Sheri Laizer — Exclusive to iKurd.net

FOR THE KURDS, THE ROAD OF THE GUN LED NOWHERE BUT DEATH

Neither democratic campaigning nor the ‘road of the gun’ has secured rights for the Kurds in Iran.

The track zigzags sharply downwards. Thousands of tiny stones spin away beneath my feet. Far below, a green valley suddenly comes into view riven by a rushing stream, wild and muddied as one gets closer. Sliding and clutching at dwarf oak branches for balance I watch the Kurdish guerrilla fighters move swiftly in front of me, as accustomed to the terrain as the animals with which they share the natural dangers, their dark khaki uniforms blending with the forest.

This side of the stream is Iran and the other, Iraq, rising and descending and approaching new heights in the blurred lines of Kurdistan’s geography. The stream is not an official border crossing place but its smooth boulders make crossing possible after the spring rains cease. A similar stony track ascends the farther slopes followed by further hills, further mountains, further plateaux and valleys. Moving along the ranges in the hinterland, Mount Qandil looms.

Evening is approaching and in the soft amber light the frogs begin their evening chorus. It is a young summer night, but the air is fresher the higher you are in the mountains. One might think this were an earthly paradise until the tat-tat-tat of gunfire echoes from the mountainsides followed by the deeper boom of RPGs. The frogs continue croaking and the cicadas chafing. There is a second round of gunfire, then a sharp exchange of ammunition exploding in several directions. A white puff of smoke goes up on the opposite slope before falling into shadow as the sun drops behind a peak and darkness drowns the landscape.

Thousands of Iranian Kurdish asylum seekers refused in Europe and the UK

Bakhtiyar is just sixteen and from a village near Piranshahr (Kurdish, Mokrian) that boasts some two-dozen houses. Leading a smuggler’s life to support his family he has seen it all. One of thousands of Iranian Kurdish asylum seekers, he has fled to the UK to seek safe harbour only to be refused asylum. Refusal is on the basis that his account of escaping the pasdaran in a gun battle and being mistaken for a guerrilla – abandoning his mule and the incriminating belongings that identify him – is ‘implausible’. He is not at risk in Iran, he is told. Why would he be of interest?

In 2011, PJAK, the PKK’s sister organisation, agreed a ceasefire with Tehran after heavy losses in combat including young Kurds like Bakhtiyar – some who had joined PJAK and others who supported them. Currently, suspected PJAK supporters face the death penalty if captured.

Guilt does not have to be established on the basis of fact but can be attributed by the Iranian judiciary on the basis of suspicions, hearsay, family association, forced confessions or and being an innocent in the wrong place at the wrong time. Smugglers and Kurdish shepherds are often mistaken for rebels or are accused of aiding Kurdish militants – the regime barely takes the time to distinguish between them for they are Kurds after all…Bakhtiyar was not wrong.

In this same terrain, the KDPI responded to Iranian shelling in the 1990s, before crossing deeper into Iraqi Kurdistan and establishing bases more distant from the front line, eventually settling upon Koya, high in the mountains outside Sulaymaniyah. Later the PKK settled in, taking over parts of Mount Qandil before spearheading its sister organisation, PJAK (the Party of Free Life) in 2004, pursuing the same quest of greater rights for Kurds in Iran. Komala has also seen its share of death down the decades, its fighters chastened and scarred.

Most recently, in May 2015, the PKK reportedly attacked KDPI positions not far from here just inside the border with Iraq.

Decades of armed struggle since the collapse of the autonomous Kurdish Republic of Mahabad in 1946 have so far not delivered Kurdish rights. The road of the gun has led nowhere but death. Since the toppling of the Shah, the Islamic government in Tehran, has persecuted its Kurds under various pretexts invoking the concept of ‘Mohareb’ crimes under Shari’a law.

Along this winding path, one way leads to comparative freedom in Iraqi Kurdistan, the other way, going deeper into Iran promises high risks of imprisonment, death in custody, death in prison or death by the noose after unfair trial. – if you are Kurdish and you oppose the regime in word or deed – even a mocking blog is sufficient to get you noticed – Ettela’at is likely to come knocking at the door or the Basij breaking it down.

PKK clashes with the KDPI – why?

The Kurdistan Parliament of the KRG delivered a timely statement to the PKK and KDPI after clashes on 24 May in Kelashin[1] urging them not to return to the dark days of Birakuji (inter-Kurdish killing), saying.

“We seriously warn both Kurdish parties to avoid the use of violence and the gun in settling their political problems. It is a crime for a nation to use violence against its own…This kind of incident is a flashback to the darkest pages of Kurdistan’s history and the Kurdish nation will not accept the recurrence of such events.”   [2]

So what lay behind the tensions? Kurdish sources reported that the PKK (HPG forces) were demanding that the KDPI withdraw from the border region where the PKK has bases. Their fighters then began surrounding KDPI positions. [3]

But by what right demand another Kurdish party to obey them? To be the dominant Kurdish party as the PKK has historically sought to be?

Kurdistan Post then reported that an agreement had been reached and the violence ended following the deaths of two KDPI peshmerga, and other KDPI fighters wounded. The agreement was underpinned by Kurdish leaders, Khosrat Rasul and Nechirvan Barzani.[4]

The PKK/PJAK/PYD habitually acts the dictator, imposing its will along with media spin and censorship – and using violence against its rivals and critics. Abusing the keyword ‘democracy, the PKK and its sister organisations, continue to endorse autocracy. Rigid structures of internal discipline also remain in place according to which hundreds of Kurdish patriots have been lined up in the sights of the PKK’s guns? Disaffected members, many long serving and long suffering, have fled on pain of death, such as those that escaped to form the PWD (Partiya Welatpareza Demokratik- Patriotic Democratic Party) based in northern Iraq since 2004. But several of its leading figures were swiftly assassinated one after another by PKK hitmen. [5] Pregnant PKK guerrillas are also among those Kurds to be executed along with their unborn and some few living babies – whose mothers successfully escaped to give birth and bear witness. For them, the road of the gun led to hell.

Massoud Barzani justifiably asks how the PKK would react if parties from Iraqi Kurdistan should begin muscling in on Mardin and Diyarbakir, in reference to the PKK/PYD’s ‘interference’ in northern Iraq and specifically Sinjar.

Barzani added, “The PKK has no role to play. They should pull out and they must because the people of Sinjar will determine their own future and this is Iraqi Kurdistan. Would the PKK be happy if a Kurdish political party inside Iraq meddled in the affairs of Diyarbakir or Mardin?[6]

In Iraqi Kurdistan the KDPI has long been betrayed to placate Iran

The KDPI has long been ‘hosted’ in northern Iraq and is still unable to return to Iran. Betrayed in the 1990s by its hosts, until the recent tensions with the PKK, the KDPI has eked out a relatively peaceful existence – although sporadically its security has been ruptured by Iranian intelligence operatives ‘welcome’ in the KRG region.

The two main traditional Kurdish parties strive to sustain friendly relations with their powerful neighbour generally at the expense of Iranian Kurds.

PUK official and co-founder, Adel Murad, who had formerly declared that the peshmerga would not withdraw from those positions they now held outside the KRG [7] has reportedly posted a fresh comment that Kurds should choose relations with Iran over relations with the US as ‘the cultural and religious parallels between Kurds and Iranians gives the Iranian government priority to intervene in the Kurdistan Region.’ [8]

One rule for one and another for another: but the Kurds of Iran cannot couch their struggle in such semantics as ‘parallels’ with the Islamic Republic of Iran. The endless blacklisting of Iranian Kurds as enemies, the scores of ethnic Kurds on death row and the even longer list of Kurds executed by the state as ‘mohareb’ offenders seems to have been overlooked.  But is not the Kurdish concept of a historical, spiritual Kurdistan that of one homeland? Has not the experience of each severed part been the same experience that leads to death and mental trauma? Do not Kurdish hearts that decry ‘birakuji’ speak the same and equal truth or is the gun raised more in the service of power than to serve the goals of Kurdistan?

Why have Kurds taken to the ‘road of the gun’ in Iran if they are so close to Iranians? That dark road still looms ahead, winding through the mountains and valleys, cities, towns and villages of Iranian Kurdistan, as immortalised by Iraqi Kurdish poet, Rafiq Sabir, in his poem about armed resistance and the reasons for it, The Road of the Gun.

I had a small blue sky
The occupiers brought it down over me
I had a trickle of dark blood
A bouquet of honey dreams
And a collection of books
They plundered them all
But when they came
To change my skin
Deform my face
I dressed myself in snow and thunder
Carried my homeland on my shoulders

And took to the road of the gun. [9]

[1] http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/iranian-kurds-clash-with-pkk-report.aspx?pageID=238&nID=82893&NewsCatID=352
[2] http://rudaw.net/english/kurdistan/240520154
[3] https://wordpress-1318350-4815544.cloudwaysapps.com/pkk-kdpi-clash-on-iranian-kurdistan-border-leaves-two-dead-2015-05-24
[4] http://www.kurdistan-post.eu/tr/birakuji
[5] http://www.pwdnerin.com/makale/faysal_dunlayici/oldurme-emri
[6] http://www.mesop.de/mesop-todays-word-of-the-week-by-kak-mesud-b/
[7] http://rudaw.net/english/middleeast/iraq/010720142
[8] http://www.mesop.de/mesop-todays-quotation-the-pkk-puk-iran-belt
[9] Rafiq Sabir, the Road of the Gun co-translated into English by Sheri Laizer, in Martyrs, Traitors and Patriots – Kurdistan after the Gulf War, pg. 29.
See also: Exiled Ink: War and its Long Shadows, Winter 2006, Jennifer Langer, p. 22 http://www.exiledwriters.co.uk/magazines/em6.pdf

Sheri Laizer, a Middle East and North African expert specialist and well known commentator on the Kurdish issue. She is a senior contributing writer for iKurd.net. More about Sheri Laizer see below.

The opinions are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent the views of iKurd.net or its editors.

Copyright © 2015 Sheri Laizer

The post Iran – Toxic Theocracy – Part II appeared first on iKurd News.

Sheri Laizer — Exclusive to iKurd.net

Editor’s Note: Sheri Laizer, a Middle East specialist and well known commentator on the Kurdish issue. Content of this article is from Chapters that will appear in Mrs.Laizer’s new book,‘Intimate Wars – From Baghdad to Bethlehem and Beirut’.

Rumi, the 13^th century Sufi Persian poet, wrote:

‘…Hallaj steps away from the pulpit
and climbs the stairs of the gallows.
Lovers feel a truth inside themselves
that rational people keep denying.
It is reasonable to say, Surrender
is just an idea that keeps people from leading their lives…[1]

A yellow-grey dawn breaks over Imam Khomeini International airport (IKA), thirty kilometres south west of central Tehran. Tehran’s notorious air pollution is, for many Iranians, a physical reminder of the social suffocation and dangers that they suffer on a daily basis. The Elborz Mountains that shield Tehran to the north are barely visible for the haze. [2]

‘More than 14,000 detained in the new dress code laws under the ‘Moralisation Campaign’

Once inside the airport concourse a sign reads “Respected Ladies: Please Observe Islamic Dress Code.”[3] There is, of course, no choice about this. It is an order, not a request. To ensure ‘propriety’ the moral police detain women and physically enforce conformity.  The Iranian airport police are reported to be preventing women from boarding their flights if they are dressed in an “un-Islamic” fashion under strict new dress code laws. They have issued over 17,000 official warnings to Iranian women and convicted a further 80. [4]

Outside, the airport, it is the same picture. Women face being dragged off the streets and pushed into minibuses curtained from view and driven to Evin Prison or police stations and forced into one-piece chadors after which they can be accused of ‘receiving foreign funds to stir up dissent in Iran’ and other crimes.[5]

As spring arrives and temperatures soften, ‘more than 14,000 people have already been detained’ under the new dress code laws and ’67,000 reprimanded by police’ based on police records.[6]

A young, newly bearded, Iranian man steps onto the tarmac from his Paris flight with great trepidation. He is arriving for a funeral. Indeed, he had just gotten married before his father’s death – but to George, a same-sex partner in a civil marriage in London. If the Iranian authorities have any evidence of his sexual orientation he could also be attending his own funeral. LBGT Iranians, and women, face daily surveillance and high risks of intervention. A conservative paramilitary group named Ansar-e Hezbollah can now enforce the code alongside the police, deploying volunteers to ‘clamp down on women’ in violation of the dress code.[7] The traffic police and Basij  – that act as moral guardians of the general public – can do the same.

Travellers arriving at IKA, and those leaving, also run a high risk of being taken aside by airport security and being made to sit in front of a computer to open their Facebook page, blogs or emails. Depending on the content, detention can immediately follow. A traveller can also be prevented from leaving the country and the arriving traveller can be taken to prison to await trial on a plethora of charges.

Extensive routine internal surveillance from close by, and in Cyberspace, includes state monitoring of the Internet generally and specifically of social networking websites and political sites. The Islamic Republic of Iran ‘possesses a technological and legislative arsenal that allows it to keep its Internet under close surveillance. Filtering, control of Internet Service Providers, prohibitions, and monitoring of email content, chats and VoIP conversations are all legal…”[8]

So ‘Happy’?

In a similar vein, private parties can be raided on the basis of tip-offs by the Basij or the nosey; young people trying to remain anonymous in outdoor locations gathered to enjoy themselves risk being reported to the police.

Last summer, eight young Iranians who filmed a video of themselves dancing to Pharrell Williams’ hit pop song ‘Happy’ were tracked down and arrested. [9] It is plausible they were released not just owing to the international outrage their detention provoked but because President Rouhani may personally have intervened. He tweeted “#Happiness is our people’s right. We shouldn’t be too hard on behaviors caused by joy.” 29/6/2013[10]

Iranian commentator, Ali Reza Eshraghi, writing for Al Jazeera emphasised the contradictions inherent in Iranian social conduct, including the sight of women at religious events turned carnival spectacle, swathed in black chadors on one hand but wearing bright lipstick and body-hugging manteaux, on the other: “This behaviour of course is not limited to wearing lipstick while praying. I know Iranians who break their fast with a glass of wine, people who start fornication with a Bismillah- In the name of God, and homosexuals who sport a beard because it is recommended in Islam.”[11]

Eshraghi claims the present trend towards religion and religious observation adopted by Iranian intellectuals is ‘functionalist’ rather than ‘fundamentalist.

Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in his twenty-fifth year as Supreme Leader

Once a lover of music, poetry and literature, having succeeded Ayatollah Khomeini, Ali Khamenei became increasingly conservative. He also altered his views including support for the absolute ‘Rule of the Just Jurisprudent’, his own office, saying it took precedence over the will of the people unlike what he had said after the Revolution in 1982 when he’d stated: “It is the people that rank highest in the country… they elect the Supreme Leader … everything ultimately goes back the choice the people make…”[12]

So, in light of Khamenei generally towing the line of the conservatives in the Majlis, what has become of the Green Movement revolution that attained such heights around the time of the 2009 elections?

After the brutal suppression of the demonstrators and the vote rigging that ensured Mahmoud Ahmadinejad a second term in the President’s office, has the million strong protest largely been forced underground?

From the outset, the Green Revolution was labelled as ‘sedition’ by the Supreme Leader. Although Hassan Rouhani’s election campaign promises of June 2013 included the release of the three leaders of the Green Movement from house arrest, following his ascendency to the Presidency the issue has become even thornier.

Former Prime Minister Mir Hossein Mousavi, his wife, Dr. Zahra Rahnavard, and former Parliament Speaker, Mehdi Karroubi, have been living under house arrest since February 2011 on the orders of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council (SNSC). Sadegh Larijani, the head of the judiciary, has argued that if they were to be released they would then be liable to be tried for “corruption on earth”  – charge that is punishable by death. Accordingly, further impeding any positive progress by Hassan Rouhani on the issue, the SNSC’s resolutions must then be approved by Khamenei himself.’[13]

The next elections are scheduled for March 2016. Iranian opposition journalist, Akbar Ganji, observed that the conservatives and hardliners fear a resurgence of the Green Movement and thus continue to insist on the house arrest of its leaders while condemning them before the Majlis. Ganji insists that Khamenei is deeply fearful of democratic processes that would no longer assure him – or his successors – ultimate power for life.

Executions

Since the 2013 elections that installed Hassan Rouhani ias President, the rate of executions in Iran reportedly increased by 68% to a total of 687 put to death last year, although the figure is believed to be higher owing to government under-reporting.

Spokesperson for the Iran Human Rights group, Mahmood Amiry-Moghaddam, commented, “It is a paradox that the relations between Iran and the international community are improving while the number of the executions in Iran increases. The election of Mr. Hassan Rouhani has not improved the situation. Improvement of diplomatic relations should be conditioned into concrete steps from the Iranian authorities to comply with the international obligations regarding the use of the death penalty.”[14]

 Last year, 2014, the official figure claimed that 200 people were executed – that figure has already been equalled in the first quarter of 2015 attaining 258 deaths despite the Iranian government admitting to only 73.[15] The Iran Human Rights Documentation Centre (IHDC) lists known victims alongside the ‘offences’ for which the punishment was given. ‘Unofficial’ victims include many human rights activists for whom no offence exists or the offence is simply “moharabeh’ that is justified as ‘enmity against God’. The list of those executed also includes a large number of drug addicts, alleged killers, rapists and criminals, but also LBGT individuals, juveniles, and members of ethnic and religious minorities.

The Iranian Penal Code specifically prohibits same-sex relations, for which the death penalty can be imposed. Oddly, it distinguishes between penetration to the point of circumcision on the male sex organ and placing the member between another man’s buttocks without penetration. How this could be observed and proven is anyone’s guess.

The UN Special Rapporteur’s report of February 2013 importantly observed with regard to LBGT Iranians: “Several people reported that they were coerced into signing confessions. Iran’s criminalisation of same-sex relations facilitates physical abuse in the domestic setting as well. A majority of these individuals reported that they were beaten by family members at home, but could not report these assaults to the authorities out of fear that they would themselves be charged with a criminal act.”[16]

Prince Reza Pahlavi – a dimension to the Iranian opposition in exile

Renowned campaigner for human rights and democratic change in Iran, based in Paris, Prince Reza Pahlavi heads the Iranian National Council (INC) and its sub organisation for Free and Fair Elections in Iran that was founded in April 2013. The INC’s bulletin states that its Charter was ‘conceived by prisoners of conscience and political activists within Iran… and offers a political alternative to the current theocratic regime. We believe that secularism, respect for Human Rights and a democratic parliament constitute the three pillars necessary upon which to build a better future for future generations, and that these are essential to the establishment of a lasting peace for the Middle East and beyond.’[17]

Reza Pahlavi also gathered together a team of international political and human rights experts and activists in October 2011 to work on a complaint against Khamenei for crimes against humanity. The complaint was lodged in the International Criminal Court on 20 January 2012. The Iranian National Security Council responded by prohibiting all mention of Reza Pahlavi in the national media. Anything published ‘could result in the closure of the news outlet and arrest of its directors, editors and reporters’.[18]

Reza Pahlavi was interviewed on BBC’s HARDtalk in October 2013 after Rouhani’s election where Stephen Sackur tried to focus on abuses on his father’s reign questioning his relevance to contemporary Iranian politics. Reza Pahlavi did not excuse any past human rights abuses and made it clear he was his own man with his own opinions and a deep concern for democratic change in Iran, providing an alternative vision.[19] He gave equally frank interviews to Chinese state television and CNN’s Christiane Amanpour on the gravity of the situation in Iran, alongside his campaign for political prisoners and insights into the scourge of worker’s strikes.

Endemic suppression of ethnic minorities

It is 19 July 2011. Several buses are parked in a line below a bridge in Kermanshah. A restive morning crowd, that includes children, await the hanging. Several young men wearing Kurdish shalvar are stood among guards on the roofs of the vehicles. Nooses are fastened around their necks. The vehicles then move off and the men’s feet leave the roofs and bodies swing below the bridge.

Blogger/activist from kurdishblogger.com Fazel Hawaramy, sent a video of the spectacle to Amnesty International. The outside world also got a taste of ‘justice’ Iran-style. Amnesty said the executions in Kermanshah followed “several widely publicised gang rapes of women this year in Iran. In some cases, officials blamed the victims for failing to adhere to the official code on dress or gender segregation.”[20] Other hangings were also carried out with the victims hung in public from cranes and high places.

Last month (March 2015) six Kurds were executed by hanging in Tehran just a day after the UN expressed concern over rights violations against minorities and the high level of executions. [21] Kurds represent some 10% of the population but continue to suffer endemic repression alongside deliberate economic deprivation by the state.

An in-depth study of the historicity of racism in Iran emphasises how such persecution of minority groups is nothing new but that the processes by which racist policies are implemented are constantly evolving. “Kurds, Azeris, Gilakis, Mazandaranis, Arabs, Baluchis and Turkmen,’ are oppressed by ‘the Persian-centric state. Power relations in Iran heavily favour Persians in terms of culture, politics and economy- the government, which is predominantly Persian, controls the presence of minority ethnic groups … Some minorities welcomed the Islamic revolution, believing that it would grant them autonomy. Instead, the revolution brought with it a system that discouraged anything distinctive to a minority- language, religion, culture, territorial identification. The post-revolution government followed a state concept of unity, which was key in racialization processes of minority groups.[22]

Expression of ethnic difference and demands for rights as distinct ethnic groups are treated by the theocracy as ‘apostate’ acts. No place exists for the concept of nationality or ethnic difference. Ordinary citizens from non-Persian ethnic backgrounds face intense surveillance, infiltration of their focus groups and monitoring of those who have family members living abroad. An activist with relatives living in Iran will justly fear that his or her family members can be arrested and suffer reprisals because of their active opposition from abroad, including taking part in demonstrations against the authorities. Phones are bugged. Computers are seized and no state or non-state organisation can intervene to protect any person detained.

Lawyers have an extremely difficult job trying to access clients spirited off to police stations or prisons.

The imposition of the ‘law’ exists in a context of state corruption and political manipulation that ensures the power of various strata of the administration.

Neither democratic campaigning nor the ‘road of the gun’ have secured rights for the Kurds or other ethnic groups in Iran. (See Part 2, ‘Kurds: The road of the gun led nowhere but death’ out soon).

Overlapping security services in rivalry

The structure of the security services is exceedingly complex as the following reference shows:

“Five security organs report either directly or by separate paths to the Supreme Leader: the IRGC, the Qods Force, the Law Enforcement Forces, the MOIS, and the regular military forces. The basij reports to the IRGC commander, and the IRGC and the Qods Force maintain close personnel links with Lebanese Hezbollah.

These forces number in the hundreds of thousands (or millions, depending on how one counts the basij), and are deployed throughout Iran and the region. In the most sensitive areas of the country…multiple security services are deployed in an overlapping fashion—LEF, IRGC, basij, and MOIS all maintain positions in Tehran and other key cities. Volatile rural regions often see a mix of IRGC, basij, and regular military forces.

Qassim Soleimani appears to have gained control of supporting Iran’s proxies throughout the Middle East for the Qods Force, but the IRGC and the MOIS reportedly maintain their own posts in Iranian embassies and their own bases in Syria and Lebanon. ”[23]

The regime protects itself in this way as no single entity can seize control. One former lawyer who escaped from Iran after being imprisoned and tortured on trumped-up charges after representing families whose properties had been seized by the regime stated concerning surveillance and intelligence records, “All records are retained: they are never erased. The Intelligence Service (Aghahi آگاهی) and fingerprinting organisation (Anghosht Neghary انگشت نگاری) retain those records in their system. Some information may not be computerised and is held on manual files covering all records since 1375  – those for the past fifteen years are held on computer.”  Once identified, it becomes impossible to remain anonymous anywhere in Iran.

Corruption throughout the Theocracy

After Mahmoud Ahmadinejad left office – the requisite two terms being up, successor Hassan Rouhani pledged to tackle corruption. Last month, former Vice President, Mohammed Reza Rahimi, once head of an Anti-Corruption Agency, was sentenced to imprisonment on corruption charges for a term of five years, 91 days, with a fine of 10 billion rials (approximately $350,000) also imposed. The Supreme Court overturned a harsher fifteen-year sentence upholding only the relatively light sentence. [24]

Businessman, millionaire, Mahafarid Amir Khosravi, was not so lucky. For his part in bank fraud worth 2.6 billion dollars, he received the death penalty and was executed at Evin Prison in Tehran without the state first informing his lawyers. Was the execution carried out in such haste and secrecy to ensure that deeper state secrets went with him?

The Independent observed “The trial has raised questions about the level of corruption in the state-regulated economy of Iran…Many believe that during the administration of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad corruption was rife throughout those that controlled the country’s economy…The government denied any involvement with the actions of Khosravi….”[25]

Ahmadinejad had previously accused one of the Larijani brothers of corruption.[26] Reuters commented “Addressing parliament to defend one of his ministers against impeachment, Ahmadinejad went on the attack, playing astonished lawmakers a recorded conversation with the brother of the speaker that he said implicated the whole family in corruption…

Fazel Larijani repudiated the claim speaking to Fars media saying “This was a conspiratorial step and hypocritical action taken so that Mortazavi could use it as leverage. I’m not the first person to be attacked by these Mafia-like individuals.”[27]

Accordingly, the secret execution of Khosravi and related death penalty verdicts handed down to several key players in his circle were interpreted as a counter attack on Ahmadinejad’s clique.[28]

As the various political circles competing with one another appear to have had their fingers in the pie, tackling corruption risks political ‘paralysis’ in the run-up to the 2016 elections according to Tehran businessman, Bijan Khajehpour.  “As the Rahimi case indicates, such high-level corruption cases will also create unwanted waves in the political structure. In fact, Rahimi’s conviction unleashed an avalanche of political accusations and counteraccusations that could potentially lead to the dismissal of a number of existing parliamentarians who accepted bribes from Rahimi and his network…”[29]

The entire political system in Iran remains at risk.

In Khajehpour’s view large governmental and semi-state organisations inhibit the private sector.  “The private sector is concerned that, similar to previous attempts, the campaign would only target low-level managers and figures not involved in main corrupt networks. Nonetheless, the new momentum has created a very healthy debate on the issue of corruption and on how it can be addressed through policies and actions…”

Endemic corruption, lack of transparency, political interference in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and now Yemen, and Iran’s anti-Israel stand all hinder progress on the issue of developing nuclear energy.

International sanctions and the nuclear issue

A remote possibility currently presents of some breakthrough in international relations with Iran and the self-chosen isolation that permits such a range of abuses hinges upon current attempts by the international community and, most importantly, the Obama administration to achieve an accord with Iran.

President Obama said ‘the framework nuclear agreement reached last week with Iran represents a “once-in-a-lifetime” opportunity to bring some stability to the Middle East – stability which would be good for Israel as well as other nations…[30]

Active in the negotiations alongside Barack Obama with Iran, U.S. Energy Secretary Ernest Moniz, emphasised that the agreement was for the long term saying ”There is no sunset. There will be a lot of phases starting with extremely stringent restrictions on Iran’s program. Hopefully, they will comply for a long time, build up confidence. But, we have 10-year restrictions, 15-year restrictions, 25-year restrictions, and we have forever-restrictions…the agreement calls for unprecedented access to Iran’s nuclear program, not just declared sites, but to any covert aspects of their infrastructure.’[31]

Israeli PM Binyamin Netanyahu’s alarmist card playing remains focused on the argument that Iran is intent on developing nuclear weapons for Israel’s destruction. Knowing it to be almost impossible The Guardian noted his demand that ‘Iran recognises Israel’s right to exist as a precondition to any final agreement.’ Following his meeting last week with his ministers and security officials he said that Israel would not accept a deal between world powers and Iran “which allows a country that vows to annihilate us to develop nuclear weapons.”

The Guardian summed the position up observing “But with the draft agreement far more explicit and involving more concessions than Israel has vociferously claimed, including over the number (of) centrifuges Iran will be allowed to retain, some believe Israel may have overplayed its hand already, not least with the more hawkish Democrats whom it will need to convince as well as Republicans.” [32]

Iran’s shadow in Iraq’s mirror

Negotiations offer leverage that sanctions do not. Iran is in a position of great strength throughout the Middle East with powerful forces operating under its command via Qassem Suleimani, in Iraq, Syria, Gaza, Afghanistan, Lebanon and now also Yemen alongside its proxy, Hezbollah.

Former CIA Director, General, David Petraeus, believes Iran represents an ever greater threat to Iraq than ISIS.  He warned “Longer term, Iranian-backed Shiite militia could emerge as the preeminent power in the country, one that is outside the control of the government and instead answerable to Tehran… the increasing Iranian influence in Iraq, through Revolutionary Guard Commander Qassem Suleimani, underlines a very important reality…It is certainly interesting to see how visible Suleimani has chosen to become in recent months — quite a striking change for a man of the shadows…The more the Iranians are seen to be dominating the region, the more it is going to inflame Sunni radicalism and fuel the rise of groups like the Islamic State” [33]

Petraeus also claims that on his watch, back in 2008, Suleimani had ‘made it clear he was in charge of Iran’s policy regarding Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Gaza and Afghanistan’.[34] Petraeus is not incorrect in seeing Iran’s shadow over Iraq as a grave threat. The Shi’a-dominated government in power in Iraq since regime change in 2003 has engendered extreme sectarian violence tantamount to bringing Iraq to civil war.

Iran’s clerics and security forces have exploited strict Shari’a law, terror, brute force, and repression for more than thirty-five years to remain in power. These driving forces owe nothing to ‘divinity’ in the name of which the cultural riches of civilisation, natural resources and human rights have systematically been desecrated.

The Persian poets of old once wrote of nature, love, beauty and a transcendent greater spirit – lines sublime in thought and feeling. The contrast with the Islamic Republic of Iran speaks for itself.

[1] http://www.fountainmagazine.com/Issue/detail/Rumi-Faith-Knowledge-Reason-and-Love; the poem ‘Secret Places’ from Bridge to the Soul the Persian. and http://heidistable.com/secret-places-rumi/
[2] http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-03-02/killer-smog-tests-iran-s-top-woman-as-pollution-sparks-action
[3] http://abcnews.go.com/Travel/story?id=6200937
[4] http://www.kintera.org/site/apps/nlnet/content2.aspx?c=9dJBLLNkGiF&b=5067603&ct=3919899
[5] Op. Cit
[6] Op.Cit
[7] http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-09-15/iran-paramilitary-group-to-enforce-islamic-women-s-dress-code
[8] http://surveillance.rsf.org/en/iran/
[9] http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/05/20/iranians-arrested-dancing-happy-pharrell_n_5360711.html
[10] http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/05/20/iranians-arrested-dancing-happy-pharrell_n_5360711.html
[11] http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2013/08/20138512624781648.html Iranians under the Islamic regime: more or less religious? The Islamic regime claims that Iranians have become more religious; its opponents argue the opposite.
[12] The Cleric Who Changed: Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran’s Supreme Leader, was not always deeply conservative. By Ali Reza Eshraghi, Yasaman Baji, Iran; source: Institute for War & Peace Reporting (IWPR) http://www.payvand.com/news/10/jun/1032.html
[13] http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-green-movement-still-terrifies-irans-leaders-12224
[14] http://iranhr.net/2014/03/report-death-penalty-iran-2013/
[15] http://www.iranhrdc.org/english/publications/1000000564-ihrdc-chart-of-executions-by-the-islamic-republic-of-iran-2015.html?gclid=CLemhKW86cQCFSoEwwod3K8A3w
[16] Para. 70 of the 2013 report on Iran of the UN Special Rapporteur reproduced at http://www.iranhrdc.org/english/human-rights-documents/united-nations-reports/un-reports/1000000256-special-rapporteur-s-february-2013-report-on-the-situation-of-human-rights-in-the-islamic-republic-of-iran.html
[17] Iranian National Council for Free Elections: 115 rue Saint-Dominique – 75007 Paris, France. contact@irannc.org
[18] Lodging a complaint in the international criminal court for crimes against humanity, Reza Pahlavi document.
[19] http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/p01jmmyf
[20] http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jul/22/iran-public-execution-human-rights
[21] http://rudaw.net/english/middleeast/iran/05032015
[22] http://cers.leeds.ac.uk/files/2015/01/Racism-in-Iran-Harriet-Blyth-2014.pdf
[23] http://www.irantracker.org/basics/security-structures-iran
[24] http://www.foxnews.com/world/2015/02/15/iran-former-vice-president-taken-to-jail-to-serve-5-year-prison-term-for/
[25] http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/man-executed-after-biggest-bank-fraud-in-iranian-history-9432824.html
[26] Fazel Larijani is a brother of the head of the Judiciary, Sadegh Larijani, and of the speaker of the Parliament, Ali Larijani,
[27] http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/02/03/us-iran-politics-idUSBRE9120DG20130203
[28] http://www.ncr-iran.org/en/news/iran-world/12901-iran-larijani-brothers-counter-attack-against-ahmadinejad-execution-orders-confirmed-for-3-billion-bank-fraud-case
[29] http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/02/iran-escalates-fight-corruption.html#
[30] http://www.voanews.com/content/obama-iran-nuclear-agreement-a-once-in-a-lifetime-opportunity/2708079.html
[31] Op. Cit
[32] http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/03/iran-deal-threatens-israels-existence-benjamin-netanyahu-tells-obama
[33] http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/world/2015/03/20/Petraeus-Iran-not-ISIS-is-main-threat-to-Iraq.html
[34] Op. Cit

The Persian poets of old once wrote of nature, love, beauty and a transcendent greater spirit – lines sublime in thought and feeling. The contrast with the Islamic Republic of Iran speaks for itself.

Sheri Laizer, a Middle East and North African expert specialist and well known commentator on the Kurdish issue. She is a senior contributing writer for iKurd.net. More about Sheri Laizer see below.

The opinions are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent the views of iKurd.net or its editors.

Copyright © 2015 Ekurd.net – Sheri Laizer

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