A Torture-Free Turkey? – Part II

A Terror Torture-Free Turkey?

Sheri Laizer | Exclusive to iKurd.net

Part two: Political prisoners and Kurdish demands

The first part of this analysis examined the ongoing problem of oppression, and the use of torture in Turkey in service of the Turkish nation. That nation is no longer basing itself on the secular ideology of Kemal Ataturk but a conservative interpretation of Sunni Islam and the ‘ummah’ (Muslim community).

To this end, Turkish president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, seeks to absorb Kurdish identity into the Turkish state like others before him, without acknowledging Kurdish demands that go beyond the gun.

Erdogan has recently forged a new Sunni triangle based on Islamic values between Turkey, Saudi-Arabia and Pakistan, dubbed, The Mecca Pact. The focus is on security. An armed attack against any one partner will be treated as an attack on all. The details of the agreement are (not yet) public. 1

Women fighters in Islamic states?

Because the PKK and its sister organization, the YPG in Kurdish Syria, are fundamentally socialist and secular and base aspects of their ideology on equality between men and women they are at odds with the Islamic governments.

These governments seek to implement Sharia law that also serves to relegate women to their domestic roles of old. For example, the women’s forces in the PKK (Yekîneyên Jinên Azad ên Star) 2 and in the YPG (Women’s Protection Units Yekîneyên Parastina Jin– the JPG) run their own units.

In Syria, under ‘interim president’ Ahmed al-Sharaa, the self-professed reformed Al Qaeda leader, no role has yet been envisioned to keep the Kurdish women’s military unit together – a proposal that they could join a female tourist police unit was rejected by its leader, Newroz Ahmed. “YPJ commanders flatly rejected the tourist police offer.

They argue that reducing an elite, battle-tested military force to a civilian police auxiliary undermines their capabilities and leaves women’s rights unprotected. 3 Syria’s new female ‘tourist’ police unit members wear hijab. They come under male authority. 4 Kurdistan 24 reported: “Speaking to the Kurdish Peace Institute on June 16, 2026, Rohilat Afrin warned that women are not being “seen, formally accepted, or included” by Damascus as the integration of the northeast progresses.” 5

Female fighters from the PKK’s Women’s Defence Forces and others in the JPG faced death and torture when taken prisoner by ISIS, by Turkish-run militias and the Turkish army and security forces. Turkey still brands them all as ‘terrorists.’ The state-dominated media perpetuate the accusation crowing when any is captured and imprisoned back in Turkey.

TRT state television calls them PKK/YPG terrorists running the two together and accusing them of terror attacks on Turkish forces and civilians putting any captive taken alive on trial much like the show trial of Abdullah Öcalan. See the TRT video of the capture of a YPG fighter codenamed ‘Çîçek Kobanê– in English, this translates as ‘the flower of Kobane’. 6 Her given name is Dozgin Temo. She is a Syrian Kurdish national, not Turkish.

Kobanê was captured after being wounded by Turkish-run Islamic extremist militia, Ahrar al-Sham in October 2019 near Ain Issa. Returned to Turkey, a Turkish Court sentenced her to life imprisonment in 2021. 7

She was forcibly moved from a prison in Urfa far from her family in 2024. She was a medical officer within the YPG. 8

PKK-affiliated Medya News noted at the time: In March 2021, a Turkish court (Urfa 5th High Criminal Court) sentenced her to aggravated life imprisonment plus an additional ten years and ten months on charges including “disrupting the unity and integrity of the state”, “membership of an illegal armed organisation” and “attempted murder”.

The verdict, which was upheld by the Court of Cassation in May 2022, “overlooked evidence that DozginTemo was engaged in humanitarian aid rather than combat at the time of her capture, as evidenced by the fact that she was dressed in civilian clothes in post-capture videos.” Images of her appear below. 9

She is in fact a prisoner of war as the YPG was a legitimate force backed by the United States at the time in the fight against ISIS. 10 Her captors shot her twice in the leg after seizing her. Turkish militias and the army conveyed a number of prisoners illegally to Turkey. No one can free them from their cells.

The Salafist fighters gloated over Temo’s capture chanting ‘to slaughter, to slaughter’ and “Treat her as a captive, she is booty” 11 much like ISIS with the Yazidis.

Al Shara’a’s militants in the security services acted similarly when capturing, rough-handling and killing YPG female fighters in clashes in Aleppo in January this year before the ‘integration’ deal was progressed further. They were called ‘pigs’ as militants chanted Allahu Akhbar. 12

As the new ‘interim’ government in Syria – like its Turkish ally – views women’s roles in traditional Muslim terms, there can be no place for independent units of female fighters even in ‘defence.’ If Abdullah Öcalan called on them to dissolve themselves as part of the dissolution of the PKK and SDF, would the women be able to refuse the appeal, I wonder.

Has anyone stood up to him openly since the large-scale breakaways after his capture? The PKK killed off their strongest competitors in the leadership of the Patriotic Democratic Party of Kurdistan (PWDK). The voice of Öcalan prevailed and prevails still despite the former ideology of celibacy until Kurdistan is free that endured for decades amongst fighters and civil cadres alike.

Locked up, silenced

Kurds who gave their lives to the call for an independent Kurdistan and thousands of activists and peaceful protestors unwell and imprisoned in overcrowded F, S and Y-type “pit’ style Turkish jails. The Istanbul Bar has called for the closure of the ‘pit-type’ prisons ‘citing dignity violations.’ 13

Many political prisoners spend years in isolation passed in badly aired cells with health problems arising from the deprivation of sunlight, a lack of exercise and inadequate access to physicians. Social isolation and highly restricted visitation rights also take a heavy toll.

The Stockholm Center for Human Rights observed last year (2025) in a report headed, Turkey’s ‘pit type’ prisons under fire amid hunger strikes, rights concerns:

“Turkey has 400 prisons with an official capacity of 304,608 (people) but which currently hold 416,927 inmates. Among them are 13 Y-type, 7 S-type and 22 other high-security facilities. Despite the overcrowding crisis, the Ministry of Justice plans to allocate 20 billion TL ($490 million) to build 11 new prisons by 2027.” 14

A report by the same group for the following month observed: “authorities have made no concrete improvements to existing prison conditions, leaving the demands of inmates and human rights groups unaddressed.” 15

Locking people up is Turkey’s age-old answer to opposition. More and more of them find themselves in captivity.

Questions to Shakhawan Shorsh, Kurdish writer and political scientist

Following on from Part One that focused on the systematic torture of opposition elements in Turkey negating the ‘terror-free Turkey’ slogan, I asked Shakhawan Shorsh two broad questions. It is my professional opinion that Abdullah Öcalan has failed the Kurdish people: as soon as he fell captive to the Turkish state, Öcalan betrayed his own message that led to four decades of blood sacrifice by tens of thousands of Kurds and the imprisonment of tens of thousands of others.

Q: Can we really believe the PKK is prepared to sacrifice the struggle for a nation for the sake of its failed leader?”

Shakhawan Shorsh: If Öcalan is released, there is a strong possibility that the PKK will accept the law that has been approved. What can be seen in the law is an attempt to find a way toward dissolving the PKK, while many PKK prisoners are not released.

The PKK does not say that all prisoners must be released; rather, it says that Öcalan’s freedom is a red line. This means that if he is released, they will do what Öcalan asks of them — namely, dissolve themselves and lay down their arms. Apart from that, the names of other political prisoners who are not members of the PKK are not even mentioned.

It seems that, for the PKK, Öcalan’s release is equivalent to the theoretical success of the concept of a democratic society in Turkey, while Turkey continues to pursue a policy of repression and violence against its critics and opponents and regards demands for the rights of the Kurdish people as treason.

Q: The focus of Kurdish rights in Turkey since 1999 and the show trial of Ocalan, has highlighted how the PKK leader has given away every previous gain and has also had his critics murdered. He now denies the importance of ‘Kurdistan’. Has the cult of Apo won or is it MIT (the Turkish Intelligence Apparatus – Millî İstihbarat Teşkilatı ) that has won – is there actually any difference?’

Shorsh: If we look at the PKK leadership’s programmes and statements, it is sometimes difficult to clearly understand what they actually want. For many years, the PKK and Öcalan have opposed the national state solution and regarded it as an important cause of the decline of societies. From this perspective, they end up opposing the demands of Kurds who seek national rights and the attainment of national self-determination.

Their problem is that they compare Turkey’s racism with the possibility of a Kurdish nation-state. The Kurdish people are an oppressed people and have the right, like any other people, to be free and determine their own destiny.

A free Kurdistan does not necessarily have to be a racist nation-state. This is demonstrated by the fact that the peoples living within Kurdistan have historically lived together peacefully, and Kurds are not inherently racist unless extremist leaders lead them in that direction.

The cult of Apo is very dominant among PKK supporters, to such an extent that Apo’s supporters and followers equate Apo’s existence with the freedom and equality of the peoples of the region. Yes, this cult has grown to the point where it has become more important than the legitimate demands of the people of Kurdistan — if we recognise that the rights of the Kurdish people existed and will continue to exist regardless of Apo’s presence or absence.

Apo is the leader of a party, and his ideology is only one ideology. In a racist Turkey, its possibilities are limited, even if he is released.

With the dissolution of the PKK, the abandonment of the demand for the national rights of Kurdistan, and giving up those demands in the name of equality between Turks and Kurds in a future Turkey, Turkey’s intelligence service, MIT, will see itself as the victor. Erdoğan and Bahçeli will see it in the same way. But has the Kurdish issue come to an end and been resolved?

Certainly not.

Q: Thank you, Kak Shakhawan, that says it all.

Sheri Laizer, a Middle East and North African expert specialist and well known commentator on the Kurdish issue. She is a senior contributing writer for iKurd.net. More about Sheri Laizer see below.

Related posts:

Turkey: The Psychological War Against the Kurds Through the PKK – Part I Business with ISIS – Updated The PKK’s Personality Cult: Changing Influences – Part II Debunked PKK Leader Ocalan Will Never Be Set Free What makes a good NATO ally? The Case of Turkey Distorting the Kurdish Question in Turkey Turkey: Nato’s Islamic State Member Can Apo Save The Kurds? Turkey’s Parliamentary Approval to Dissolve the PKK There is no hope in Ocalan’s unilateral peace initiative