with the rulers of the Byzantine Empire and Charlemagne’s Frankish empire yet still undertook military campaigns against Byzantium to secure the borders of the Caliphate and exert dominion across the region.²

The ancient walls of the Abbasid stronghold remained largely intact like surviving structures of the same period in Iraq. One of the Raqqa gates is named the Baghdad Gate – Bab al-Baghdad. The distance to Baghdad, the city of Harun al-Rashid is 858 km.

Raqqa had a population of over 220,000 people at the beginning of the new millennium according to the 2004 census. Although the majority belonged to Arab tribes from within a Sunni historical tradition, Turkmen, Kurds, Circassians and Christian Armenians also lived there as in other large cities in the Levant and Middle East. Numerous Armenians were descendants of the families that had fled Turkish genocide in 1915. The Arab Ujayli tribe exhibited great tolerance, and compassion towards them and supported their need for asylum.

The Assyrian Christians were also part of the diversity – a pluralism swiftly extinguished by the extremist ideology of the Islamist militias that rapidly imposed all manner of restraints and demanded taxes (jisya) from them. Their churches were vandalised or taken over to function as ISIS headquarters and prisons.

Western journalists were also kidnapped, ransomed, or tortured and several killed by the FSA, ISIS, Ahrar al-Sham and al-Nusra. In previous articles I have cited the testimony of Theo Padnos, an Arabic speaking American writer and reporter held and tortured by Al Sharaa and his men for almost two years, including a very harsh stint in the group’s Raqqa torture chambers.

Unlike other Western prisoners and hostages whose paths he crossed inside Syria, a ransom (for an undivulged figure) eventually secured his liberty from al-Nusra. Others were not so lucky. His account is delivered in harrowing detail in his book, Blindfold, published after his return to freedom.³

Kayla Mueller

American aid worker, Kayla Mueller, became the toy of al-Baghdadi as attested by her fellow hostages and even al-Baghdadi’s first wife, Umm Sayyaf, who claimed the rapes were love. In fact, Mueller had become just another sex slave. Al Bagdhadi’s widow was charged in Iraqi custody for her part in the crimes the group committed. Mueller had been kidnapped from Aleppo in August 2013 and was killed in captivity during airstrikes on Raqqa in February 2015.⁴ ISIS attributed the strike to Jordan, which naturally it rebutted.

The fall of Raqqa to jihadist groups

The city itself had first fallen on March 4, 2013, to armed anti-government forces that were increasingly being taken over by jihadist groups. Most of the Islamist fighters came from outside the area and originated from Hama and Idlib and were concentrated in the ranks of Ahrar al-Sham.⁶

The Turkish-backed misnomer Free Syrian Arm (FSA) and Jabhat al-Nusra under Abu Mohamed al-Jolani’s command also surged into the area, sometimes co-operating with each other, at other times seeking ultimate dominion. The democratic opposition was swiftly taken over by the jihadists. Al Nusra set up a Sharia court in the sports centre, flying its black banners.⁷

Al Nusra fighters clad in black patrolled the streets, smashed alcohol in two Christian owned shops and consigned the former governor to prison taking over the Governor’s Palace, and the city’s institutions.⁸ The radical Egyptian cleric, originally of Turkmen origin, Sheikh al-Dhahabi, (Hani Dahab) once an ISIS mufti, who now promotes Niqab for female students and employees, was brought in to preside over the court and lead Friday prayers under al-Nusra after defecting from ISIS. ⁹

A Telegraph report from May 12, 2013, once opined of al-Nusra:

Their new-found power is such that it is changing international calculations over the conflict. After first being discouraged from action by their presence in rebel ranks, Britain now has a revised diplomatic strategy.

David Cameron put it to Russia’s president Vladimir Putin on Friday and will discuss it this week with a nervous President Obama in Washington.

Mr Cameron’s officials now feel Jabhat al-Nusra has to be defeated by actively supporting the less militant rebels, including with arms. Many of Jabhat’s rival militias are being marginalised in cities like Raqqa across the north. On Tuesday, Britain will seek to have Jabhat al-Nusra added to an official list of sanctions at the United Nations.

In taking Raqqa two months ago al-Qaeda achieved its greatest coup in the war to date: it was the first provincial capital to fall outright to the rebels, and allowed Jabhat to assume a leadership role over a large swathe of north-eastern Syria, to the Iraqi border…

Part of it is money. Jabhat al-Nusra has always been well-funded compared to other militias – most people assume due to wealthy backers in the Gulf, though few have been able to track down the lines of the money supply…¹⁰

This is the man that was welcomed to the UK to address the government’s Chatham House think tank last year.

Radicalised rulership

After al-Nusra and Ahrar al-Sham formed a pragmatic alliance having gained military control of the city early in 2013, their fighters increasingly used the city’s resources for themselves paying local tribes for support just as the Assad dynasty had done. Some of the tribes had supported the government all through the opening of the civil war but the extremists imposed Sharia law by force and through fear but did little to help or protect the local people whose numbers swelled with incoming IDPs to as many as 800,000 people.¹¹

They seized control of the adjoining oilfields in Deir Ez Zour selling enough for cash.¹² They smuggled the town’s goods across to Turkey for profit, stripping the factories, recalled a witness to the Telegraph’s reporter, David Rose.¹³ Members of the Farouq Brigade (Liwa al-Farouq) from Homs were present along with the Lions of the Caliphate Battalion and Ahfad al-Rasoul, all in pursuit of an Islamic state.

The Farouq Brigade ran the border crossing gates with Turkey including at Tal Abyad. More than 70 groups operated across the country, several composed almost entirely of foreign fighters including Saudis, Chechens, Uzbeks, diverse north Africans and mixed brigades.¹⁴ On the government side, Hezbollah and the Iraqi Shi’a Resistance (Hashd and independent militia) groups were equally committed to victory within a Shi’a crescent alliance.

The jihadists had operated an aid and supplies corridor through the border crossing with Turkey at Tal Abyad. Turkey closed the border gate in 2014 from the Turkish side at Akçakale. The Turks had partially opened the border crossing at Tal Abyad in 2019 for access by government and military officials during military operations against both ISIS and the Kurdish fighters of the SDF/YPG as well as allowing some trade and goods across and access for funerals.¹⁵

ISIS seized Raqqa from Al-Sharaa’a Nusra Front before going on to take Mosul in Iraq. The government’s Al Tabqa military airbase lay just outside Raqqa.¹⁶ ISIS overran the base taking soldiers hostage, torturing and executing them despite their begging the government to negotiate their release.¹⁷

Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi reclaims the caliphate of Harun al-Rashid

In November 2014, Jabhat al-Nusra’s base and prisons were finally taken over by rival extremists loyal to ISIS and al-Nusra and the smaller groups driven out. The earlier alliance entirely fragmented.¹⁹

After sweeping across the border into Iraq from Syria and taking control of Mosul in June 2014 Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (²⁰ originally named Ibrahim Awad al-Badri from Samarra in Iraq) proclaimed the Caliphate of the Islamic State there but Raqqa was to become its new capital.

Raqqa was strategically and ideologically important to him. He saw himself as bringing about the renewal of the Caliphate recalling the Caliphate of Harun al-Rashid. He stayed there with his first wife, Umm Hudaifa in the summer of 2014. She later gave an account of the period when held prisoner in Iraq.²¹

Munitions and equipment seized in Mosul as the Iraqi Army fled without putting up a fight was then transported back into Raqqa and elsewhere across Syria. As early as July 2014 conditions had become extremely unstable with the violence exploited in the streets by militia commanders unchecked. By the end of the year Raqqa had become one of the most dangerous parts of Syria to live in.²²

US-led strikes on ISIS positions included Raqqa, peaking at the end of 2014 into early 2015. Living conditions rapidly deteriorated. Bread shortages soon began and overall power supply was inadequate. Raqqa was one of the main bread baskets of Syria, but ISIS lacked specialist managers and engineers able to run the city effectively. The group held on there until October 2017 but by that stage, the extremists had lost the support of the local population.

Overall, ISIS was perceived to have become detrimental to the revolution and did not represent local people. Crime rates and kidnapping had risen to new heights even when under the control of al-Nusra.

By 2017 many residential neighbourhoods of Raqqa had been destroyed in fighting. ISIS lost its seat in the autumn. The US-backed SDF then gained control after heavy fighting. It was reported that by then 80% of the city had been reduced to rubble.

The SDF declared complete liberation from ISIS which had held the city for the past three years. Mines and explosive devices had to be removed before locals could begin to return and assess the destruction to their homes and livelihoods. They had fled even as ISIS fighters surrendered to the YPG Kurdish forces. ISIS had run the stadium as a prison, the last bastion to be abandoned. See the ABC video of the destruction soon after liberation from ISIS:

While some Arab tribes and locals first supported ISIS in Raqqa, disenchantment swiftly set in over the militias’ excesses.

“We didn’t fight and protest Assad to then have these fanatics,” explained a secular activist, already aware of religious hardline militias. He continued, “one thing that keeps us activists hopeful is our society. Although Raqqa is a tribal area, people are open and tolerant. Even those who are a bit conservative, are very open-minded compared to Jabhat al-Nusrah or ISIS. So, our society will resist [their] imposed regime.”²³²³

The border crossing gate at Tal Abyad into Turkey wasn’t re-opened until 12 years later in May 2026 after the SDF had been obliged to surrender control to Al Sharaa’s forces.

Al Hol Internment Camp in al-Hasakeh Province

Al Hol lies about 170 km west of Raqqa as the crow flies but just 13 km from the Iraqi border and entry to the Yazidi area of Sinjar via the flashpoint town of Rabia. It was first established as a refugee camp for Iraqi refugees fleeing the turmoil of the 1990 Gulf War. It re-opened at the time of the US invasion of Iraq for the same purpose. Between 2016-2017 it received a new wave of Iraqi’s fleeing from ISIS and Shi’a militia revenge attacks in Nineveh governorate. ²⁴

In 2019 the camp was transformed into a holding tank for ISIS-allied families after the fall of Baghouz in SE Syria on March 23 of that year, at one point holding as many as 73,000 people. It was closed down in February 2026 after the Kurdish SDF forces were pressurised into giving up control of the camp along with the rest of Raqqa, Der ez-Zor and much of al-Hasakeh.

ISIS loyalists outside the camp engaged in battle leading to the escape of detainees when the site as left without guards in the change-over of responsibility. The New Arab cited official data from the camp that thousands of detainees escaped due to the sudden lack of surveillance.

The camp’s population had been 23,407 people the day before the government takeover, including 6,280 foreigners from more than 40 nationalities. The SDF said its forces had been “compelled” to withdraw from the camp. As they had already lost the support of many of their Arab fighters during the HTS take-over of the country, they were left without backing.²⁵

The second Trump administration had already abandoned them as during his first term in office, instead welcoming Ahmed al-Sharaa to the diplomatic fold as a ‘great new leader.’ The smaller Roj camp was located near Derik.

It contained suspects accused of links to jihadist groups, many of whom were foreign nationals. Derik provides access to the Semalka crossing leading across the river to Faysh Khabur in Iraqi Kurdistan. The river represents the border. It has long been the artery feeding arms, oil and US personnel back and forth between the two Kurdish-controlled regions.²⁶

A report published by the Emerald Expert Briefings of October 16, 2017, observed of Raqqa that:

“Some 80% of the city, which was the de facto capital of Islamic State (IS) until its capture by the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), was ruined in fighting and reconstruction efforts have been limited. With 90% of the governorate’s population of tribal origin, the Kurdish-dominated SDF relies on clientelist networks with tribal leaders, all Sunni Arab, to maintain order and garner support.”²⁷

The organisation also made predictions that largely held true until after regime change on December 7, 2024, as below:

Impacts

Local and regional actors will compete for tribal leaders’ loyalty, creating divisions within tribes and clans.

The SDF will retain the support of Raqqa-based tribal leaders.

Tribal leaders who have fled elsewhere will promote dissent in SDF areas of control.

Some youths who sympathise with IS’s cause will cause instability in Raqqa.²⁸

When Islamist militiamen who had gathered under the banner of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham descended on Hama from their stronghold northwest in Idlib in December 2024, locals old enough to remember the earlier slaughter feared a replay. Hama was Syria’s 4^th largest city. It fell swiftly in the end, but 13 long years into the internal conflict that had ravaged the entire country.

Rival Arab tribes and the creation of the Office of Tribes and Clans

The tribes – and there are many – remain very powerful locally. The truce agreement reached on January 18, 2026, under considerable duress between Al Sharaa’s regime and the SDF following violent clashes between their respective forces led to the withdrawal of the SDF from Raqqa and Deir ez-Zour provinces as well as their removal from control over Al Hol camp in al-Hasakeh, as detailed above.

Less publicised has been that this situation ostensibly arose because the Arab fighters in their brigades had largely defected to al-Sharaa. The Arab Center DC usefully analysed it thus:

Importantly, the region changed hands not because Syria’s newly established national army proved more capable, but because Arab tribes switched sides, defecting from SDF military structures and handing the region to the Damascus government on a golden platter. Yet control has not delivered inclusion. Arab tribes that helped the central authority regain control are now largely ruled by outsiders, and many feel that the capital benefits from the region’s natural resources without giving local people their fair share. In consequence, the same grievances about regional inequality that existed under Bashar al-Assad—and that contributed to Syria’s 2011 uprising—are now building up against the new government…

The relationship between this peripheral part of Syria and the capital has rarely been stable. Protesters in the region joined the 2011 uprising against the Assad regime; in 2014, when the Sheitat clan rose up against IS’s attempts to control the al-Omar oilfield, fighting killed as many as 1,000 people. In 2023-24, Ibrahim al-Hefl, one of the sheikhs of the Uqaydat tribe, led an insurgency against the SDF on the grounds that it was seizing the region’s oil while neglecting its people…

Damascus has seized the east, but so far has made no real effort to include it in governance. It rules the three eastern governorates through outsiders, draws on the region’s natural resources, and responds to protests with concessions rather than with inclusion. This relationship risks reproducing the same dynamic that existed between the center and the periphery under the Assad regime. Unless Damascus offers the east a real share of power and revenue, it will recreate the same grievances that led to earlier revolts in this region… ²⁹

In September 2025, Ahmed Al Sharaa established an “Office of Tribes and Clans” in September. Administration was put into the hands of his old combatant, Jihad Issa al-Sheikh, (Abu Ahmed Zakour) with three branches in Aleppo, Hama and Idlib.

France 24 noted: “Strategically placed alongside Aleppo’s Bureau of political affairs, the local branch of the Office of Tribes and Clans has moved into the former premises of the …Its task is to maintain the non-aggression pact between Syria’s former rebels and the Sunni militias that had previously backed the Assad regime, before switching sides during the lightening offensive… in November 2024. It was their change of allegiance that led to the fall of Aleppo, Syria’s economic capital, in just three days, hastening the end of Assad rule…”³⁰

The eastern provinces’ descent into Salafism anew

Sheikh al-Dhahabi proselytises extremist Islamic views anew, back where his voice once echoed in the name of ISIS.

Al-Sharaa’s former allies have been rewarded with positions and power.

According to the Asma Center’s research, immediately after Kurdish forces withdrew from northeastern Syria and al-Sharaa’s forces deployed in their place, numerous documents emerged showing (Egyptian cleric, Sheikh) al-Dhahabi’s preachers arriving in Raqqa and al-Hasakah alongside al-Sharaa’s soldiers, distributing Qur’an and hadith books, Islamic kits, and bags containing niqabs for local women.³¹ See, Niqab makes a comeback to Syria’s Universities.

A female ISIS member brigade, the Khansa Battalion, led by Saudi militant, Nada al-Qahtani, once paraded in Raqqa’s streets, all concealed in niqab and brandishing rifles.³²

One would do well to ask what the fight against ISIS was ultimately for and how much it cost in blood as well as economically? Equally, what has the Syrian uprising achieved and what has it lost? And, ultimately, are we seeing a Taliban-style clampdown on all manner of freedoms that Syrians had once taken for granted?

A recent poster edict hung in the streets of Damascus equates long hems on men’s trousers that fall below the ankle bone providing a ticket to hell.

The poster reads:

قال رسول الله ﷺ ما أسْفَلَ مِنَ الكَعْبَيْنِ
مِنَ الإِزَارِ فَفِي النَّارِ

“The Messenger of Allah ﷺ said:   ‘Whatever of the lower garment (Izār) is below the ankles is in the Fire.'”

The Hadith “Whatever of the lower garment is below the ankles is in the Fire” is an authentic (sahih) Hadith narrated by Imam al-Bukhari in Sahih al-Bukhari on the authority of Abu Hurairah (may Allah be pleased with him).

Brief Meaning of the Hadith

The lower garment (Izār): Refers to what is worn on the lower half of the body; trousers, robes, and pants are measured by the same rule.

The two ankles (Al-Ka’bayn): The two prominent bones at the joint connecting the lower leg and the foot.

Below the ankles: Whatever part of the clothing extends beyond the ankles and drags towards the ground.

Is in the Fire: A severe warning indicating the prohibition of Isbal (lengthening clothing below the ankles), signifying that the portion of the garment extending beyond the prescribed limit exposes the wearer to punishment in the Fire.

Backwards in time

Clearly such medieval religious pronouncements that the ‘new’ regime neither rejects nor prevents from being made public do not bode well for Syria’s present or future wellbeing. Raqqa was largely rebuilt when under SDF control through the AANES funding sources.

One source said to me, “Yes, the so-called Syrian Democratic Forces and its political front, the AANES tried to grain grassroots support by rebuilding it and prioritising Raqqa for any funding provided by NGOs originally were there for intelligence purposes. They compiled a report on the tribal organisation of Raqqa that detailed the location of each clan, its size, its leader and so on.

Raqqa, like all Syria, has become a victim of the new world order.

The new government has changed the name of a school named after Raqqa’s prominent novelist, Abd al-Salam Al-Ujayli (1918-2006) a fine and cultured man that the city had given birth to, a doctor, writer and political figure…” ³³

Now, it is back in the hands of the duplicitous sheikhs and, increasingly, it seems, the fundamentalists.

1 Asharq al-Awsat, January 6, 2014, Militant Groups Surveil Syrian Sufis
2 https://worldhistoryedu.com/abbasid-caliph-harun-al-rashid-life-reign-accomplishments/
3 https://ikurd.net/hostages-jihad-austin-tice-2025-08-29
4
5 “There was no word from the Jordanian government on whether its planes had struck Raqqa on Friday. But activists who monitor the Syrian conflict from inside the country said US-led coalition planes hit several targets on the edges and outskirts of Raqqa, in quick succession on Friday.” See more at https://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4623818,00.html
6 https://www.newamerica.org/insights/how-raqqa-became-capital-isis/revolutionary-rule-in-raqqa-march-2013-november-2013/
7 https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/10051207/Under-the-black-flag-of-al-Qaeda-the-Syrian-city-ruled-by-gangs-of-extremists.html
8 Ibid.
9 https://israel-alma.org/is-syria-returning-to-salafi-islam-the-sharia-campaign-of-the-isis-mufti/
10 www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/10051207/Under-the-black-flag-of-al-Qaeda-the-Syrian-city-ruled-by-gangs-of-extremists.html
11 http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2013/03/201334151942410812.html
12 Op. Cit. https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/10051207/Under-the-black-flag-of-al-Qaeda-the-Syrian-city-ruled-by-gangs-of-extremists.html
13 Ibid.
14 https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-25460397
15 https://www.institutkurde.org/en/info/latest/turkey-syria-border-gate-to-reopen-after-12-year-closure-15141/
16 https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/documentary/the-jihadist/
17 https://creativememory.org/chronology/al-tabqa-airbase-massacre/
18 https://www.courrierinternational.com/article/2014/11/10/le-tweet-qui-montre-que-le-calife-de-l-etat-islamique-est-blesse
19 https://www.eip.org/report-on-the-legacy-of-isis-rule-in-northeast-syria/raqqa/
20 https://jamestown.org/new-details-on-the-life-of-iraqs-abu-bakr-al-baghdadi/
21 https://www.bbc.com/afrique/articles/c255ge7j7n1o
22 https://www.newamerica.org/insights/how-raqqa-became-capital-isis/raqqa-isis-capital/
23 Ibid.
24 https://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/camp-profile-al-hol-al-hasakeh-governorate-syria-april-2017
25 https://thearabweekly.com/eu-alarmed-mass-escape-relatives-isis-members-syrian-camp
26 https://dearborn.org/preview/sudden-closure-of-the-faysh-khabour-semalka-crossing-between-the-regions-of-iraqi-kurdistan-and-the-sdf-29575
27 https://www.emerald.com/expert-briefings/article-abstract/doi/10.1108/OXAN-DB239205/471083/Rivals-will-use-tribes-to-destabilise-Syria-s?redirectedFrom=fulltext
28 Ibid.
29 https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/control-without-inclusion-eastern-syria-under-damascus/
30 https://www.france24.com/en/middle-east/20260115-syria-sunni-clans-hold-key-to-stability-ending-sectarian-strife-sharaa
31 https://israel-alma.org/is-syria-returning-to-salafi-islam-the-sharia-campaign-of-the-isis-mufti/#_ftn9
32 https://english.alarabiya.net/News/middle-east/2016/02/28/Baghdadi-appoints-ISIS-female-fighter-to-Syria-battalion
33 https://www.dappledthings.org/reviews/an-overlooked-syrian-writer

Sheri Laizer, a Middle East and North African expert specialist and well known commentator on the Kurdish issue. She is a senior contributing writer for iKurd.net. More about Sheri Laizer see below.

The post The Rape of Raqqa and How It Became the ISIS Capital appeared first on iKurd News.

QAMISHLO,— Syrian Kurds are seeking to preserve education in their mother tongue as Damascus restores authority over Syrian Kurdistan (Rojava Kurdistan) after years in which Kurdish regions governed themselves during years of war, Reuters reported.

The issue has emerged at the beginning of the first school year since Kurdish-majority areas were reintegrated into the Syrian state under agreements between Damascus and Kurdish-led authorities.

Pupils in Kurdish regions have protested against the introduction of a new Arabic-language curriculum.

The role of the Kurdish language is a sensitive matter for Kurds. It was banned in schools under the Assads, who promoted a Baathist ideology based on Arab nationalism, but the language expanded during years of Kurdish self-rule in northern Syria.

President Bashar al-Assad was ousted in 2024. Syria’s Kurds now face a changing situation after the state, under Islamist interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa, also known as Golani, took control of Kurdish-run regions in an offensive in January following the Kurds’ withdrawal.

Before Sharaa’s rise, Syrian Kurdistan was governed through a secular, decentralized system of self-administration that emphasized gender equality under the law, participatory and direct democracy, and a strong commitment to environmental sustainability.

That offensive opened the way for negotiations over merging their security and civilian institutions with the state, while Kurds sought to preserve as many of their gains as possible.

Before the school year began, the education ministry issued a decree recognizing Kurdish as a national language that could be offered in areas where Kurds make up a significant share of the population.

The measure met a longstanding Kurdish demand.

However, Kurds who have been educated largely in Kurdish since 2012 object because the decree limits Kurdish instruction to three class sessions each week.

It also allows geography, history, social studies and philosophy to be taught in Kurdish, while Kurdish officials said science and math would be taught in Arabic under the arrangements.

“I have studied Kurdish since the start of my schooling up through 11th grade, and now they are saying they will only allocate three class periods for Kurdish. This is unacceptable,” said Suzan Ali, 16.

“Half the curriculum in Kurdish and the other half in Arabic – we cannot study in Arabic.”

She said students should continue receiving their education in Kurdish because they had used the language throughout their schooling and needed to maintain that instruction through university.

Merva Amo, 18, said she had protested to demand “a return to the previous curriculum where all subjects were taught in Kurdish” and would continue demonstrating.

The education ministry did not respond to a request for comment.

Education Minister Mohammed Abdul Rahman Turko told parliament on Monday that there had been two views: one called for Kurdish to be studied alongside other subjects, while the other sought to have the entire curriculum translated into Kurdish.

“Translating the curriculum completely into Kurdish, frankly, it’s very difficult,” Turko said in excerpts of the session posted on social media by news outlet afrin now. “First, providing teachers for all specialties, and second, how is (the student) going to continue their university studies?”

A ‘good’ step but short of Kurdish hopes

Syria’s Kurds are part of an ethnic group that became stateless when the borders of the Middle East emerged from the collapse of the Ottoman Empire.

Kurdish groups took control of parts of northern Syria after 2011. They built an armed group that fought Islamic State alongside U.S. forces and established autonomy they had hoped to preserve.

Their position was weakened by the government offensive in January and as Washington urged them to integrate with Damascus. Negotiations since then have led to the dissolution of the Kurdish-led forces and their merger into the defense ministry.

Syrian Kurdish official Ilham Ahmad called the decree “a good initial step” but said it fell short of “the demands of our community”.

“We believe that all subjects should be taught in Kurdish – alongside English, Arabic and other languages – especially in these regions. It is essential for the Kurdish people to learn in their own language, though what we see now is nonetheless a step,” she told Reuters.

Ahmad said the constitution must protect the right to teach in Kurdish.

Syrian Kurds speak Kurmanji, a variety of Kurdish written in a Latin-based script. Kurdish belongs to the Indo-European language family and is distinct from Arabic.

Teacher urges transition period

Sharaa has pledged to protect minority rights and appointed General Mazloum Abdi, head of the dissolved Kurdish-led forces, as a presidential adviser.

Kurdish was taught secretly under Assad.

Teacher Mohamed Ahmed said he expected difficulties for pupils who had been taught only in Kurdish and called for “a transitional period of a year or two”.

“We hope things proceed smoothly and easily, and that the region’s situation is accepted, especially given the sensitivity surrounding these issues,” he said.

(With files from Reuters)

Copyright © 2026 iKurd.net. All rights reserved.

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Despoling the Goddess: Zenobia, the Empress of Palmyra (Tadmor) Symbolised a Waning Universality

Sheri Laizer | Exclusive to iKurd.net

Palmyra

Palmyra, so well-known for its near complete obliteration by ISIS in 2015 was once the seat of a 3rd century enlightened, if warlike empire. Its Empress bore the honorific name Septimia Zenobia Augusta, reflecting family loyalty to the Roman Severan dynasty.

Her Palmyrene name was Bat Zabbai or daughter of Zabbai in Aramaic. Historical opinion is divided over many aspects of her genealogy but reach a general consensus in that Zenobia probably had both Aramean and Arab ancestry. 1

When her husband, Ras (Lord) Odaenathus, a Romanized Arab, was murdered in 267 AD she automatically became regent. Odaenathus had become lord of the Palmyrene empire just seven years before after retaking the hub in 226 AD from the Sassanian Persians whose capital was situated in Ctesiphon across the Euphrates south of contemporary Baghdad.

A great battle to retake Palmyra was waged between the two forces in 263 AD, with the Romans ultimately victorious. The Sassanid monarch, Shapur 1, retreated to Ctesiphon from where Odaenathus’s pursuing forces were forced back.

Palmyra lay on the caravan route through the desert and Zenobia – who claimed Egyptian descent from Cleopatra as well as from Dido, Queen of Carthage (in contemporary Tunisia), ostensibly for political reasons in extending her realm by annexing parts of the Roman Empire, Judaea and Petra and as far as northern Egypt.

Palmyra remained the beating heart of her empire and was a site of culture, philosophy and learning. Her son, Vaballathus, at age ten was too young to rule. Thus, to consolidate her territory and his succession, Zenobia resumed minting coins with the Roman Emperor Aurelian’s profile and the title imperator on the obverse with her son Vaballathus’ face and the title of rex on the reverse.

This act is viewed by historians as her attempt to signify loyalty to Rome despite her military campaigns against various Roman provinces. “The numismatic evidence and papyri documents are all that remain of Aurelian’s response to Zenobia’s invasion of Egypt.” 2

However, sensing Roman weakness, in 272 AD, Zenobia changed the coin to omit Aurelian’s profile. Her son became ‘august’ and herself ‘augusta’ – Roman honorifics of the period.

Aurelian at last reacted to her machinations, defeating the Goths and then moving his army via Byzantium to pursue an invasion southward, fielding a second front from Egypt that Zenobia was unable to match. The two armies collided near Antioch, subject to Turkish annexation in 1939 as part of the province of Hatay, the city itself now known as Antakya.

Zenobia was then taken captive in 272 AD and conveyed as a trophy to Rome. Some sources claim she remarried a Roman senator and lived with him in a fine villa as would any high-born Roman woman. Other sourced claim she was executed by Aurelian after the victory parade more in keeping with Imperial Roman military and political character.

The Hatay Dispute

Hatay had been part of the the Ottoman sanjak of Alexandretta. It had fallen under the French mandate of Syria and Lebanon after the collapse of the Turkish Empire. Hatay was still included as part of Syria in the Treaty of Lausanne of 1923.

The Hatay Dispute became part of a wider French-Turkish dispute. Syrian Arabs still hold France responsible for giving way to Turkey fearing an invasion of the region by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk.

The Hatay State became the Hatay Republic and joined Turkey after a referendum claimed to have been rigged by the Turks given that 46% of the population was Arab, 39% were Turks/Turkmen, 11% Armenian and the remaining 4% Circassian, Kurdish and Jewish. 3

Zenobia Women’s Gathering

A mixed ethnic women’s group called The Zenobia Women’s gathering was founded in 2021 as part of the women’s movement in Raqqa, Tabqa, Manbij, Deir ez-Zor and flashpoints that were retaken from ISIS after much bloodshed, including that of female fighters.

After the conquest of the Assad government by Hay’at Tahir al-Sham (HTS) on December 7, 2024, women who had come together against ISIS felt the ground shifting afresh beneath their feet. Using the symbolism of Zenobia and her enlightened reign in Palmyra they released a statement a year after the transitional or interim government had been in power and massacres of minorities were undermining trust.

It read, “Syria will not be built by force or exclusion, but through dialogue, justice, and respect for the will of its people, and that women will remain the voice of wisdom and guardians of the country’s unity and peace.”4

Gathered under its banner were Kurdish, Circassian, Turkmen and Arab women recognising the shared goal of protecting women’s gains following from the defeat of ISIS and of the wider extremist Salafist jihad. They organised women’s centres to combat ‘honour’ killing, domestic violence, polygamy, and address challenging issues over divorce, inheritance rights and child marriage.

Ahmed al-Sharaa’s regime then retook control of Raqqa, Taqba and areas from where ISIS had been driven out.

Opponents of the Zenobia Women’s Organisation claim it is linked to the PKK. At the conference where the group had first announced itself early in June 2021, some 150 women representatives took part from the four SDF-controlled areas at that time, Tabqa, Raqqa, Deir ez-Zor and Manbij.

The Future Syria Party leader, general secretary, Siham Daoud, was present and the party was believed to be a sister of the JPG and the PKK female forces. PKK veteran general secretary, Abdullah Öcalan’s image was visible along with various banners of the PKK’s sister organisations. The Arabic, Kurdish and Syriac languages were all used in reports written for the media.

Ahmed al-Sharaa’s female appointees

The Zanobia group has since come to loggerheads with Ahmed al-Sharaa’a new regime. In the appointment of the new People’s Assembly members on Jul 1, 2026, Ahmed al-Sharaa included 22 women of a total of 210 members, 70 of whom were directly appointed by al-Sharaa himself citing presidential privilege and the right to name one third of his cabinet. The women included Fasla Yusuf from the Kurdish Democratic Unity Party who appeared in subtle Kurdish dress not exhibiting the Kurdish national colours of red, yellow and green.

Fasla Yusef had been her party’s secretary and was the past president of the Kurdish National Council (ENKS) that opposed the PYD (Democratic Union Party linked to the current ideology of Abdullah Öcalan). Yusuf had briefly been detained by the PYD for three weeks in 2017. 5

ENKS is in fact aligned with the KDP of Iraq led by the Barzanis. ENKS was first established on October 26, 2011, with the support of the KDP – and Turkey and in perpetuation of the shared goals of each in Syria.

The pro-SDF media organisation, ANHA, Hawar News Agency, accused ENKS of direct collaboration with the Turkish Intelligence Agency (MIT) and with KDP Intelligence (Parastin) claiming there had been meetings with MIT 16 times since 2016. 6 ENKS representatives continue to meet with Massoud Barzani, who claims to be stressing ‘Kurdish unity.’

Ahmed al-Sharaa also appointed Mervat (also spelled Marfat and Mirvet) Muhammed Subhi Toto (Toutou) who adopted niqab at the event. She comes from Idlib that was held under former HTS control. She had been married to the (deceased) leader/commander of Jaysh al-Fatah (Army of Conquest) code-named Abu Omar Saraqib and also Abu Hajar al-Homsi and Abou Khaled Lubnani (whose real name, is Osama Namoura). He had fought alongside Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in Iraq. 7 His wife taught in Idlib for thirteen years. 8

Osama Namoura was a co-founder of al-Sharaa’s Jabhat al-Nusra, the AQ brand first operating in Syria. He became general commander of its successor, Jabhat Fateh al-Sham and was killed in an air strike in September 2016 during a meeting of (regional) leaders in the village of Kafr Nahr, 15 km west of Aleppo. Jabhat al-Nusra had changed its name to Jabhat Fateh al-Sham in July 2016 when it split from Al Qaeda but perpetuated a similar ideology with a Syria-centric focus.

Several other senior jihadists were killed in the blast that targeted the hidden compound, with Namoura’s deputy commander, Abu Muslim al-Shami being wounded. The US denied involvement leading to speculation the strike was carried out either by Russian or Syrian government aircraft. Sources later stated it was unknown if al-Sharaa then going by his codename Abu Mohamed al-Jolani had been present. 9

The appointment of an Al Nusra former commander’s widow to his new cabinet sends a clear message. She was also the first women to ever wear niqab in the parliament as the extreme covering had been banned under the former government.

Al Sharaa appointed 15 of the 22 women directly such that only seven women were elected from the committees first established in 2025.

Mazloum Abdi and female commander, Newroz Ahmed, had also been welcomed to the People’s Palace. Newroz Ahmed chose to remain in military uniform.

https://www.facebook.com/reel/919269314112941

MEMRI (Middle East Media Research Institute) published a report in September 2026, called Islamization And Religious Radicalization In Syria Under The Al Sharaa Regime, one of the first recent publications to sound any warning notes about the new regime. It opens by stating,

“The new Syrian regime headed by President Ahmed al-Sharaa – formerly the leader of the Islamist organization, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) – is promoting religious radicalization and Islamization in Syria, despite its public statements about commitment to the rule of law, pluralism, and civil equality, and (sic) although it enjoys considerable foreign support, including from the U.S. and other Western countries…”11

MEMRI also observed that on August 24, 2026, the US removed Syria from the list of State Sponsors of Terrorism (SST) and announced the revocation of HTS’s status as a Specially Designed Global Terrorist (SDGT) along with its removal from the Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) list, which includes companies, organizations, and individuals identified as threats to the US, with the goal of promoting Syria’s national recovery. 12

MEMRI also noted: “Furthermore the US appears to be downplaying the severity of other extremist trends in Syria under the Al-Sharaa regime including the promotion of extremist ideology within the education system, which portrays jihadists and leaders of terrorist organizations as “heroes”; jihadist calls for action against Israel; the repression of women and restrictions on their freedoms; 13 persecution and incitement against minority groups in the country, and clear measures aimed at consolidating a dictatorial regime…” 14

Women’s rights

Syrian women – that include women from minority groups and religions – need to integrate their demands and vision to go beyond all-female groups, including sect-based groups and avowedly feminist organisations.

In my experience, separating women into self-representing groups like the Zenobia Women’s Organisation actually serve more than anything to keep women apart from men and achieving an integrated society. Such groups further divide society by gender instead of attaining a unified community in which persons are not primarily defined by their sex or sect.

Segregation ultimately serves Islamic fundamentalism and that is achieving great strides in Ahmed al-Sharaa’s Syria.

Sheri Laizer, a Middle East and North African expert specialist and well known commentator on the Kurdish issue. She is a senior contributing writer for iKurd.net. More about Sheri Laizer see below.

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Dr. Amir Sharifi | Exclusive to iKurd.net

A political revolution is occurring in Rojava in northeastern Syria after the integration and dissolution of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). A new generation of youth who have studied Kurdish for 12 years now face an official decree from the transitional Syrian government that Kurdish can only be taught for three hours.

The language practices have changed both aesthetically and ethically as waves of thousands of demonstrators at the beginning of the new academic year refuse to attend Arabic classes; the students sing the Kurdish national song “Oh, Enemy,” speaking of resilience, persistence, and resistance. They sing a familiar national song, composed by Younis Rauf in prison in 1938.

Social media images permeate as students, teachers, and parents congregate in front of schools, and thousands of demonstrators of various age groups in Qamishlo, Kobani, and Hasaka participate in rallies and refuse to attend classes. Kurdish was once banned, and speakers of the language would be imprisoned for using the language in Syria.

Now, more than 400,000 students who have learned Kurdish express new ways of being in the world. They share freely their ideas and dreams—a world that must reckon with the force of linguistic freedom. They want a radical change in their history to heritage and heritage to identity in Rojava (northeastern Syria).

A 10-year-old child, Noor Gohar from Qamishlo in Rojava, or Northeastern Kurdistan in Syria, captures the imagination of all in a Rudaw interview as she addresses a linguistic fact eloquently: “As a child, I reject the proposal; as Kurds, we come into this world, it is our right to learn, to use our own language, not only [for] special topics but all, not only one year but up to the university,”

“We have the right to study Kurdish. I hope that we learn in Kurdish and that Kurdish becomes an official language both in elementary [school] but in the whole Syria…. I love Kurdish as my family fostered in me the love of Kurdish. It is the language of my ancestors: Faqi Tayran’s and Mullah Jaziri’s poetry and mysticism, Mastura Ardalan’s poetry and history, Maryam Khan, the vocalist, Muhammad Arif, Jagar Khwin and Abdulla Pashew, poetry, and Jaladat Badr Khan, the linguist and creator of the modern Kurdish Latin alphabet.”

The revolution in Rojava is uplifting linguistically as a great many pupils and students in various cities, in opposition to the new decree of the Ministry of Education, refuse to attend the new academic year. They want Kurdish to be recognized constitutionally; they have indeed learned a new way of learning about their identity. They rise above linguistic abstractions and do things with their mother tongue; this is the first time that so many youths appreciate the beauty of their language in social actions.

Rosev, about 11 years old, a resident of Amudia near Qamishlo, sobs as she wipes her tears, reflecting on the implications of this decision: “If I had to go back and start learning Arabic from scratch, it would be incredibly hard—and I am not alone.

All my friends are going through the same thing; we have studied in Kurdish in Northern Syria (Rojava). I have a message for Kurdish officials in Rojava: we know these are difficult times, and we know sacrifices must be made—but we ask only one thing: do not let the Kurdish language be one of them….” An old man, Arshak Baram, argues this is the beginning of integration or forced assimilation.

A sign of linguistic revolution is also found among the youth in collaboration with their teachers in Zirkan, Hasaka, Kobani, and elsewhere. They want official recognition of Kurdish after rejecting the decision of the Ministry of Education.

In Hasaka, teachers held a sociocultural event where signs such as “Kurdish is our identity,” “Kurdish is our history,” “Language is our culture,” and “There is no life without language” were displayed and uttered.

The same process occurred in the city of Zirakan. Women’s Bakery was where the protests began, where participants held slogans such as “I want nothing but the Kurdish language” and “Education in your mother tongue is a legitimate right.” This event was reiterated by paying tribute to martyrs who gave their lives for the language and human rights of others.

According to Channel 8, which captures a vibrant rally and interviews with some of the demonstrators: “We want our school; we want our own teachers. I have studied Kurdish for 11 years. I have no objection to Arabic and English as foreign languages.” Another student stated: “We go out every day and are not leaving the streets. We demonstrate every day until we achieve the right to use our own language, until we get our rights as human beings.”

“We want to study our own language in an equal state. I am a Kurd and I cannot study Arabic. I do not understand Arabic. I do not. If an Arab were to study in Kurdish, would they do it? They could not.” Hamida Mohammed observed through Rudaw: “We laughed, played, and cried and joined school using our mother tongue; how did they change it to a foreign language overnight? The decision will never be implemented as we will not accept it.”

The Kurdish language rights revolution began a long time before UNESCO declared Cultural Diversity Day on February 21, 2001. Kurdish is spoken by 15% to 20% of the population in various areas in Rojava in Syria; it deserves to be enshrined in the constitution of the new Syria. The Kurdish youth, in their revolution, have discursively brought heritage to personal and communal levels; our world needs more equitable dynamics of both past and present, the present speaking of the past.

Our world needs linguistic equity, diversity, and equality as upheld in the UN. Mother-tongue education ensures this equity and inclusive development and empowers cultural and cognitive development. This is where a new vision is born, where the linguistic hegemony of dominant languages is seriously challenged by the speakers of those languages as well.

Demonstrators stress not only that Kurdish is a tool of communication and a foundational source of knowledge but also a component of historical identity, deep-seated in the cradle of civilization, where Jaladat Badirkhan used Latin characters to write Kurmanji in 1932. This is where history echoes an ancient memory and re-echoes the current revolution.

Dr Amir Sharifi, a lecturer at California State University, Department of Linguistics, Long Beach, and Co-Director of the Kurdish Human Rights Advocacy Group ( KHRAG), Los Angeles.

The opinions are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent the views of iKurd.net or its editors.

Copyright © 2026 iKurd.net. All rights reserved

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Dr. Kamal Sido | Exclusive to iKurd.net
A commentary by Dr. Kamal Sido, Middle East expert at the Society for Threatened Peoples (GfbV).

In mid-August 2026, the Kurdish-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) announced its dissolution. Their leader, General Mazlum Abdi—with whom I spoke at length during my last visit to Syria—reportedly became an advisor to the Islamist leader Al-Golani and the current Syrian ruler Al Sharaa.

Below, Dr. Kamal Sido of the GfbV comments on these and other developments.

The Disbandment of the SDF

The SDF had two options: Either they put up a fight, which would result in the complete destruction of the remaining Kurdish areas in Syria and the elimination of the Kurdish presence, or they surrender and the Kurds would be forced to lead a humiliating life without dignity, without freedom, and without full recognition of their language and culture. A life under Islamists offers no guarantees of freedom.

From a geopolitical perspective, Russia, the U.S., and Israel—which had or still have a presence in Syria—were not willing to protect the Kurds from the Syrian Islamists and their supporter, Turkey.

The SDF and other Kurds have made mistakes, which we have always pointed out in a timely manner. You can read all about it. The problem with the Kurds was, is, and will likely remain their inability and unwillingness to work together.

In particular, many blind followers of Barzani and Öcalan would rather fight each other in the service of Turkey than work together for the rights of the Kurds.

This was and remains the case in the dispute between the Barzanis and the Talabanis. Had the Kurds worked together, they would have had a better chance of improving their situation.

Öcalan is the founder of the now-dissolved Kurdistan Workers’ Party and has been imprisoned in Turkey since 1999.

The Barzanis and the Talabanis are two Kurdish families in Iraq who have been dividing the Kurdistan region among themselves for decades. All three groups have waged war against one another at various times, and their supporters in the Diaspora are also deeply at odds with one another.

Israel’s Stance

I am well aware of Israel’s stance. I have been visiting Israel regularly since 2013 and have met with many officials there. They said, “We can’t do anything for the Kurds. All we can do is talk to the U.S. and say, ‘Don’t let the Kurds down!'” To that, I replied to the Israelis: “I understand. Then don’t let the Druze down.”

I hope that the Druze will not be subjected to new campaigns of genocide. For every defeat of the Druze means new catastrophes for the Alawites, Kurds, and other groups. I am pinning my hopes on the Druze and on Hikmat Hijri, leader of the Druze in Syria.

Will Israel let the Druze down? Anything is possible. The Sunni Qatari lobby in Israel is very strong. Even many Jews from Syria are on Al-Golani’s side. They say: “Al-Golani is our man; he is Israel’s man. Why should we defend the Druze?” The role of the Druze in Israel—especially that of Sheikh Mowafaq Tarif, the head of the Druze community there—is crucial.

Alawites

The situation of the Alawites in Syria is far more dire than that of the Kurds and Druze. They are abducted almost daily; women, in particular, are raped and killed. The Assad family, which ruled Syria from 1970 to 2024, belonged to the Alawite minority and committed numerous crimes and mass murders.

One of the worst crimes committed by this family was the destruction of the ancient, traditional structures of Alawite society. When the Alawites urgently needed an organization in December 2024 to resist Islamist barbarism, the Assad family simply fled, leaving Alawite society defenseless against the Islamist barbarians who had seized power in Syria.

They urgently need a functioning, unified organization. Sheikh Ghazal, with whom I recently conducted a long interview, can play an important role in this regard. For a community in distress needs an organization and leadership to mount resistance; otherwise, it is lost.

The West’s Stance

Regarding the stance of the United States, Germany and other Western countries, I can only reiterate what I have been saying since 2011 — from the very beginning, in fact: Germany, for example — specifically the federal government and, above all, the Foreign Office — has consistently supported Islamists in Syria diplomatically, politically and financially.

There are many historical and geopolitical reasons for this. One important reason is that Germany views developments regarding the Kurdish issue in Turkey, Syria, Iraq and Iran through Turkey’s lens. Regarding the Druze issue, Germany would also prefer Israel to abandon the Druze and support Al-Golani instead.

What can we do?

We must continue to criticize the Islamist regime in Syria, expose its crimes, and document them. Otherwise, it will normalize its actions and view its crimes as collateral damage. That must not happen. We must explain to the Western and German public the role their governments—especially their foreign ministries—play in supporting Sunni political Islam.

People in the West, including Germans, need to know what their foreign ministries have been doing for decades and continue to do.

An Urgent Request

I would like to address the Kurdish solidarity movement in Western countries, especially in Germany, and particularly those in left-wing circles. If you support the Kurds, don’t just support a single party or leader; stand up for the rights of the Kurdish people. Solidarity with the Kurds and other communities must always be critical; otherwise, they will repeat their mistakes and the solidarity will have no effect.

Dr. Kamal Sido, a prominent Syrian Kurdish intellectual. He is a Middle East Consultant for ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities at the German Society for Threatened Peoples (STP).

The opinions are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent the views of iKurd.net or its editors.

Copyright © 2026 iKurd.net. All rights reserved.

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QAMISHLO, Syrian Kurdistan,— Kurdish women fighters who gained worldwide attention for battling Islamic State are now in talks with Syria’s new Islamist leaders, trying to keep an organized combat role after a major government shake-up put their future in doubt.

The Women’s Protection Units, known as the YPJ, are part of the YPG, which fought alongside the U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces SDF during Syria’s civil war. Together, they helped push Islamic State out of large areas in the country’s north and east.

The YPG serves as the main strength behind the SDF, the armed wing of the self-run Kurdish administration in Syrian Kurdistan, Rojava Kurdistan. Kurdish-led forces took back wide stretches of Syrian territory from Islamic State fighters.

Those forces removed Islamic State from its final stronghold in the eastern Syrian village of Baghouz in March 2019. More than 21,000 young Kurdish men and women died fighting Islamic State and Turkish-backed Syrian Islamist armed mercenary groups.

The YPJ became one of the war’s most recognized fighting units, known worldwide for its all-female ranks battling Islamic State militants.

The unit’s future became unclear after former President Bashar al-Assad was removed from power in late 2024, followed by a new government run by Islamist rebels. The new leadership has worked to bring formerly independent armed groups under state control.

Last week, the SDF was officially dissolved. Its commander, General Mazloum Abdi, was named an adviser to interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa, formerly known as Golani, and other SDF members moved into the defense ministry. However, no women hold posts in Syria’s new defense ministry.

YPJ commander Newroz Ahmed said that during meetings with Sharaa in Damascus last week, she was told her fighters would not have a place in the military.

“We were aiming to join the army, because our forces have experience and expertise that would enable them to protect themselves in an organized way in the form of an independent brigade or battalion,” Ahmed told Reuters at a military base in the northeastern main Kurdish city of Qamishlo.

“Our main condition was that this force must be organized, must not be deployed to any place, and must not be in small groups. They rejected this proposal.”

Female fighters’ role unclear

The YPJ is now talking with Syria’s interior ministry, hoping to find another way to stay together as an organized force. These talks are happening as the new government reshapes Syria’s security agencies following more than a decade of war.

The interior ministry already has women working in a tourism police unit. Earlier this year, Syrian officials suggested YPJ fighters join that unit, according to people familiar with the discussions.

The YPJ turned down the offer, those sources said, though a YPJ spokesperson denied such a proposal was ever made.

Ahmed said the YPJ instead suggested joining the interior ministry’s special operations forces, a unit that better matches her fighters’ training and could boost the number of women in forces mostly made up of men.

“When we discussed with the interior ministry, we told them that our forces comprise more than 1,500 fighters and we asked whether all these forces would be merged or not,” Ahmed said, adding that she expects an answer “in the coming days.”

Syria’s defense and interior ministries did not immediately respond to questions from Reuters about the talks.

Interior ministry spokesperson Noureddine al-Baba told Kurdish news outlet Rudaw on Friday that YPJ fighters would be accepted into the ministry, though he gave no specifics about their duties. He said any units would be sent across the country rather than kept in one region.

Kurdish distrust remains

These discussions are unfolding amid ongoing Kurdish suspicion of Syria’s new government.

Many Kurds remain cautious of the new leadership, pointing to deadly violence carried out by government-linked Islamist forces against minority groups in 2025, as well as Sharaa’s past leadership of Al Qaeda’s branch in Syria before he cut ties with the group.

The outcome for the YPJ carries weight for many Kurdish women, who see the force as proof of political and social progress won during the war.

“They always see women as weak. We as women don’t draw our strength from men, nor do we draw our strength from the current state,” said Goksu Ciyager, a 20-year-old YPJ fighter. “Of course, we want to have a special case and we insist on this.”

Penaber Baran, a 31-year-old YPJ unit commander, said Syria’s constitution should clearly protect a role for the force. “Until today, we have never waited for anyone to defend us,” she said. “We as women defended ourselves.”

Before Assad’s fall and the rise of Sharaa, the Autonomous Administration, set up in 2018, ran the region under a system called democratic confederalism.

The system stresses direct democracy, equal rights for women, separation of religion from government, and protection of the environment. It has drawn wide recognition for expanding women’s roles in politics and local decision-making.

As in Israel, Kurdish women are required to serve in the Kurdish armed forces to help defend the Rojava region, under local rules supporting equal rights. Women make up close to half of those involved in military, political, and social institutions.

(With files from Reuters | Agencies)

Copyright © 2026 iKurd.net. All rights reserved.

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DAMASCUS,— Syria’s interim president, Ahmed al-Sharaa, has named the former top commander of Kurdish-led SDF forces as an adviser to his office, state media reported Thursday.

A decree, numbered 164, appointed General Mazloum Abdi “as an advisor to the Presidency of the Republic,” the state-run Sana news agency said. Al-Sharaa is also known as Abu Mohammed al-Golani.

The appointment came three days after Abdi said the Syrian Democratic Forces, the group he led, had been dissolved and folded into the Syrian military.

The SDF had served as the de facto army of the autonomous Kurdish administration in Syrian Kurdistan.

Abdi is the highest-ranking Kurdish official to receive a state post. Earlier this year, another SDF commander was named assistant defense minister for the country’s eastern region.

The new advisory job carries less weight than an offer made in January, when al-Sharaa proposed making Abdi deputy defense minister and governor of Hasaka province.

That plan was meant to bring the SDF-held provincial capital back under state authority.

Al-Sharaa and Abdi first agreed in March 2025 to merge the SDF into Syria’s central government.

The agreement stalled ahead of its year-end deadline, and government Islamist militia forces moved into the northeast in January 2026, seizing Raqqa and Deir al-Zor after SDF withdrew from these areas.

Al-Sharaa, an extremist Islamist, who once fought with al-Qaida and later with the Islamic State group, founded the al-Nusra Front, an al-Qaida affiliate that later became Hayat Tahrir al-Sham.

He has led Syria’s interim government since former President Bashar Assad was ousted in December 2024.

A ceasefire that halted the January fighting placed Raqqa, Deir al-Zor and Hasaka under government control and required the SDF to join the defense and interior ministries under a 14-point agreement.

One Kurdish-led unit remains outside that framework. The Women’s Protection Units, known as the YPJ, asked to join the defense ministry but were told the army has no positions for women.

Separately, al-Sharaa signed a decree in January recognizing Kurdish as a national language and restoring citizenship to Syrian Kurds, the first such recognition since Syria gained independence in 1946.

The SDF’s dissolution gives Damascus control over nearly all Syrian territory, a goal al-Sharaa has pursued since Assad’s fall.

Most Kurds of Syria live in Syrian Kurdistan (Rojava Kurdistan), one part of the greatest Kurdistan, which includes Iraqi Kurdistan, Turkey Kurdistan and Iranian Kurdistan.

(With files from Agencies)

Copyright © 2026 iKurd.net. All rights reserved.

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