The Resurrection (Ba’ath) Party – Before the Iran-Iraq War

Sheri Laizer | Exclusive to iKurd.net

Historic documents on the 35th year after the death of co-founder, Michel ‘Aflaq [1]

“We are not hermits taking refuge in mercy to give peace to a conscience disturbed by seeing misery and suffering, so that we become great in our own eyes and sleep untroubled…” (‘Aflaq on ‘socialism’). [2]

The Arab Socialist Resurrection (Ba’ath) Party first saw the light of day in Damascus in 1947. It was essentially the brainchild of Michel ‘Aflaq (09.01.1910-23.06.1989), the son of a Syrian Greek Orthodox wheat-trader and of a Sunni Muslim fellow student, Salah Ad-Din Al-Bitar (01.01.1912- 21.08.1980) later taking in people around Zaki al-Arsuzi.

Michel ‘Aflaq studied history at the Sorbonne in Paris where he met al-Bitar. The two graduates would go on to work with spirited dedication to engender a Pan-Arab resurrection. They envisioned a future political order leading to a secular socialist enlightenment beyond the strait jacket of class struggle that would pose constraints on Arab unity.

Michel ‘Aflaq originated in the Christian quarter of the al-Midan (horse arena) district of Damascus, south of the ancient city walls and close to the centre of the modern capital, looking up to the dry slopes of Mt Qasioun. Born during the early years of the Arab revolt against the Ottomans he grew up as one of five children in a pluralist Damascus setting. Al Midan would suffer adversity and bombing during the Mandate period when Arab lands came under European colonial rule that was further enforced through economic and territorial fragmentation. This period is believed to have aroused strong nationalist sentiments in the young ‘Aflaq before he travelled to Paris to take up his scholarship there awarded by the Damascus Preparatory School. He studied history at the Sorbonne between 1928-1932 and read widely spanning the work of Bergson, Dostoevski, Ghandi, Gide, Marx, Nietzsche, and Romain Rolland but according to Norma Salem-Babikian (contrary to Patrick Seale) in her paper,‘ A Partial Reconstruction of Michel ‘Aflaq’s Thought: The Role of Islam in the Formulation of Arab Nationalism [3] is said to have been most influenced by André Gide as a ‘creative writer and political thinker.’ [4]

In his twenties by the 1930s, Michel ‘Aflaq had embarked on a literary career writing pieces in different genres ‘that expressed new moral and social attitudes, which had been unknown in Syria, …picturing universal themes in an Arab milieu. ‘ The work was also imbued with a message of revolution against the social and moral conditions pertaining in Syria. 5 When still based in the French capital, ‘Aflaq also founded an Arab Students’ Union.

After his return to Damascus, he taught secondary school history until devoting his days to political activism. He would profit from the political settlement reached between the Syrian and French leaders in 1928 under Henri Ponset who had become the French High Commissioner to Syria and had sought to make peace with the Syrians. [6] [7] In the period of mounting Arab opposition to French rule at the time, ‘Aflaq and al-Bitar set up a secret organisation called Youth for Arab Resurrection (Shabab al-ihya ‘al-‘arabi) AKA the Arab Resurrection (al-Ba’th ‘al-arabi). At the same period, but unknown to each other for that year, Zaki al-Arsuzi had founded the Arab Nationalist Party (al-hizb al-qawmi al ‘arabi).

In 1940, Michel ‘Aflaq published Fi Sabil al-Ba’ath (In the Way of Ressurection [8]), which according to one commentator became the party’s central doctrinal text for the next twenty years. His other seminal works were Ma’rakat al-Masir al-Wahid (The Battle for One Destiny, 1958), and his 1975 work, Al-Nidal did Tashweeh Harakat al-Thawra al-Arabiyya (The Struggle Against Distorting the Movement of Arab Revolution). [9] ‘Aflaq had moved increasingly away from literature as a vehicle of change to direct action but his political work still bore the hallmarks of multi-layered, creative thinking and of literary influences rather than bare political propaganda. [10] His first audience had been his students, ‘who eventually formed the core of the Ba’ath Party’. [11]

In 1941, ‘Aflaq keenly supported the Arab rebellion in neighbouring Iraq against the British and with his supporters led the formation of shabab al-nasrat al-iraq (Youth in support of Iraq) backing its leader Rashid Ali ‘al-Kaylani, but not in its fascist undercurrents. [12] ‘Aflaq and al-Bitar then steadily built up the Arab Resurrection organisation in the last years of WWII. Its rallying cry was ‘One Arab nation with an eternal message’ first used in 1943 when the French in Syria permitted elections. Michel ‘Aflaq stood as the Greek Orthodox candidate for Damascus, losing only because of the manner in which the electoral system operated.

‘On 10 July 1945, ‘Aflaq, al-Bitar and Midhat al-Bitar applied for a permit to officially constitute the Ba’ath movement as a political party. The permit was initially refused but the Ba’ath organisation “was launched and no one could doubt its existence”. [13] It had also become strongly anti-communist.”

In 1946, permission was granted for the publication of a newspaper, al-Ba’th (The Resurrection). With al-Bitar as editor in chief, ‘Aflaq became the paper’s political editor and the political party it linked with was viewed as an educational vehicle to enlighten people to Arabism.

That same year, the UN Security Council upheld the demands of the nationalist governments of Syria and Lebanon for French foreign withdrawal and the French evacuated Syria in April and Lebanon in December. Palestine and Iraq remained Arab nations under the British mandate.

Michel ‘Aflaq’s political philosophy

Growing up in the Communist era ‘Aflaq had increasingly rejected Marxism as lacking in relevance for the Arabs. State and religion had to be kept separate and neither alone could resolve the problems faced by mankind. The poorer classes needed structured political support in order to attain human dignity and self-respect. ‘Aflaq advocated bringing about an end to colonial imperialism, particularly, to begin with, in his native land. This would necessitate ending hereditary rule by the old social classes still much in place since the Ottoman Empire but complicated further by Arab tribal traditions.

As with the French Revolution and the violent posturing of the sans culottes (‘without breeches’ as the French lower classes were dubbed) in their frenzy to seize power, exact bloody revenge and impose themselves upon their former rulers – the successive coups in Syria, Iraq, Egypt (and the post-Ottoman Republic of Turkey) presented barriers to a smooth transition to social change with a greater measure of equality for all. The three former Ottoman Arab states that initially sought unity under the auspices of the United Arab Republic would stumble over their unequal civic and economic levels, leadership and how to achieve the common goals at the same time as fighting colonial imperialism. The military revolt under Lieutenant Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser in Egypt had a common goal and shared Arab identity. The Resurrection Party leaders appealed to this shared history and identity and sought to stimulate a renaissance of past Arab glories in literature, musical forms, architecture and valour. Past Arab achievements needed revival in the present ’so as to stimulate a resurrection or rebirth (Ba’ath)’.

First Ba’ath Party Congress in Syria: the Palestinian Nakba threatens Arab unity

The party’s first congress was held in Damascus in 1947 and ‘Aflaq was elected as the leader, (Amid), of a four-member executive. The party then began to publish Al Ba’ath, the following year. Aged 48, Michel ‘Aflaq also married an Egyptian scholar, Dr Amal Bashour, in a Christian wedding ceremony year during the short-lived Syrian-Egyptian alliance (UAR). The couple took their vows in the Greek Orthodox Mariamite Cathedral, archaeologically speaking, the oldest church in Damascus. [14]

The Arab Socialist Rebirth party was then led forward by civilians, not military officers. Once Hafez al-Assad took power in Syria several years later he entirely rejected ‘Aflaq and al-Bitar’s model. His was a militarised Ba’ath Party deriving from a military leadership and sustained by the army. ‘Neo Ba’athism’ was soon at odds with the civil branch founded in the Iraq region. The parties essentially became two different parties with the same name.

Just a year after the founding of the new party, the Arab-Israeli war of 1948 erupted – the year of the Palestinian Nakba (the disaster that overtook the Palestinian nation). The Syrian-Arab defeat, suffered during the conflict, severely strained the ideals of the fledgling party with its intellectual civilian leadership. The Arab defeat posed a bloody test for pan-Arabism thereafter as indeed for national unity as with each successive year Israel occupied more and more Palestinian land endorsing demographic change through free Jewish immigration and the perpetuation of Zionist ideology. Israel also counted upon American backing at it has done ever since and never more striking than in the bloody conflict in Gaza for the past year, now stretching into Lebanon. The Arabs and Israelis have continued to clash bitterly and profoundly, their conflicting political aims and outlook lacking any common ground such as to secure any kind of peaceful co-existence. Israel, also, was never serious about peace as the Zionists gained ground, demanding all Palestinian territory for the state of Israel as ‘Palestine’ shrank further and further year by year.

The rampant sectarianism and religious division that was destabilising their near neighbour also deepened the strain over the question of Arab unity that had been central to the Ba’ath Party’s formulation.

After Adeb Shishkali had taken power in Syria through a military coup in 1953 [15] he banned all other political parties including the Ba’ath Party whose leadership escaped into Lebanon where ‘Aflaq and al-Bitar had agreed to merge with Akram al-Hawrani and establish the Arab Socialist Ba’ath Party in 1952. Following Shishkali’s assassination, his regime collapsed in February 1954 after just one year. The three Ba’athist ideologues – ‘Aflaq, al-Bitar, and al-Hawrani returned to Syria to contest the first post-Shishkali parliamentary elections. Owing to Akram al-Hawrani’s popularity the Ba’ath Party then won 17 out of 142 seats in the Chamber of Deputies.” [16] Despite this, the elite in Syria opposed the socialist trend of the Ba’ath and after Michel ‘Aflaq had gained some degree of influence in the government he was driven out of the country and ousted in the 1966 Syrian Coup d’état that split the Ba’ath Party in two.

Although ‘Aflaq escaped with his life to Lebanon he disagreed with the Syrian-Lebanese Communist Party’s support for colonial policies through the Popular Front put in place under the French Mandate at the end of the 1930s. The new faces in power in Syria then sentenced ‘Aflaq and al-Bitar to death in absentia in 1971 [17] and additionally accused ‘Aflaq of stealing Zaki al-Arsuzi’s political ideas together with the Ba’ath Party name.

Iraq Region Branch and Nasserism

The Iraqi regional branch of the Ba’ath Party was established in Baghdad in 1951 as a sister branch to the Syrian chapter by a Shi’a Muslim Arab named Fuad al-Rakabi. Neither religion nor sect determined belonging to the new party and its movement. Its goals were secular, egalitarian and socialist and were expressed in its motto, ‘Unity, Liberty, Socialism’ and a greater unified Arab nation – One Arab nation with an eternal message. Faith was accepted but religion and state were to be kept apart. [18]

The Iraq branch rejected the Syrian branch’s accusation that al-Arsuzi’s influence on Ba’athist philosophy was significant and credited him solely with coming up with the name Ba’ath – ‘Rebirth’ seeing him as being far more to the left in his orientation.

Egypt’s charismatic president, Gamal Abd al-Nasser, also from a military background like Assad and like the pre-Ba’ath Iraqi military officer, Abdul-Karim Qassim, had led the revolt of the Free Officers in Egypt on July 23, 1952, together with Mohamed Naguib, in toppling King Farouk. They too sought to advance and cement the pan-Arab dream along similar lines to the Ba’ath Party. Nasser mounted his revolution on the slogan of ‘dignity in life’ and depicted himself as trying to elevate the poor Egyptian fellahin rural masses even doing so at popular rallies.

The Syrian Ba’ath party engaged ideologically with Nasser and on February 1, 1958, the two countries took the step of establishing the United Arab Republic (UAR) under Nasser’s charismatic leadership. It was the same year that on July 14 in Iraq, Brigadier-General Abdul-Karim Qasim slayed and overthrew the Hashemite monarchy establishing a Republic. The two kings, as cousins, had formed a rival Arab Federation. King Hussein and King Faisal II established the Arab Federation at a ceremony in Amman, the Jordanian capital.

During the pan-Arab merger Iraq underwent the July 14, 1958, revolt under Brigadier-General Karim Qasim and Colonel Abdul Salam Arif’s leadership – a mutiny, in fact, successfully carried off by the so-called ‘Free Officers’ against the young monarch, King Faisal II. As Qasim’s mother came from the Kurdish Shi’a Faily sect, he also gained popular backing from a sector of the Kurds in the north despite profound ideological differences and aims. The Kurds sought equality, recognition of their identity, and self-rule along the lines of the decrees of the short-lived Kurdish Republic of Mahabad of 1946 in Iran and then to declare independence. [19] The Arab leader had aimed to end British and Colonial influence in Iraq, the Kurds to supplant the Arab (Turkish, Syrian and Iranian) domination over them.

Abd al Karim Qasim and the Free Officers brutally executed the young king, Faisal II (at just 23, the younger cousin of King Hussein of Jordan, (both young men had been educated at Harrow, England), the Crown Prince Abd al-Ilah who was his uncle and every member of the royal family present at the Qasr al-Rihab Palace in Baghdad that fateful morning. The mob once roused then also murdered and mutilated the prime minister, Nuri Said, after Said’s escape and recapture, along with numerous officials of the former British-created Kingdom. [20]

After the killing of King Faisal II, Nasser recognised Qasim as leader. The Iraqi Ba’athists, some of whom had fought with Qasim in bringing about the coup, supported joining the UAR but once Qasim set himself up as Prime Minister and sole leader, he saw Nasser as a rival and threat to his own power opposing the union. He put an end to talks in 1959. The diminishing Syrian influence with Egypt over economic standardisation also led to the Syrian coup d’etat in September 1961, ending the UAR. Bitter differences over the problem of a single leadership for the two countries (with Egypt in the ascendant), fundamental political goals and strategy ended the union in 1961 after just three years. The Syrian military officers had also opposed being subordinate to Egyptian officers and had increasingly agitated. The Communists had then gained ground in Syria. Agricultural differences between Egypt and Syria were also highlighted. The Ba’athists in the Qasim government began to plot to remove him after he consolidated his personal power, leaning towards the Communists and Kurds for further backing.

In 1963, the Ba’athists rose up and Qasim was assassinated in what became known as the Ramadan Revolution of February 8th. The Ba’ath briefly gained power and the quest for re-cementing unity between Iraq, Syria and Egypt moved forward anew with a common flag with three stars symbolising each of the three nations agreed upon. This flag, Iraq would maintain alone of the three. The first Ba’ath government was overthrown by pro-Nasser military officers between November 13-18.

In his 2015 publication, Sold Out? US Foreign Policy, Iraq, the Kurds, and the Cold War, Dr. Bryan Gibson observes how Qasim’s former deputy and co-ringleader in the coup against the monarchy, Abdul-Salam Arif, had been politically independent. He gained the largely ceremonial title of President, while the prominent party general, Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr, related to future leader, Saddam Hussein in being his uncle Khairallah Tulfah’s cousin whose son also married Khairallah Tulfah’s daughter became premier. [21] It is claimed that the most powerful figure in the new government was its general secretary, Ali Salih al-Sa’adi who was in control of the National Guard militia and went on to organise a massacre of suspected communists and other dissidents following the coup. [22]

Saddam Hussein becomes the protégé of Michel ‘Aflaq

In Iraq in 1952, a new generation had come of age, and among them, the revolutionary young Saddam Hussein, who shared a birthplace with the great Islamic warrior, Salahaddin in Tikrit, 100 kms north of Baghdad. Tikrit also boasted a glorious ancient Sumerian past.

At just fifteen years old at this period, Saddam Hussein had developed well beyond the rural farming existence into which he had been born and over which he would campaign ever afterwards against illiteracy. Deeply aware and proud of his Arab roots, he knew at first hand of the problems faced by the villagers and the gap between the people of the countryside and the educated political class in the capital through his maternal uncle, Khairallah Tulfah. His uncle brought him under his roof and tutelage in the historic Karkh district of west Baghdad. Khairallah was a dedicated and active proponent of Ba’ath ideals.

Suez Crisis elevates Nasserism

In 1956, the Suez crisis erupted. The Israelis, British and French plotted to seize control of the Suez Canal. In the space of a week in November 1956 the British government faced public panic as petrol rationing was introduced, saw the pound plummet in value, the ‘special relationship’ with the US crack and the cabinet split while protests spread across the country and around the Middle East. In January 1957, British Conservative Party Prime Minister, Anthony Eden, was dispatched on sick leave, humbled and then forced to resign two months after his controversial role in halting the Suez operation, ‘suspected of having misled the House of Commons over the extent of his complicity with Israel and France. In July 1956, Nasser had nationalised the Suez Canal Company which had been British and French owned after the United States and Britain refused to accord Egypt economic aid. ‘British and French leaders threatened to use force to compel Nasser to restore their control of the canal company. Citing the importance of the maritime trade that plied the waterway and the profits the Western governments earned from operating it, British Prime Minister Anthony Eden observed that “the Egyptian has his thumb on our windpipe.” ‘ [23]

Israel was then to invade Egypt and when Egypt retaliated, as expected, the British and French were to issue ultimatums ordering Egyptian and Israeli troops to withdraw from the Suez Canal Zone. Under the pretext, Israel invaded the Sinai on October 29. Israeli forces promptly approached the Suez Canal and the bogus ultimatums issued and air strikes launched against Egypt. US President, Dwight Eisenhower imposed sanctions on the colluding powers, achieved a UN ceasefire resolution and a UN Emergency Force to secure disengagement but the crisis escalated beyond his diplomatic efforts. On November 5, British and French paratroopers landed along the Suez Canal and Soviet Cold War leaders threatened to intervene through assembling forces in friendly Syria, against Britain and France using weapons of mass destruction. On November 6, Eisenhower’s threatened politico-economic pressures on the parties to the conflict secured a UN ceasefire and UNEF forces were at once deployed to Egypt.

Nasser, in contrast to the plot, was strengthened and his “picture was everywhere—carried aloft in the streets from Cairo to Baghdad, on the front cover of Time magazine promoting the Arab view that their national liberation could be achieved and the colonial imperialists defeated. He was hailed acros the Arab world as a leader that survived an Israeli invasion and repelled the colonialist forces. However, the Suez crisis also exposed the fundamental weaknesses of the Egyptian army and of the state party. [24]

“The Suez Crisis instigated a new level of U.S. involvement in the Middle East. Concerned by the decline of European influence and rise of Soviet involvement, the United States declared the Eisenhower Doctrine in early 1957, pledging to distribute economic and military aid and, if necessary, use military force to contain communism in the Middle East.” [25]

Egyptian, Syrian and Iraqi rivalry

Before long, internal splits were gaining momentum between the three Arab states that had viewed their union with ideological enthusiasm. Itamar Rabinovitch in his book, Syria under the Ba’ath – 1963-1966: The Army Party Symbiosis [26] analysed the next stage of the timeline thus:

“On 2 October 1961, Bitar, Hawrani and 14 other politicians—mostly conservatives—signed a manifesto.[13] Two months later, Bitar signed a similar document, the National Charter for the Separatist Regime. His signing both of these documents was used against him in the 1963 Unity Talks between Egypt, Iraq and Syria as proof of him lacking pro-Arab nationalist credentials. The manifesto, which was handwritten by Bitar, stated that Nasser had distorted “the idea of Arab nationalism” and accused him of strangling the “political and democratic life” in Syria.[9] Bitar, then under popular criticism, withdrew his signature from the 2 October manifesto, but it was too late to prevent damage.[14] Several members called upon ‘Aflaq to expel Bitar from the party, citing his wild opportunism.[9] After the dissolution of the UAR, Bitar did not join the reconstituted Syrian Regional Branch of the Ba’ath Party until after the 8 March 1963 Syrian coup d’état. Because of this, ‘Aflaq became the unquestionable leader of the Ba’ath Party.” [27]

Al-Bitar’s third cabinet of August 4, 1963, was dissolved on November 11, and Hafiz al-Assad succeeded him the next day as Prime Minister. Al Bitar was re-appointed after the Hama riot and massacre between the Ba’ath and the Muslim Brotherhood, outlawed in 1964.

‘Aflaq faced opposition and division over unity with Egypt

After the creation of the United Arab Republic, (UAR) Michel Aflaq had been forced by Egypt’s Gamal Abd-al Nasser to dissolve the Ba’ath party. The condition thus imposed by Nasser to strengthen unity provoked a major crisis inside the party and ‘Aflaq was widely blamed over it. Sources note that to reinstate the Syrian Regional Branch of the Ba’ath Party, Muhmmad Umran, Salah Jadid, and Hafez al-Assad set up a Military Committee.

Later in 1962, Aflaq convened the 5th National Congress of the Ba’ath Party (where he was re-elected as the Secretary-General of the National Command) and ordered the re-establishment of the Syrian Regional Branch. At the Congress, the Military Committee (through Umran) established contact with ‘Aflaq and with the civilian leadership. The committee requested the party’s permission to take power by force, and ‘Aflaq agreed.

After the success of the February 1963 coup in Iraq by the regional branch there, the Military Committee of the Syrian regional branch swiftly gathered to launch a similar coup in March 1963 against President Nazim al-Quds. It began on March 8 and Assad led a small group to capture the government’s Dumayr airbase, 40 kilometres northeast of Damascus, the only unit to come up against any resistance before the base surrendered. The Military Committee had allied with the regionalists, a group of cells in the Syrian Regional Branch that had refused to disband in 1958 when the party had been dissolved.

Although Michel ‘Aflaq viewed these cells as traitors to the command, Assad conversely hailed them as constituting the “true cells of the party” highlighting serious divergences in outlook between the Military Committee and the National Command, the superior decision-making body under ‘Aflaq.

 In 1965, at the Eighth National Congress Hafez al-Assad was elected to the National Command and informed Jadid on its activities. Thereafter, the National Command dissolved the Syrian Regional Command.

Michel ‘Aflaq proposed his close confederate and co-founder Salah al-Din al-Bitar for the post of Prime Minister but Assad and Brahim Makhous opposed it. According to Patrick Seale, Hafez Assad greatly disliked ‘Aflaq branding him with having ordered the party’s dissolution to Nasser’s dictates back in 1958 – the year that Abdul Karim Qasim’s Free Officers murdered the Hashemite royal family and ended the monarchy in Iraq.

He was hostile to ‘Aflaq’s supporters and planned to supplant them. In response to the imminent coup, Hafez Assad, Naji Jamil, Husayn Mulhim and Yusuf Sayigh swiftly headed to London. In the staging of the coup that followed in 1966, the Military Committee overthrew the National Command causing an enduring split in the Ba’ath movement and the supplanting of Aflaq’s ideology by Neo Ba’athism with its military emphasis over the civilian pan-Arab cause. The international party accordingly became split between Damascus and Baghdad as two rival seats of power with Michel ‘Aflaq favouring the Iraqi Regional Command.

The Syrian coup was led by leftist military officers aligned with Hafez al-Assad and Salah Jadid. The victorious “neo-Ba’ath” then severed links with the National Command. After seizing power in the coup in which more than 400 people were killed, Assad and his men purged the Ba’ath Party’s old guard including its leading ideologues and founders. This resulted in the permanent schism between the Syrian and Iraqi Ba’ath branches. Many of the Syrian Ba’ath leaders fled to Iraq in preference for maintaining the party’s original ideals. [28] There is much more detail to this period in Syria and Egypt than the focus of this article allows for.

Ba’ath Party – Iraq region

The revolutionary Arab Socialist Ba’ath Party – Iraq branch region – was first established in 1948 by two Shi’a Muslims, Fuad al-Rikabi and Sa,dun Hammadi, who became Minister for Foreign Affairs (1974-1983), Oil Minister and then briefly, prime minister in 1991, and later Speaker of the House from 1996-2003 US invasion. [29]

Al Rikabi became secretary general of the regional command in 1952. He believed strongly in Gamal Abdel Nasser to the extent that he quit Qasim’s government, which had included a number of Ba’athists, and instead joined the plotters seeking Qasim’s end after the latter had rejected Nasserist goals and instead proclaimed himself the sole leader, or Zaim.

The Ba’ath Party’s branch in Baghdad attracted membership from both the educated civil strata of society and from the military officer class and educated members of the Iraqi Army.

Abdulsalam Arif Mohamed al-Jumayli

Abdulsalam Arif became Iraq’s second Republican president after the overthrow and execution of Brigadier General Abdul Karim Qasim on February 8-9, 1963, at the age of 49 (born November 21,1914). He had been Qasim’s aide during the coup that ended the monarchy but had fallen out with him as Qasim promoted nationalism without unity and had allied with the Communists.

Although Abdulsalam Arif had been a member of the Free Officers and among the leaders of the coup against the Hashemite monarchy with Qasim, he was a pan-Arabist and supported the creation of the UAR under Nasser.

On May 26, 1964, Arif established the Joint Presidency Council with Egypt. On the anniversary of the July 14 revolution, he declared the founding of the Arab Socialist Union (ASU) of Iraq, and declared it to be the “threshold of the building of the unity of the Arab nation under Arab socialismit closely resembled the structure of the ASU of Egypt where many of the Arab nationalist parties were dissolved and absorbed into the ASU.30 Banks and key businesses were also nationalised aiming to bring Iraq and Egypt closer and on December 20, plans for union were announced. Despite this, in July 1965, the Nasserist ministers resigned from the cabinet.

Arif appointed Ba’ath Party member, Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr (1.07.1914 – 04.10.1982) as Prime minister, and to the post of Vice President, forming a new cabinet that retained several Ba’athists, but favoured pro-Nasser military officers. He declared himself Chief of Staff. A month later he handed that position over to his brother, General Abdulrahman Arif and made  Lieutenant-General Tahir Yahya his Prime Minister.

Assad condemned the old guard

After the 8 March 1963 Revolution in Syria, ‘Aflaq’s position had been weakened, and he resigned from the leadership in 1965. However, he supported the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) urging al-Bakr to send armed Iraqi troops into Jordan to save the PLO’s fighters in Amman. Bakr refused to involve the Iraqi Army and Michel ‘Aflaq returned to a self-imposed exile in Lebanon.

At the age of 44, Michel ‘Aflaq had become the Secretary General of the National Command of the Iraqi Ba’ath Party holding that office between June 1954 and April 1965 when he was succeeded in the role by Munif al-Razzaz.

Those that opposed Hafez al-Assad (1930-2000), like Ba’ath ideologue and founder, Salah al-Din al-Bitar were either facing execution in Syria or would be tracked down and assassinated abroad. Assad had taken part in the second coup in Syria of February 1966 that had overthrown the Syrian Ba’ath leadership and had then become defence minister in the new government. After four years in this position, he had initiated a third coup and in 1970 installed himself as president of the country.

Forswearing state socialism and advocating privatism and private property he had then allied himself with the Soviet Union and its Eastern bloc in return for support against Israel thereafter organising the government of Syria on a sectarian basis. The Alawite sect to which he belonged took control over the military, the intelligence apparatus and the security services, as well as dominating the civil bureaucracy. ‘Aflaq viewed him as autocratic and condemned his military regime as fundamentally at odds with the ideals of the Ba’ath party’s founders despite Assad retaining the party name.

The Iraqi Kurdish War 1961-1966 (and 1969, 1974-1975)

After Arif’s sudden and untimely death when short haul, De Haviland aircraft crashed near Basra on April 13, 1966, his soldier brother, Abdul Rahman Arif, became president (April 16, 1966 -July 17, 1968). [31] The first Kurdish revolt had already broken out under Abdul Salam Arif’s presidency:

The Iraqi military launched a major offensive sending 40,000 troops against the rebels under Mala Mustafa Barzani that numbered just 3,500 peshmerga guerrillas. The support of the Shah and of Israel aided a Kurdish victory at Mt. Handrin on May 11, 1967, where a plan devised by an IDF military officer, (sic) Zuri Sagy (General Uri Sagy [32]), led to the deaths of 1,400-2,000 Iraqi soldiers with hundreds of others taken prisoner. The Iraqi military hawks were discredited. And on 29 June 29, Prime Minister, Abdul Rahman al-Bazzaz announced a Twelve Point Plan for peace, which included administrative decentralisation in Iraqi Kurdistan and Kurdish representation in the Iraqi Parliament. [33]

Author, Dr Byran Gibson details in the Introduction to his book, Sold Out?: US Foreign Policy, Iraq, the Kurds and the Cold War:

“…As a whole, this study relies on recently available primary documents, interviews, and the available secondary resources to construct a detailed narrative of US-Iraqi relations and the Kurdish War between 1958 and 1975. It advances existing historiographical debates by bringing to bear a significant body of newly available primary source material. In doing so, it underlines that the established historiography has relied excessively on the Pike Report, which has distorted our understanding of events. As a complement to this research, interviews were conducted with General Brent Scowcroft, Ambassador Ronald Neumann, Pulitzer Prize–winning Washington Post journalist Jim Hoagland, and a former high-level CIA official. This former CIA official was a bonafide participant in the events detailed in this book. He was stationed in Iran between 1958 and June 1963, assigned to Tabriz to monitor the Kurds in 1959, in charge of the CIA’s “denied area” operations in the Middle East from late 1968 through June 1970, and deputy station chief in Tehran from August 1973 to 1976. He has asked to remain anonymous because he still consults for the CIA. Two Israeli intelligence officials, Zuri Sagy and Eliezer Tsafrir, were also interviewed on the subject of Israel’s involvement in the Kurdish War. Sagy played a crucial role in directing Kurdish military operations against Iraq during the 1960s and later in 1974–75, and Tsafrir is a former senior Mossad official. Both explained in detail Israeli operations inside Iraq during the 1960s and 1970s. …details provided here have either been confirmed or supported by documents or secondary sources. This book seeks to redress these historiographical deficiencies and further develop the argument that the US policy toward Iraq between 1958 and 1975 was based on denying Soviet influence over Iraq, inline with its Cold War strategy…” [34]

Al Bakr’s Presidency and the second Ba’ath era, July 17, 1968

In 1964, the Ba’athists had tried to overthrow Arif but the plot was exposed and the plotters, including Saddam Hussein, were arrested and imprisoned.

Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr gained the presidency on July 17, 1968 in a bloodless coup against Abdal Rahman Arif while he was asleep, aided by Arif’s own men and Ba’athists. Sources state just as Arif and his brother, Abdul Salam had done in the 1963 coup carried out against Major General Abdul Karim Qasim, the new coalition declared victory having once captured the state radio station and the Ministry of Defence. When the defence minister,Hardan al-Tikriti called Arif and informed him he was no longer president the new regime was declared and Arif sent into exile in Turkey.

Meanwhile, in 1970 under al-Bakr’s leadership, Iraq having refused to support the PLO against King Hussein of Jordan, tried to find solutions to stop the bloodshed in Lebanon, while suffering the ongoing conflict with Syria. [35]

When 300,000 Palestinian refugees in Lebanon developed a significant resistance movement after 1967, and after 1970, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) relocated its headquarters to Beirut, Palestinians and Lebanese in the south became a major target of the Israeli military as now again. Amal, the Shi’a secular militant group founded in 1975 had become a strong ally of the PLO early in the war but its support eroded as time passed. [36] Iraq, under Abdulrahman Arif, and the government in Lebanon had both refused to recognise the state of Israel.

When the Lebanese Civil War broke out in 1975, Michel ‘Aflaq returned from Beirut to Baghdad. Vice President Saddam Hussein received him warmly and ‘Aflaq was honoured at state functions, always seated on Saddam’s right.

After 1977, Syria, had backed the PLO and opposed Egypt’s peace-making endeavours with Israel. [37] Syria had also become deeply engaged in the Lebanese Civil war having intervened in June 1976, a year into the conflict, sending in 25,000 troops against the PLO and other militias on the left, siding with Soviet-aligned Arab countries to support its Maronite Christian allies in government. Syria would remain there as the real power in the country for the next three decades. The PLO had been allied with Druze leader, Kamal Jumblatt’s PSP at the time. Fighting had broken out between the PLO and the Christian militias but Syria constantly switched sides as the war went on.

Vice president, Saddam Hussein al-Majid al-Tikriti

As Vice President to Ahmad Hassan al-Bakr the younger man enjoyed a spate updating Iraq’s diplomatic relations with France, Spain, Algeria, Tunisia, Yugoslavia, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the Soviet Union, Cuba and Japan. He also secured the approval of the CIA and MI6. The Arab world began to look upon him as a new Nasser, and he became a source of pride for the greater Arab nation. Al Bakr remained president until 1979 when he passed the baton to his vice president. (Former president, Abdal Rahman Arif had safely returned to Iraq then but kept a low profile remaining there until regime change in 2003 when he fled to Jordan. His daughter and family were killed in the sectarian bloodshed that followed and he passed away in Amman in 2007).

Saddam’s uncle and future father-in-law, Khairallah Tulfah, passionately upheld Michel ‘Aflaq’s philosophy inside his own Baghdad circle and conceived it to be a practical vehicle for Iraq’s evolving society. Ba’athism, after all, he reasoned was founded on the values of Unity, Liberty/Freedom and Socialism, echoing the slogan of the French Revolution, Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité – Liberty, Equality and Fraternity (to which, more recently, ‘laicism/secularism’ would be added). Ba’ath principles would also allow for flexibility in social and economic advances. According to President al-Bakr’s former Foreign Minister, Talib el-Shibib, the religious denomination or sect of the leading Ba’ath party members was accorded little importance because most did not know each other’s religion. [38]

By October 1978, al-Bakr had begun working closely with Hafez al-Assad to foil the Camp David Accords, signing a charter for Joint National Action in Baghdad which provided for the “closest form of unity ties” including “complete military unity” as well as “economic, political and cultural unification”. [39] This plan was to come into effect in July 1979. Under it, Saddam would have become a deputy to Assad of Syria.

Personal ties

Saddam’s maternal cousin, Adnan Khairallah, was married to Ahmad Hassan al-Bakr’s daughter, Ghaida al-Nada. He enjoyed close relations with al-Bakr.

Having joined the Ba’ath party in 1957, just one year before the 1958 coup against the monarchy, in 1963 Saddam Hussein married Adnan’s sister, Sajida, who had been working as a primary school teacher in Baghdad. Saddam’s formative years were spent with his maternal uncle Tulfah and the intellectual circle that were gathered around him. [40] Saddam and Sajida were betrothed by their families in childhood in accordance with Iraqi customs but Sajida only met Saddam when he was aged 21. The young couple would name their first child, a son, born in 1964, a year after their marriage, Uday, meaning in Arabic, ‘eminent, distinguished and noble’. The second son, Qusay, born in 1966 meant ‘one that runs fast’, or in its Islamic sense, a unit of warriors attacking the infidel enemy. Their first daughter, Raghad, was born in 1968 and her name means ‘abundance’. Another daughter was born a year later in 1969 and named Rana, which means mesmerising through her beauty those who behold her. The couple’s last born and fifth child in 1972, again a daughter, was named Hala, which means the bright aura of the moon. All were romantic, idealised names. In this period, Saddam became the popular widely travelled vice president.

The Diplomatic, Jet-Setting Vice President of Iraq, 1970-1980

As vice president of Iraq for the decade from the second Ba’ath Party bloodless coup of July 14, 1968, until he became president on July 16, 1979, Saddam Hussein travelled widely. He received praise as an effective diplomatic leader cementing Iraq’s politico-economic relations far and wide.

On August 4, 1970, Vice President Saddam headed an official Iraqi government and Ba’ath party delegation to the Soviet Union as a guest of the Communist Party and of the Soviet government. He paid three official visits to the Soviet Union, the last in February 1974 where he met Brezhnev instead of Soviet premier, Alexei Kosygin41, the latter not being present at the time. He visited Leningrad and Moscow. It had been President al-Bakr that had then welcomed Premier Kosygin to Baghdad on Sunday 9 April 1972. The two Presidents went on to sign a 15-year Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation that was witnessed by vice-president Saddam Hussein and several Ba’ath Party officials. [42] Two years on diplomacy was flourishing. A Western report observed at the time:

“Beginning in 1974 a more flexible approach in the conduct of foreign relations, if not in the language of foreign policy could be discerned. The shift reflected Iraq’s new oil wealth and the Baath government’s new self-confidence. Now the government of Iraq is beginning to seek recognition and influence through ties with its Arab and non-Arab neighbors as well as with the West. Iraq under Bakr and Saddam Husayn is re-emerging as a participant in the affairs of the Arab world, the Gulf and the West. Instead of isolation, participation; instead of confrontation, cooperation…” [43]

On March 25, 1974, Saddam Hussein travelled to Delhi in India where he was warmly welcomed by PM Indira Ghandi. [44]  India’s Ambassador, Romesh Bhandari, claimed that Saddam held her in high regard. She returned the visit to Iraq and was photographed with Saddam on January 19, 1975. [45]

Between June 10-15, 1974, Saddam Hussein visited Josip Broz Tito in Yugoslavia and signed a five-year bi-lateral agreement on both economic and technical/scientific co-operation. He was received in the style of a true head of state and visited Rijeka over two days including the Treci Maj shipyard and diesel engine plant and Tito’s hunting lodge on June 12th at Karadjordjeyo. [46] Tito passed away six years later after a long illness on May 4, 1980. Saddam Hussein and Sad’un Hammadi attended the state funeral along with kings and world leaders.

The Arab League Summit took place in Rabat, the Moroccan capital, on October 27, 1974, and its programme included OPEC discussions among the twenty countries that attended including Palestinian representatives. The Non-Aligned Movement and Arab solidarity were seen to be gaining traction over the former Ba’ath ideal of Arab unity. Saddam Hussein spearheaded proceedings as a forerunner of the Algiers meeting in March 1975.

Spanish dictator, Francisco Franco, welcomed Saddam Hussein on his arrival in Madrid on December 12, 1974. He was taken to spend an hour visiting the famous fort of Toledo and its museum.47 He also went into the famous Mosque-Cathedral in Cordoba and the Alhambra palace in Granada, expressing deep appreciation of the former’s Moorish architecture and of the Nasride craftsmanship at the Alhambra.

In March 1975, Saddam Hussein visited Tunisia and a bi-lateral reconciliation was agreed. A US intelligence report set out the following details:

Tunisia, 11 March 1975

Summary:

At the end of Saddam Hussein’s visit, it appears that Tunisian-Iraqi reconciliation has been cemented. Iraqi side announced a $15 million credit for Tunisian development projects and invited President Bourguiba and Prime Minister Nouira to visit Baghdad. Hussein apparently impressed Tunisian leaders with his flexibility and statesmanship, and they are encouraged by the more moderate image of Iraqi policy…

2. Iraqi vice president Saddam Hussein completed his official visit to Tunisia on March 9 after meetings with President Bourguiba, Prime Minister Nouira, and other top government leaders. According to press reports, Hussein’s meetings with government officials concentrated on the rekindling of (the) Tunisian-Iraqi bilateral relationship and included discussion of international problems.

3. Joint communiqué issued at end of visit covered several bilateral and international issues. It began with exchanges of praise for commitment of both governments to internal development and, in (the) case of Iraq, recovery of natural resources. Iraqi side pledged a $15 million loan for unspecified Tunisian development projects and a government team will soon visit Baghdad to work out details. Communique also expressed satisfaction with Iranian-Iraqi settlement reached in Algiers. Regarding OPEC conference, communique supported call of French president for general conference of petroleum producers and consumers while stating that petroleum and other raw materials prices should reflect changes in prices of manufactured goods. On Middle East, communique stated that Iraq and Tunisia do not expect peace in area until “Zionist imperialists” abandon Occupied Territories and Arab Palestinians regain their rights to their land and country. The communique closed with announcement that Bourguiba and Nouira had accepted invitations to visit Baghdad.

4. Regarding Middle East, Hussein said in press conference that Iraq does not have an “extremist attitude” toward Middle East problem but he also insisted that any action taken toward solution that was in conflict with Iraqi position would be inappropriate. He said that any territory unconditionally liberated would be a gain for the Arabs. Habib Bourguiba, jr. told the ambassador that Hussein commented to Tunisian officials that although Iraq opposes Secretary Kissinger’s step-by-step approach to solution of Middle East problem, it likewise opposes renewed warfare. According to UPI, Hussein told journalists that Iraq rejects in advance any accord that might be concluded during current mission of secretary and that any solution tied to negotiations will be stamped with ambiguity. He added that the only valid liberation of territories is by war or without any sort of compromise. He said this is not an “extremist” position when compared to “defeatest attitudes”. Tunisian press version did not carry these remarks.

5. Regarding relations with other countries, Hussein indicated to press that Iraq now wants to do business with Arab brothers on the basis of respect and dialogue. In this connection he said that presently modest Iraqi aid to Tunisia will be increased. In answer to a press question on the Gulf States’ summit, Hussein said Iraq applauds this initiative which contributes to peace and would develop cooperation in region. Hussein explained to press details of Iranian-Iraqi accord and said it could not fail to have favorable repercussions in the area. Bourguiba, jr. informed ambassador that Hussein told Tunisians he is very serious about agreement with Iran and major concession over Shatt al-Arab is evidence thereof. Government entertainment for Hussein included dinner hosted by foreign minister Chatti, to which (the) only non-Arab diplomats invited were American and Soviet ambassadors, Gabonese chief of mission, and French chargé. Chatti told the ambassador afternoon second day of visit (March 8) that he had not yet raised question of US- Iraqi relations with Hussein but intended to do so before Hussein’s departure (we will follow up when we have an opportunity)…

7. Comment: while Saddam Hussein’s past reputation and his dour appearance in Tunis might argue otherwise, Tunisians appear to have taken him to be flexible and statesmanlike. They are pleased with the new, moderate image of Iraq and the improved bilateral relations that it has brought. The Tunisians’ deletion of his remarks to press on secretary’s current trip to Middle East no doubt reflects government’s own support for US Government efforts. [48]

During his subsequent visit to Algeria, following OPEC discussions, Saddam Hussein met the Shah of Iran through the mediation of President Houari Boumediene. The Algiers Agreement was reached on March 15, 1975, Iraq and Iran having established a joint committee to try to demarcate the new border between them along the Shatt al-Arab waterway. The protocol was signed two days later, on March 17 to re-mark the border. A subsequent treaty was signed on June 13, 1975. [49] “The thalweg, meaning the median course of the Shatt-El-Arab waterway, was designated as the border. The agreement caused the Shah of Iran to withdraw Iranian support for the Kurdish rebellion, which thereupon collapsed.” [50]

Two months prior to Saddam’s visit to Hungary in May 1975 a political portrait was compiled on him at the request of Hungarian Foreign Minister, Frigyes Puja. Saddam then visited Budapest on May 8, 1975, meeting the Hungarian Communist leader, János József Kádár. [51] The report described Saddam Hussein’s “personal background, his political views, and negotiating persona”, emphasising:

“Since he is not entirely healthy (lumbar inter-vertebral disk syndrome) he gets tired easily and spends his evenings with rest, reading rather than going out. Thus, he did not participate in the evening programs. The Soviet comrades organized film screenings for him: he mostly enjoyed documentaries on advanced military technology, field-exercises and war movies. During his visits he was taken to visit military units, witness smaller (sic) manoeuvres and he always enjoyed these programs.”

In September 1975, Saddam Hussein was invited to Paris where he was hosted by Jacques Chirac and a special French Air Force display was staged for him showcasing the latest French Airforce military machinery. [52] It was said:

“In recognition of France’s “neutrality” in the 1973 Arab-Israeli war and her correct stance on the Palestinian issue, Saddam Husayn signed an agreement in September 1975 with the French Government pledging nuclear cooperation, oil and trade concessions. France pledged to build and equip a nuclear reactor and power plant and to train Iraqi technicians in its use and maintenance. Iraq in turn agreed to provide 15 percent of France’s petroleum needs at preferential rates and to award 80 percent of its development projects to French companies.” [53]

This was the nuclear reactor Tammuz 1 at Osirak that the Israelis would bomb on June 7, 1981, under the code name of Operation Opera, to the great consternation of the French government and their Iraqi partners. [54]

A US government assessment opined:

“The Kurdish rebellion and Iran’s direct support for it gave particular impetus to ending Iraq’s international isolation. Iraqi strategy was to crush rebellion militarily and to exert pressure on Iran through other states, particularly other Arabs. This required winning the confidence of leading Arabs and culminated in Saddam Hussein’s attendance at the Rabat Summit4 and the dramatic rapprochement with Egypt, Saudi Arabia and even King Hussein. All of these states played a role in ending Iranian support for the Kurds although President Boumediene got public credit.

The rapprochement with Iran gives every indication of enduring for the following reasons; (A) both countries have a need for regional stability in order to concentrate on economic development; (B) for the first time Iraqi-Iranian interests have begun to coincide in oil matters, particularly in maintaining prices and OPEC solidarity (it is worth recalling that until two years ago major oil policy was still being made in London); and (C) Accord is popular with Shia communities in both countries. In Iraq it is virtually first thing this regime has done that is popular with Shias… [55]

Back in December 1973, in exchange for oil, Japan had modified its Arab-Israeli policy and extended credits to finance several major projects in Iraq. In 1974, “Trade Minister Nakasone and Economy Minister Azzawi visited each other and signed an economic and technical cooperation agreement – Yen loans ($250 million) and export credit ($750 million) $1 billion export credit was added, responding to Iraq’s request.

Khor al-Zubair Chemical Fertilizer Plant (in 1975) – Yen loan: ¥22 billion, private credit: ¥66 billion – Rehabilitated by yen loan (2008, ¥18 billion)

• Hartha Thermal Power Plant (in 1976) – Yen loan: ¥15 billion , private credit: ¥44 billion – Rehabilitated by yen loan (2015, ¥20 billion; 2017, ¥22 billion)

• 13 General Hospitals (in 1982, 1983) – Yen loan: ¥7 billion – 11 are rehabilitated by grant aid (2003)

• Baiji Fertilizer Plant (in 1985) – Yen loan: ¥14 billion. [56]

In January 1976, an agreement with Italy was concluded on atomic energy and other contracts were awarded to Swiss and West German companies for subway construction.

On December 14, 1976, Saddam paid a one-day visit to Algeria arriving off an Iraqi Airways flight where he was received by President Bouteflika on the tarmac of the capital with a military band and reception. [57]

As Revolutionary Command Council vice chairman, Saddam Hussein hosted a return visit by Yugoslavian President Josip Broz Tito in Baghdad on February 6, 1979. The 90-minute meeting was intended “to extend the cordial relations between the two nations, and developments that would also serve the interests of both nations. The meeting also covered current Arab and international issues of joint interest and means of strengthening the non-alignment movement in its struggle against Imperialism and Colonialism. At the conclusion of the … meeting, President Tito decorated the RCC Vice Chairman with a Yugoslav medal, as a mark of friendship and co-operation.” [58]

That same year, Saddam Hussein who would remain in post as vice president for a further six months, visited Fidel and Raul Castro in Havana, Cuba.

Saddam also met PLO leader, Yasser Arafat in Havana for the 6th Non-Aligned Summit. [60]

Yasser Arafat visited Baghdad on March 28, 1979, returning again on July 29, 1984, on November 14, 1987, and between 28-30 May 1990 for the Emergency Arab Summit Conference. Arafat enjoyed a lasting friendship with Saddam despite his overtures to Ayatollah Khomeini in Paris before Khomeini’s seizing power in the Islamic Revolution. He went on to betray many of the groups that had supported him once he was installed as Supreme Leader of Iran. Vowing to overthrow the Ba’ath Party and destroy the secular state in order to replace it with Shi’a religious rule, he undermined the Shatt al-Arab Treaty and numerous hostilities led to war just over a year later. A new era then began.

HISTORIC ARCHIVES DOCUMENT

CIA profile analysis

No. 317. Research Study Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency 1

Washington, November 1976.

PR 76 100701

IRAQ UNDER BA’ATH RULE, 1968–1976

Introductory Note

The Baath Party, then, appears to be in firm control of the country and Bakr and Saddam Husayn are in firm control of the party. Policies established by them are not likely to be changed by an alteration in government or party. If the President and the Deputy are assured of political power today, it is because of their successful manipulation of the party, the government and the military as well as their ability to isolate and eliminate their opposition. Their position has been enhanced by recent successes—the establishment of civilian control over the party, the government and the military; the end of the Kurdish war; and the treaties and negotiations with the Soviet Union and Iran.

However, Bakr is ill and may be out of touch with day-to-day developments. Saddam, as Deputy Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council and Deputy Secretary of the BPI Regional Command, is the actual center of power but the facade of joint rule prevails. It is probable that on the event of Bakr’s retirement or death, there will be an orderly transfer of power to Saddam Husayn. The relationship is one of marriage not blood. Bakr’s daughter is married to the brother of Saddam’s wife. (Adnan Khairallah.)

What is not clear is whether the loyalties Bakr holds in the military and the party are transferable. While the military may accept Saddam as a civilian ruler, they will probably not accept him as President and Staff General (he was elevated to this rank in January 1976) and Minister of Defense, a post Bakr [Page 853] now holds. Saddam may have to acquire an acceptable senior military figure in order to maintain the appearance of unity and cooperation…

“As a revolution and a regime we are unconditionally biased in favor of the toiling masses, of Socialism, of Arab unity, of the liberation of Palestine and of the Arabism of the Gulf. Therefore, who supports (us) internationally in this stand is our friend and ally and whoever stands against us and opposes our trends and legitimate rights is our foe.” Saddam Husayn al-Tikriti…

In November 1969, the power base of the government altered with the addition of 10 civilian members to the Regional and National Commands of the RCC. The shift, engineered by Saddam, Salih Mahdi Ammash, then Interior Minister, limited the influence of the military and broadened the base of support for the government [Page 857] among party members. Saddam…already Deputy Secretary of the BPI Regional Command, was appointed Deputy Chairman of the RCC; he could now assume Bakr’s duties and powers in the event of the President’s absence or incapacity—a powerful position for the head of the party’s civilian faction. Bakr and Saddam next took advantage of the rivalry between Hardan al-Tikriti and Ammash, both members of the RCC and both Cabinet Ministers holding powerful positions, to remove their two strongest opponents. In April 1970 Hardan and Ammash were sworn in as Vice Presidents of Iraq. Six months later Hardan was dismissed from office and exiled; a year later he was assassinated in Kuwait. Ammash survived politically until 1971 when he was removed from all state positions and appointed Ambassador to the Soviet Union. 4…

Kazzar had set several conditions for the release of his prisoners: that the Iraqi Army be sent to the Palestinian battleground, that military action against the Kurds be resumed, that rightist leaders be removed from the government and the party, and that the dominant role of the Regional Command of the BPI be given to the National Command. The last two demands were used to implicate Abd al-Khaliq al-Samarrai, party theoretician and rival of Saddam, in the plot. Kazzar and 35 others were executed; Abd al-Khaliq’s death sentence was first commuted to life imprisonment, then to exile in Algeria. The BPI was purged of Samarrai supporters and in August, two months after the coup attempt, Bakr delegated to Saddam Husayn full responsibility for holding party elections that fall. From November 1973 through February 1974, 250 military officers were “retired,” i.e., replaced by pro-BPI officers most of whom were supporters of the Deputy…

On 11 March 1974, four years after the initial agreement had been signed and the date by which it was to have been implemented, the RCC announced the granting of self-rule to the region in which the majority of residents were Kurds. Irbil would be the capital city of the autonomous province which would have a legislature, an executive council and a special budget with revenues derived from property taxes. The KDP rejected this unilateral declaration of autonomy and more clashes were reported by mid-March. The Kurds of Kurdistan, announced the KDP, would become part of a voluntary federation with the Arabs of Iraq and Mullah Mustafa Barzani, by virtue of his position as chairman of the Kurdish Executive Council, would become Vice President of the Republic. This the Ba’ath rejected and major fighting ensued…

The “house” Kurds appointed on 7 April 1974 were Aziz Rashid Aqrawi, Minister of State; Hashim Hasan Aqrawi, Minister of Municipalities; Ubayadallah Mustafa Barzani, son of Mullah Mustafa Barzani, Minister of State; Abd al-Sattar Tahir Sharif, Minister of Public Works and Housing; and Abdullah Ismail Ahmad, Minister of State. All support the government’s self-rule law.

Barring coup or assassination, then, Saddam Husayn will be the successor to Bakr. The Deputy at 40 is essentially an opportunist, not an ideologue. He has a reputation for courage, ruthlessness and shrewdness. He pays lip-service to an ideology of Arabism but realizes that, given the substantial non-Sunni Arab population, Iraqi nationalism and Arab unity are not necessarily one and the same thing. Again, Saddam’s first concern is Iraq, not Arabism, not Palestine, not even Baathism per se. In his world-view Iraq is independent, socialist, nonaligned and anti-imperialist. The Deputy is ambitious, both nationally and personally. He would see Iraq become one of the Arab world’s largest oil producers and he would see himself leader of that development. He would have Iraq, too, resume its place as a maker of Arab policy, a participant in the shaping of Arab and Gulf affairs.

The question is not whether Saddam will be able to retain the power he currently holds; rather, the question becomes will he be able to maintain it without the facade of Bakr’s “guidance.” Until recently, it appeared that the Deputy would not seek power overtly in the event of Bakr’s death or retirement but in order to insure acceptance and a peaceful transition would probably rule jointly with a figure representing the military. However, in January 1976 Saddam was given the military rank of general by Bakr. This appointment may have been intended as a prelude to making Saddam Minister of Defense; the Deputy at present holds no Cabinet or government position other than as Deputy Chairman of the RCC. It may have been intended as a means of guaranteeing his ultimate and solo accession to power. But Bakr has not relinquished the Defense Ministry and Saddam is no more palatable to the military as a general than he is as the Deputy.

Footnote 29

In 1974–1975, of a total $1,468 million spent in arms orders, 43 percent ($636 million) were in Soviet arms, 31 percent ($462 million) to France, and 9 percent ($128 million) to Great Britain. [1½ lines not declassified] [Footnote in the original.] [61]

Deepening rift between the Iraqi and the Syrian Ba’ath Party Leadership

After Hafez al-Assad’s attendance at the Arab Summit in Baghdad of 1978, it became impossible for the Iraqi region of the Ba’ath Party to tolerate what was happening in Syria and Lebanon. Assad viewed Lebanon as very much part of Greater Syria and therefore a natural part of his domain, as it had been falsely carved off from the Levant and Syrian dominance under the terms of the Sykes-Picot agreement in their colonialist dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire. The Levant had been brought under French influence and Mesopotamia mandated by the British. Although Lebanon had been granted independence on November 22, 1943 (Eid al-Istiqlal) ending French rule after 23 years under the Mandate French colonial reach remained strong, particularly among the various Lebanese Christian sects. As a Christian with co-religionists in Lebanon, ‘Aflaq identified with the Lebanese but abhorred their acceptance of prolonging French colonial influence and ties with France.

The wider region was also in tumult – the neighbouring Republic of Turkey had suffered two bloody military coups (1960 and 1971) with armed groups on the left and right clashing in the streets creating the political space for a heavy-handed military to step in and take power. Turkey was heading afresh for a third military coup under General Kenan Evren, that would kick off on September 12, 1980 after he plotted within the army late in 1979. [62]

Smooth succession

The NY Times reported on July 17, 1979 that al-Bakr had handed over all his roles to his successor. His secretary, a Shi’a Muslim, also known as Muhyi al-Shemmari, after his tribal designation, but in most Western sources, as Muhyi Abdul Hussain Mashhadi was dismissed from the party. The state-run Iraqi media reported that Mashhadi was suspected of having contacts with Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. Izzat Ibrahim al-Douri, the Minister of Interior, was elected deputy chairman of the Command Council. Saadun Shaker was named as the new Interior Minister. Taha Yasin Ramadan, was appointed as Minister of Housing and Reconstruction and First Deputy Prime Minister, and Mohammed Fadel succeeded him. [63]

Aged 42 at the time he ascended to the presidency after ten years as vice president, Saddam Hussein appointed individuals from diverse religious and ethnic backgrounds to key posts, not just members of his tribe from Tikrit, as Western destractors have generally alleged. Tariq Aziz, named Mikhail Yohannes at birth was a Chaldean Christian. He stepped into the role of vice president and maintained close relations with French industrialists and leading politicians throughout the Iran-Iraq war. Izzet Ibrahim al-Douri who later became vice president was a Muslim of the Naqshabandi sect.

The US propagandist Deck of Cards of Iraq’s Most Wanted, printed during the US Occupation, provides counter evidence to the lie that the Ba’ath Party was anti-Shi’a as more than 32 Shi’a Ba’athists are depicted on the faces of the cards in the pack. Positions in the party were awarded for ability, and on the basis of a shared vision of Iraq as a progressive, secular Arab nation emerging from being an under-developed country to a modern, technologically and militarily advanced state. Fidelity to the goals of Arab identity and socio-economic advancement remained paramount whilst ‘unity’ became that of vision.

Saddam Hussein took over the Iraqi Presidency on July 16, 1979, on the eve of the anniversary of the 1968 revolution. His 62-year-old relative, Ahmad Hassan al-Bakr, announced his resignation on the grounds of declining health. He had suffered a first heart attack three years before in 1976 and had then delegated increased responsibilities to Saddam. Al Bakr died in October 1982, just three years later. He was given a state funeral that was led by Saddam Hussein and Michel ‘Alfaq and attended by King Hussein of Jordan. Al Bakr was buried in the al-Khark Cemetery on the west bank of the Tigris and a week of mourning was announced with government offices closed as a mark of respect.

At the time of the announcement of al-Bakr’s resignation the United States Interests Section in Baghdad sent a telegram to the State Department that spoke approvingly of the succession noting:

2. Summary: President Bakr’s dramatic July 16 abdication was unexpected, but the smooth succession of Saddam Hussein et al was not. Health may indeed have been the real reason, but the timing of Bakr’s exit may be fortuitous in terms of governmental stability at least in the short run. Number of factors combine to leave Saddam with a firm grip on a relatively solid regime. End summary.

3. Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr was known to be old (particularly for his age—62) and not terribly healthy. The general consensus of outsiders’ opinions, however, was that the old gentleman would totter around for some years to come, probably with a steadily decreasing role other than the symbolic leader of the country. Over the past several months, there were signs of occasional weakness, but nothing of sufficient duration or impact to lead to a conclusion that he was about to resign.

4. The July 16 announcement was therefore a surprise. The extent to which there was actually a sudden deterioration in Bakr’s health or in his desire to conserve what is left of it in the quieter role of dictator-emeritus, is unclear. The pressures of office have indeed grown, as Iraq has become less and less isolated, and while Saddam was carrying the major share of the role, even the ceremonial responsibilities were taking their toll on Bakr’s flagging resources (Baghdad 1404). 3

6… The timing of Bakr’s departure however, will probably on balance be a stabilizing factor. While there are a number of serious problems facing the leadership, in particular the possibilities of increased domestic unrest resulting from the Kurdish problem and the as-yet unmeasured threat of active Shia dissidence, the GOI is at or near the pinnacle of its aspirations. Thus far, it appears that the threat posed by the Shia majority may not be as major as early signs of trouble indicated…

7… Our preliminary estimate is that the efforts that Saddam and the party have made to purge and realign armed forces leadership over the past several years, combined with the dramatically heightened increase in the threat from Iran, are probably sufficient to hold the military in line.

8. The party itself has always been considered relatively unified, and the recent upsurge in Iraq’s Middle Eastern—and world—role should act to keep the militants happy. Saddam takes over a nation that has gained remarkable international stature in a remarkably short space of time, is wealthy and growing wealthier, faces an external threat which, imperfectly, tends to strengthen rather than weaken support [Page 440] for the changeover, and has already demonstrated considerable ability in handling minor difficulties that may occur.

9. This latter point, of course, is one of the most significant intangibles. Saddam Hussein has impressed a lot of people with his adroitness, shrewdness, and toughness. The so-called Tikriti clan i.e. the top handful, has moved upwards more or less as a bloc. The conformity of their views, opinions, objectives and methods may not be perfect, but it also does not appear to be widely divergent. They have had experience in working well together and with their enhanced positions should be able to do so in the future. Thus, in sum, it is reasonable to anticipate a further period of relative stability in Iraq. Barring the unforeseen, which in this country takes in a broad range of possibilities, Saddam Hussein is quite likely to be in power for a long time. 5 [64]

The purge within the Revolutionary Command Council after the 9th Arab Summit, July 1979

On July 22, 1979, Saddam Hussein organised an emergency Ba’ath Party Command Council meeting in the capital’s Al Khuld Hall. The denounciation of party members that had aligned themselves with Hafez al-Assad against his leadership in a Syrian-backed conspiracy were swiftly followed by the arrests of those accused. Saddam exposed a fifth column within the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) mainly comprised of military officers operating in conjuntion with external enemies plotting to topple the civil Iraqi Ba’ath region leadership. Left-leaning military officers of the Iraqi Ba’ath Region, close to Syria, and supportive of the religious Shi’a militant elements among the al-Sadrs and al-Baqr in Najaf in step with Iran and with Syria’s Alawite leadership, had planned to kill Saddam Hussein and set up an Islamic Republic in Iraq. Word was leaked out and Saddam took decisive steps to expose those involved publicly.

From the podium a tearful Saddam had called upon Mashhadi to confess publicly over how he had conspired against the Iraqi government. Mashhadi then identified 68 alleged co-collaborators who were all led out from the hall and detained to stand trial.

Found Guilty

Twenty-one people, including five members of the RCC were later sentenced to death for high treason, inluding former secretary, Muhyi Abdul Hussain Mashhadi, and were executed by firing squad a fortnight after the exposures, trial and convictions pronounced against them. Thirteen others that had been accused but had been found not guilty were freed. A twenty-second man that had been sentenced in absentia could not be found. The majority of the original defendants were spared.

Mashhadi (1935-1979) who had been a member of the regional branch of the party between 1974 and 1979 and of the RCC between September 1977 and August 1979 had opposed President al-Bakr’s resignation reportedly urging him just to take a holiday. Al Bakr had rejected the proposal and gone on to transfer power to his vice president. Saddam emphasised that Mashhadi had been under surveillance ever since he had been working as al-Bakr’s secretary but he had not immediately ordered his arrest following al-Bakr’s resignation. He was subsequently executed on charges of treason on August 8, 1979.

Deputy Prime Minister, Adnan Hussain, who was also a Shi’a Muslim, was not reprieved either. Back in May and on through June 1979, the government had suppressed Shi’a riots provoked by the Iran-allied Sadrists. In June there had been a demonstration in Baghdad against the arrest of their leader, Mohammad Baqir al-Sadr led by his sister Bint al-Huda. They had been calling for the overthrow of the secular Ba’ath government and for an Islamic Revolution linked to Iran’s to replace it calling on al-Sadr to be ‘their Iraqi Ayatollah Khomeini.’ [65] Mohammad Baqir al-Sadr had founded the Al-Da’wa Party (Islamic Call) with Grand Ayatollah Muhsin al-Hakim to lead the Islamic revolt against the Ba’ath. The uprising had divided the ruling Ba’ath council.

Mashhadi’s sympathies for the Sadrists, as a fellow Shiite, had been voiced loudly and openly in the council meetings during the June riots. Mashhadi had protested saying the treatment of Shi’a Iraqis was ‘intolerable.’ He was sacrificed for having endorsed them. Al Da’wa was already banned and its major supporters had fled into Khomeini’s Iran. Mashhadi later confessed to saying Syria had promised the coup plotters military help if they wished to act against the Iraqi Ba’ath regional leadership. Some of the council members had wanted to improve relations with Syria and the Soviet Union whose relations with Syria had intensified. [66] Syria was also supporting Khomeini.

On the evening of August 8, 1979, immediately after the twenty-one executions that the president and his Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) witnessed, Saddam Hussein stood on the balcony of the Presidential Palace in Baghdad, his arms raised in salute. Over 50,000 people who had gathered there bellowed in approval chanting, “Death to the traitors!” [67]

The NY Times from Beirut reported:

BEIRUT, Lebanon, Aug. 8 — Baghdad executed 21 officials today, including prominent political and trade union leaders, for having taken part in an alleged conspiracy against the Government.

The official Iraqi News Agency announced that the executions had been carried out by a firing squad.

A special court sentenced 22 persons to death, including five members of the Revolutionary Command Council, the country’s top executive organ, it was announced yesterday. One of the 22 was sentenced to death in absentia. Thirty‐three defendants were given prison terms ranging from 1 to 15 years and 13 persons were acquitted.

President Saddam Hussein told a crowd gathered at the Republican Palace today that the Iraqi leadership was aware of the activities of “traitors and vicious circles beyond the border” but had acted “in the interest of the Arab nation.”

…President Hafez al‐Assad of Syria has sent assurances to President Hussein that Damascus was not a party to any move to undermine the Baghdad Government. Syria was said to have stressed that if any of the prisoners had links with Damascus, they ante-dated the reconciliation of the two Governments last October. [68]

Unity talks did continue between Assad and Saddam after July 1979, but Assad rejected Iraqi demands for a full merger and for the immediate deployment of Iraqi troops into Syria. Wary of Iraqi domination and of a new war with Israel, Assad adopted the stance of advocating a staged approach. The talks were eventually suspended after the accusations of the Syrian role in the plot to overthrow Saddam Hussein and replace him with a leadership drawn from military officers as had taken place in Damascus. In November 1979, relations between Iraq and Syria were suspended, the unification plan collapsed and their mutual ambassadors were withdrawn, not less because of the purge of the plotters in Baghdad. Assad denied involvement but the plan for unification was abandoned entirely.

When Saddam Hussein executed the purge inside the Ba’ath Party on July 22, 1979, just six days after his ascent to the presidency, a number of factors that had long been at work had come to a head. These have been largely passed over in biased Western accounts. The purge was not undertaken on the basis of a fabricated plot as Western biographers have generally tried to claim in supporting Saddam’s subsequent overthrow but arose from the original splits between the Syrian and Iraqi regions of the Ba’ath party and the long running and indeed, inherent, struggle between the civil class and the military officers as well as conflict over Iraq and Syria’s wider regional relations with Iran and Israel and Shi’a religious militant groups. There was substantial merit to the accusation that Syria and Iran in supporting the Sadrists, al-Daw’a, Lebanese Amal, and the fledgling Shi’a Iranian proxy, Hezbollah, and wider Shi’a militant movement were part of a mission to overthrow the Iraqi Ba’ath government. Khomeini had publicly declared this intention on February 11, 1979 when taking power, vowing to export the Islamic revolution while calling for the eradication, or subjucation, of Arab nationalism in order to achieve the higher unity of Islam. [69]

In April 1980, after al-Daw’a tried to assassinate deputy prime minister Tariq Aziz [70] at Mustansiriya University, the Ba’ath government finally executed Bint al-Huda and Mohammad Baqir al-Sadr who had been held in detention since the pro-Iran Shi’a Islamist riots. [71]

Khomeini agitates

By 1977, Khomeini had been agitating against the Shah and the secularists from exile in Najaf for 14 years. In February 1977, prior to Khomeini taking power in Iran, religious Shi’as had staged protests in Najaf and Karbala. Khomeini was still based there at the time and the Shah considered his proximity too close for comfort in Tehran. The preacher was not dispatched from Najaf until as late as October 6, 1978. He then gained French protection and was housed in Neuphle Le Chateau, on the outskirts of Paris after Kuwait had also refused him sanctuary. [72]

Khomeini had turned against his former Iraqi hosts the moment he returned to Tehran vowing the destruction of the Ba’athists [73]. In the first months of the revolution he also turned on other of his early supporters, the Marxist-Islamist Mujahiden-e Khalq (MeK) the Kurds and the moderates. Thousands were executed in months of purges. Fundamentalism took hold. In 1981, Khomeini issued a fatwa that led to the mass execution of political prisoners that included many members of MeK [74]. Another purge took place under a fatwa in 1988.

France’s Ambassador to Iran François Nicoullaud (2001-2005) recalled: “Of course the poorest people were under the influence of the clergy. This is how the clergy came up. And in fact, as in every revolution – we had it in France with the Jacobins and the Girondins, the moderates and the extremists. We had it in Russia with the Mensheviks and the Bolsheviks. “There is a short moment of unanimity at the beginning of the revolution, when everyone agrees to get rid of the tyrant. After that, all the groups enter into coflict, one with the other. And in the case of Iran, the religious won.” Khomeini through the intellectuals around him was portrayed deliberately as preaching ‘peace and love’ and France bought into the illusion. [75] When he arrived in Iran on February 1, 1979 he announced:

“…You have accomplished the first step toward a complete victory by removing Muhammad Riza, the chief traitor, from the scene. It is said that he is plotting certain intrigues abroad and that although his masters are keeping him at ·arm’s length and refuse to admit him to their country, he is seeking the aid of treacherous rulers like himself. But his hopes are in vain after the fifty years of treason his family has committed and the more than thirty years of crime in which this traitor has himself engaged. He has exploited our country and made it more backward than it was before, destroyed our agriculture and ruined our land, and made our army subordinate to foreign advisers. Our triumph will come when all forms of foreign control have been brought to an end and all roots of the monarchy have been plucked out of the soil of our land….” [76]

That too was propaganda. He would soon turn on many groups that had supported him, including the Kurds of Iran, leading to a bloody repression that has been ongoing for the 45 years since the revolution.

Syria and the Islamic Republic of Iran

Hafez al-Assad, who had never had warm relations with the Shah of Iran, swiftly embraced the Islamic Revolution and sent Khomeini a gold-illuminated Koran and congratulatory telegram in which he proclaimed his support for the revolution, which he announced as serving the interests of both Arabs and Muslims, Iran being Muslim but not Arab. He was the first Arab leader to recognize the new regime.

Khomeini also sought to strengthen ties with Hafez al-Assad in order to secure a bridge to Lebanon’s Shi’as and Syria went on to side with Iran in the Iran-Iraq war. Assad also supported Musa al-Sadr, the founder of the Shi’a Amal movement and Mostafa Chamran his close ally in Lebanon. During the Islamic Revolution, Chamran returned to his birth place in Tehran and led military operations against the Kurdistan Democratic Party-Iran (KDPI) as the Islamic Republic’s Minister of Defence. Along with Sadegh Ghotbzadeh he was part of the so-called Syrian Mafia in Khomeini’s circle.

The move proved fortuitous for Assad, as Syria then entered an era of relative isolation having lost its partnership with Egypt over the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty. It also entered an era of hostility with Ba’athist Iraq after Saddam Hussein accused Syria of aiding the coup plot against the government. [77]

On March 26, 1979, Egypt under Anwar Sadat’s presidency, had signed a peace agreement with Israel that came to be known as the Camp David Accords under the leadership of Menachem Begin, and witnessed by US President, Jimmy Carter. Anwar Sadat was killed by his own guards as a result. [78] Syria also opposed the pact and the terms that had been agreed to the great consternation of all Pan-Arabists but especially the disenfranchied and suffering Palestinians.

A year later, one of the founding Ba’ath ideologues and former university comrade of Michel ‘Aflaq, Salah al-Din al-Bitar, who had been strongly opposed to Hafez al-Assad, was assassinated in France with a silencer shot to the back of his head. He had sought refuge in Paris back in 1966 and had since become an outspoken opponent of Hafez al-Assad. [79] Three days before his killing in Paris there had also been an assassination attempt on the life of the former Iranian premier, Shahpour Baktiyar. Al Bitar had been leading the broad-based National Front against Hafez al-Assad. His last interview with a French journalist is revealing of the period. [80]

When Israel invaded Lebanon and attacked Syrian forces in 1982, Assad again turned to Iran, which then mobilised Lebanese Shiites to take up arms in the Lebanese Civil War against the multinational peacekeeping force comprised of American, French, British, Italian, and Israeli forces. Iran’s allies officially formed Hezbollah, or “Party of God” in 1985. Syria continues to this day to ensure that Iran has ready access to its Hezbollah proxies. [81]

Iran accused Iraq of starting an “imposed war” but expanded the message of the 1979 revolution

After the February 11, 1979 revolution swept the exiled Grand Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini to power in Iran, relations with Iraq very swiftly became strained with Khomeini now Supreme Leader vowing to spread the Shi’a Islamic militant revolution. Having been buoyed by the religious Shi’a masses and the widely disenfranchised lower classes on return from exile, Khomeini soon sought to destroy the Ba’ath regime. One of his earliest rallying cries was “Death to the Ba’ath”. He was joined by Shi’a Iraqis that fervently embraced his doctrine of ‘rule by the Islamic Jurist’ (Velayet e-Faqih). Its goal was to spread the Islamic revolution – including into Iraq – and once having overthrown the secular Ba’athists to unify the Shi’a on the basis of their common sect and create a greater Shi’a swathe or crescent extending from Alawite Syria into Lebanon and reaching into Yemen – a fact achieved after the US led war on Iraq removed Saddam as the strongest bulwark preventing it. Khomeini’s proxies in Iraq like SCIRI (Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq) and its armed wing, the Badr Brigade and al-Da’wa, the (Islamic call) became Khomeini’s militant vanguard amongst Iraq’s Shi’a population.

Many millions did not look in the Ayatollah’s direction but maintained their Arab identity over that of their sect. The Shi’a Marja in Najaf also firmly believed that religion should not enter the political sphere and occupy itself with the business of government but ought to focus on spiritual guidance.

When Saddam Hussein invaded Iran in September 1980 just over 18 months after the threats were made, Syria was the only Arab country that supported Iran. Syria provided arms, and guided Iran regarding Iraq’s Soviet-made equipment, shut down an Iraqi oil pipeline that crossed Syrian territory, and sabotaged an Arab League meeting in Amman at which King Hussein of Jordan sought to rally support for Iraq.

Hafez al-Asad’s growing closeness to Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in Tehran destroyed any prospects of further rapprochement between Syria and Iraq. In January 1982, the borders between them were sealed off and all civilian movement and trade were curtailed.

The Iran-Iraq war was swiftly hijacked to further cement the goals of the Islamic revolution and weaken Iraq through internal Shi’a rebellion.

Religion and the Ba’ath Doctrine in Iraq

Michel ‘Aflaq remained honoured in Iraq as Secretary General of the Ba’ath Party until his death in 1989, although without direct or practical political power. He had strongly supported Saddam Hussein as the ideal charismatic leader of the Ba’ath Party whereas Hafiz al-Assad was seen as having usurped the Party’s values to set up an Alawite military dictatorship – an accusation echoed by al-Bitar and call it ‘neo-Ba’athism although none of the original values were maintained.

Saddam Hussein had embarked on a series of lectures concerning the Ba’ath party’s relationship to Islam and stressed: ”Our party is with faith (al-iman), but it is not a religious party, nor should it be one.” He defined shari’a law as “ancient jurisprudence,” insisting that it was unsuitable for modern life and warned that turning Islamist would only divide Sunnis and Shi’as.”

Like his mentor, ‘Aflaq, he implied that the Ba’ath and its secular doctrine had come to replace Islam in the modern era and explained that concessions to Islamist demands would inevitably lead the party to lose power because they had no chance of beating the religious parties at their own game. He said that most Iraqis were much more traditional than the ruling party but instructed the cadres: “[Never] give up your … leadership in … education…Ambiguity …should not be our means of winning over the majority.”

In 1986, a practical working accommodation was reached with the by-now influential Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, as also with its southern neighbour neighbour, Sudan, part way into the Iran-Iraq war and from Iraq’s point of view owint to Ayatollah Khomeini for years having claimed the Ba’athists were unbelievers to be overthrown and replaced with his own brand model of an Islamic Republic.

Iraqi Ba’ath government audio tapes taken in 2003 and examined by American researchers claim that at a secret or closed Pan-Arab leadership meeting convened in 1986 to redress Iran’s negative propaganda campaign, Saddam Hussein agreed to a shift in policy over Islam so as to express greater tolerance towards moderate Muslims. Some support for the Syrian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood had been shown by Iraq in its opposition to Hafez al-Assad to establish a front with the Syrian opposition but the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood’s insistence on Islam as the ultimate source of state and religious authority prevented the practical establishment of any form of joint constitution by the secular pan-Arab Ba’ath. Aiming to harness some Islamic support from Egypt and Sudan via the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood because the movement had influence in both nations they agreed to proclaim that Michel ‘Aflaq was not an atheist, but was a believer drawing upon both his and Saddam Hussein’s recorded speeches.

Foreign Minister, Tariq Aziz, although born a Christian, but a secular Arab thinker of his generation, reminded the meeting that while the Ba’ath were committed to a “democratic national pan-Arab state” (dawlah dimuqratiyyah qawmiyyah), the Brotherhood were fighting for the “religious state” (al-dawlah al-diniyyah). He also reminded his colleagues that the reason why Saddam had defined the Ba’ath doctrine clearly and publicly in 1977 was so that “we had a powerful religious movement that was hitting us with bullets, and namely, that they had staged armed demonstrations attacking us with bombs (ya’ni, tutalli’u muzaharat musallaha wa gamat tadhrubu ‘alayna qanabil), so it became imperative for us to present an ideological position against them, in addition to mass public – even repressive (qam’iyyah) steps against them.” [82]

‘Aflaq had originally accommodated Islam in his pan-Arab vision

‘Aflaq had sought to encompass Islam within Ba’athist thought and, in his text, “The Life of the Prophet is a Summary of the Life of the Arab People” had written:

“The life of the Prophet, a reflection of the Arab character in its purest form, cannot be arrived at by intellect, but rather by living experience. This experience cannot be a beginning, but a consequence or a result. Once life had shrunk away from them hundreds of years ago, Arabs read the life of the Prophet and spoke of it, but they did not understand it. This is because understanding was necessitated by a climax in their souls, a certain degree of deep honest feeling that they have not reached yet, an existentialist position which places man face to face with his destiny, and which they are far from reaching at this point. [83]

The stance adopted was not that of advocacy for fundamentalist Islam – such as came to be expressed by the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt – nor was it any kind of return to Wahhabist medievalism. ‘Aflaq was a progressive thinker seeking “the betterment of the impoverished Arab classes and the fulfilment in dignity of the intellectual classes”. In his address on Islam in Damascus in the pre-UAR period in 1943 he had emphasised:

“Its great worth and depth and expansive nature relates intimately to the pure content and characteristics of Arab life itself. It explains the innate richness of Arab potential and its natural course. It is correct for us then to explain its continuous striving for the revival of its soul and character, not just its superficial revival in shape or rhetoric…Islam constituted for the Arabs a dynamic earth-shaking movement that stirred the internal potential of the Arabs, imbued it with life, and enabled it to drive out the obstacles of imitation and the shackles of reform. It reconnected its attachment to the true deep understandings of the universe around it. Inspired by wonder and enthusiasm, it embarked on new words and glorious works, and in its excitement was unable to keep it to itself any longer, so expanding to other nations in intellect and deed, and in so doing, fulfilling it. [84]

Although Saddam Hussein later claimed that ‘Aflaq had converted to Islam, Khomeini had nonetheless still reviled him and had claimed that the Ba’ath government was under Christian influence. Michel ‘Aflaq’s son, Iyad (the Arabic name means ‘generous’ or as in a large mountain), confirmed that his father had thought about conversion in 1980 and is rumoured to have adopted the name, Ahmad (meaning most commendable, in Arabic). [85]

Michel ‘Aflaq’s optimism over Islam suffered serious blows with the revival of Iranian Shi’a fundamentalism under Ayatollah Khomeini and the populist mob revolt in Iran of 1979. He had also been deeply disappointed by the militarist turn that Syrian Ba’athism had taken under Hafez al-Assad’s leadership. By the time of his death in 1989 during heart surgery in Paris, his commitment had remained loyal to the Ba’athist vehicle in Iraq.

Iraqi State funeral for Resurrection Party Founder, Michel ‘Aflaq

Saddam Hussein walked proudly on July 23, 1989, as one of two leading pall bearers of ‘Aflaq’s coffin at the state funeral in his adopted city of Baghdad. The longest serving President of Iraq accorded full honours to the Ba’athist theoretician having been deeply influenced by his thinking since his youth. Also prominent at the funeral were Iraqi vice president, Taha Yasin Ramadan, from March 1991 until the US led invasion, and Syrian Ba’ath official, Shibli al-Aysami, a contemporary party founder of Michel ‘Aflaq in Syria. [86]

A Syrian-born Druze by origin, Al-Aysami was kidnapped years later on May 24, 2011, aged 88 when visiting his daughter in Aley, Lebanon. His family accused Bashar al-Assad of being behind his kidnapping and disappearance that took place two months after the Arab Spring revolt had reached Syria. [87] [88]

Al Aysami wrote several books about Ba’ath thought and history including ‘The Arab Ba’ath socialist Party: The Founding Period in the 1940s.’ The Syrian government considered him to be among the dissidents of As Suwayda. [89]

Soon after the state funeral of Michel ‘Aflaq, and despite the war with Iran, President Saddam Hussein commissioned and constructed a very fine turquoise domed mausoleum to honour ‘Aflaq on the Tigris River lying close to his new palace, Al Sijood. Designed by the Iraqi architect, was vandalised, along with Saddam’s palaces and monuments, by Iran-backed Shi’a militia groups handed power through the US-led invasion.

A bronze monument erected to honour Michel ‘Aflaq in front of the Ba’ath Party World Headquarters and Presidential Guards barracks in 1991 [90] was defaced before being removed after regime change imposed after the 2003 US invasion.The Ba’ath Party Headquarters complex was also damaged in the US bombing during the invasion and remained unrepaired for the next two decades.

1 https://carnegieendowment.org/middle-east/diwan/2014/03/the-miserable-afterlife-of-michel-aflaq?lang=en

Sheri Laizer, a Middle East and North African expert specialist and well known commentator on the Kurdish issue. She is a senior contributing writer for iKurd.net. More about Sheri Laizer see below.

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