Could Kurdistan's Masrour Barzani be the next Manuel Noriega?

Michael Rubin | American Enterprise Institute

Masrour Barzani, prime minister of the Iraqi Kurdistan Region and heir-apparent to the Barzani family’s multi-billion dollar business empire, is not having a good year. Earlier this year, dissident Maki Revend and the U.S.-based Kurdistan Victims Fund filed an expansive lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia against Masrour, his father Masoud, and several of his brothers and associates for a variety of crimes ranging from murder and kidnapping to counterfeiting and racketeering.

The plaintiffs have access to the “Pedawi Papers,” the private banking records of long-time Barzani aide Sarwar Pedawi, who for decades helped the Barzanis squirrel away hundreds of millions of dollars, if not billions of dollars, in offshore shell companies.

Masrour may believe that he can ignore the lawsuit because of sovereign immunity, but he misunderstands the laws and precedents, many of which the U.S. District Court in which the case will be tried itself set. His lawyer, Joe R. Reeder, a former U.S. undersecretary of the Army who himself is now a defendant in the case due to information exposed by the Pedawi Papers, may also have misled him as Reeder balances his own interests with those of the Barzanis.

Also undermining Masrour’s case is the fact that the Kurdistan Victim Funds’ lawyers have acquired a copy of Masrour’s green card showing that he has had American permanent residency for two decades. The combination of assets channeled through companies in the British Virgin Islands and Masrour’s obligations to file U.S. tax returns may also open Barzani up to tax fraud charges and perhaps even jail time.

Masrour may now believe that his U.S. security partnerships will immunize him from the consequences of the alleged crimes listed in the case. Prior to rising to the regional premiership, Masrour served as chancellor of the Kurdish region’s National Security Council, a position from, which he regularly liaised with the Central Intelligence Agency. Masrour and younger brother Waysi also head special units of the Peshmerga and intelligence service that, in theory, work alongside U.S. partners to counter terror but also serve as a personal militia and moonlight as death squads.

Kurdish counterterror partnership is important, but Masrour overestimates the immunity it buys him. No single individual or family is essential; there is always someone willing to take their place. Some even turn state’s evidence in order to ingratiate as downfall becomes more likely.

Here, Masrour should reflect instead on the case of Manuel Noriega, the former leader of Panama. Noriega could not rely on nepotism to rise through the ranks; rather, he was a hard-scrabble climber who ingratiated himself to Panama’s sitting president, often using his national guard perch to beat demonstrators and imprison and torture detainees. His reputation for brutality and deviance extended into his personal life. In 1966, as a second lieutenant, he attended the School of the Americas. Over subsequent years, he trained with Americans both in the Canal Zone and at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.

After helping crush a coup against President Omar Torrijos two years later, Noriega rose quickly through the military ranks, ultimately becoming head of intelligence, a portfolio Masrour also held in Iraqi Kurdistan. As with Masrour, the CIA considered Noriega an ally and asset, often paying him for services. Declassified documents show that U.S. officials understood privately that Noriega sought to profit off his American ties, even selling U.S. intelligence to Cuba. The same now is true with the U.S. intelligence and diplomatic communities. The Kurdistan Victims Fund case, meanwhile, documents the murder of an American intelligence officer by Barzani’s henchmen as they sought to “sell” him to Iran.

Ultimately, Noriega first rose to become Panama’s de facto leader after Torrijos’ death, just as Masrour’s power grew as he sidelined his aging father Masoud. After several years, Noriega and Masrour ultimately took the helm of their respective governments.

Relations between the United States and Panama grew strong during the Reagan administration. Noriega might have been a brute, but strategic necessity trumped value judgments. Panama provided crucial bases as the United States sought to counter socialist regimes and insurgencies in Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Colombia. Once again, there is a parallel as the major reason for the American embrace of Iraqi Kurdistan has less to do with moral imperative and more with the Barzanis’ willingness to allow American forces and intelligence agencies to operate in their region to monitor and perhaps even run operations against neighboring states.

Believing he had a pass from the Americans, Noriega grew even more corrupt. Beyond demanding kickbacks from those seeking legitimate business, the Panamanian leader used his position to provide cover for Colombian drug cartels as they shipped their product northward.

The Kurdistan Victims Fund case alleges Barzani involvement in the drug trade. Paragraph 726 reads:

The largest source of illegal drug revenue for the Barzani Continuing Criminal Enterprise, according to Confidential Human Source #8, who has direct clandestine access to senior ranking officials of the Defendant Iraqi Kurdistan Regional Government, is crystal meth and cocaine. The cocaine is unlawfully imported and distributed principally to Europe and Asia. The Barzani Continuing Criminal Enterprise partners with international drug cartels and the IRGC [Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps] to obtain cocaine, and manufacture crystal meth. In the business association with the IRGC and international drug cartels, the IRGC is the lead member because of Iran’s desperate need for cash. Defendant Masrour Barzani manages the illegal drug operation through the intelligence agency of the Defendant Iraqi Kurdistan Regional Government, which is controlled by the Barzani Continuing Criminal Enterprise. Raw material of Sudafed is imported from China and India in blister packaging. In Erbil, the capital city of the Defendant Iraqi Kurdistan Regional Government, the Sudafed is taken out of the blister packs and shipped in bulk to Iran for chemical processing. The product comes back to Erbil as meth and is then distributed to world markets, principally Europe and Asia. Under the direct control and command of Defendant Masrour Barzani.

Despite extensive ties between Noriega and George H.W. Bush in Bush’s role as CIA director, vice president, and president, Bush eventually concluded that the arrogance and criminality of Noriega was too much to tolerate. In December 1989, after unsuccessful efforts to compel Noriega to resign, Bush ordered the U.S. military to remove Noriega so that the United States could prosecute him for his crimes against Americans.

On January 3, 1990, Noriega surrendered and transferred to Miami, where the following year he faced a trial. The court ultimately convicted the former Panamanian leader and U.S. ally on eight counts of drug trafficking, money laundering, and racketeering.

Masrour may believe that he is immune, but he might consider that during his visit to Washington earlier this year, successive U.S. officials reportedly turned down his requests to set aside the Kurdistan Victims Fund case, and President Joe Biden refused to meet him.

While Noriega ruled an entire country, the Barzanis controlled only one portion of one region within a larger country. If anything, then, Reagan and Bush administration officials considered Noriega more indispensable than recent administrations have viewed Masrour.

American humorist Mark Twain reportedly said, “History doesn’t repeat itself, but it often rhymes.” It is a lesson both Barzani and Kurds suffering his corruption might consider.

Michael Rubin is a former Pentagon official whose major research areas are the Middle East, Turkey, Iran and diplomacy. He is author of “Dancing with the Devil: The Perils of Engaging Rogue Regimes” (Encounter, 2014). He is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute AEI. His major research area is the Middle East, with special focus on Iran, Iraq, Turkey, and Kurdish society.

The article first published at aei.org

The opinions are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent the views of iKurd.net or its editors.