Turkey: The Psychological War Against the Kurds Through the PKK – Part I

Sheri Laizer | Exclusive to iKurd.net

The Turkish Deep State’s Exploitation of captive PKK leader, Abdullah Öcalan in a fake ‘peace’ deal

Abdullah Öcalan has been held under psychological warfare conditions for the past 25 years and should not be taken at his word. He has been subjected to extreme measures by his captors including isolation, social deprivation and limited contact with his lawyers, relatives and Kurdish negotiators, as well as any access to normal life.

The PKK ignored its own rule of not following anyone taken prisoner by their enemy when he was first captured and has since continued to accept Öcalan as its leader. That led – after his poor performance during his trial portrayed by the Turks as the “baby killer “and tried when displayed encased in a glass cage – to mass resignations from the PKK.

Not only did Öcalan’s own brother, Osman, leave the party, more than 250 guerrillas and key officials, including Botan and Kani Yilmaz argued with their counterparts, defected and fled for their lives between 2002-2005. Leaving the PKK – briefly named Kongra-Gel after Öcalan’s capture – was forbidden and to do so carried the death penalty.

Patriotic Democratic Party of Kurdistan breakaways (PWDK) threatened and killed by Kongra Gel/PKK

The breakaways set up a new party, the Patriotic Democratic Party of Kurdistan (PWDK). They insisted on democratic channels for resolving the Kurdish issue in Turkey but the die-hards they left behind in Qandil would have none of it. They insisted on maintaining arms and armed resistance. Within short succession, assassination attempts were carried out against the leading breakaways.

An influential Iranian Kurd, Siphan Rojhilat was killed first (October 2004). Kemal Sahin, a Syrian Kurd, was killed on 17 February 2005. Five months later, the assassination was followed by the murder in Turkey of former HADEP chair, Hikmet Fidan on 5 July 2005.

This murder was followed by the killing in Iraqi Kurdistan of Kani Yilmaz, a Kurd from the Turco-Syrian border in the Kurdish heartland, assassinated on 11 February 2006 in a car bomb. It was the 7th anniversary of Öcalan’s capture and the act was intended as a blood sacrifice to Öcalan. 1 The PWDK lost momentum –as the PKK intended.

Devlet Bahçeli, the leader of the far right MHP – Turkish Nationalist Action Party linked with the Grey Wolves (Ülkücü) 2 that is in coalition government with the Islamist AKP, is an ageing man who was ever a proponent of violent pan-Turkish fascism in the past.3 He shares this attribute with his AKP partner, Erdoğan. Between them they have successfully manipulated Abdullah Öcalan into a corner. Knowing his foibles well after years held in Turkish captivity they understood how he could be flattered into believing he is making grand gestures for peace by sacrificing everything his party stood and fought for.

Like lemmings over the cliff?

We are reliving the political games that were played by the Turkish Deep State before and after Öcalan was first captured on 15 February 1999. That initial phase saw Öcalan making calls for various guerrillas to surrender themselves in October 1999 in the name of peace as with Ali Sapan, the PKK’s former European spokesman for the political wing, the ERNK. Öcalan claimed it would show the PKK’s desire for peace. It highlighted Turkey’s desire for conquest alone.

The eight-person delegation was locked up the moment they crossed into Turkey from their mountain stronghold – and are still in prison. The PKKwas also called on to disarm and enter a ‘democratic’ process. As part of this process, they went as far as to accept to change their name for a time to KADEK, (Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy Congress) but it didn’t stick.

In 2003, it was then renamed Kongra Gel. 4 Other euphemistic names have emerged over the years like the distinctly forgettable Kurdistan Committees Union (KCK)5 that functions under PKK guerrilla chief, the co-chair, Cemil Bayik, He looked sober in the photographs issued from the PKK’s 12th special party congress agreeing to follow their leader by dissolving the PKK and accepting to put down their weapons. The KCK is already the PKK’s ‘democratic’ vehicle.

Through the PKK affiliated Firat News Agency, the declaration was made public but without details of the terms Öcalan had discussed with Bahçeli and Erdoğan. What do they get in return?

No rivals

To date, the Kurdish parties in Turkey have gained nothing from peaceful processes: the successive chain of parties from HEP to DEM have face closure on accusations of being linked with the PKK. Each has followed the other in the same vein. All the Kurdish promises have been received cynically. Hundreds of thousands of dissidents are in prison.

The AKP even turned on their old ally, Fethullah Gülen blaming him for the false flag coup of 2016 and locking up his supporters in the thousands. Anadolu news agency claimed on July 12, 2024 that “705,172 people have been investigated thus far on terrorism or coup-related charges due to their alleged links to the movement. 6

The cleric died in exile in the United States on October 20, 2024. The US wisely refused to extradite him to Turkey. Pro-AKP media constantly published ‘hate speech’ thereafter: The Stockholm Center for Freedom (SCF) published a report, “Dehumanizing a Legacy: How Fethullah Gülen’s Death Triggered a Campaign of Hate Speech in Erdoğan’s Turkey,” which examined the surge of hate speech following the death of Fethullah Gülen… whose followers have been systematically persecuted in Turkey for more than a decade.” 7

Taking a cue from … Erdoğan’s own inflammatory rhetoric, pro-government media relentlessly used hate speech dehumanizing and demonizing Gülen and his followers after his death… Simultaneously, the government also initiated a spate of censorship to suppress moderate voices and promote anti-Gülen hate speech as the dominant public discourse.”8

The latest target of Erdoğan’s supremacy drive has been the elected mayor of Istanbul, Ekrem Imamoğlu, also now locked up on false accusations to render him powerless as a contestant for the presidency. Student and other demonstrators, and journalists are also being put on trial for criticising the government. 9

Erdoğan should have gone long ago but he changed the Constitution to stay in power and seeks to do the same again, also playing his Kurdish card in now claiming to have defeated the PKK. He does not speak of ‘peace.’ He continues to attack dissident Kurds and threaten the Autonomous Region of East and Northeast Syria (AANES) – the Kurdish West Kurdistan, Rojava.

Rojava and Ahmed al-Sharaa

The Syrian Kurds are as divided as Kurds are elsewhere. Some support the PKK-leaning YPG that dominates the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) instrumental in containing ISIS in Syria with US backing. Others look to the homegrown parties and across the border to the KDP and PUK. But many reject the proposal for the PKK to lay down its arms under the undisclosed deal said to have been reached between Öcalan, Bahçeli and Erdoğan.

Kurdish opposition figure, Hüseyin Baybaşin, imprisoned on false charges in the Netherlands since 1994, and only recently found innocent of any financial crimes despite Turkey branding him as a drug lord 10 has been spearheading the registration of the United States of Kurdistan (USK) at the UN.

He spoke to me by phone on Sunday 11 May after the PKK’s two-day Congress held in Qandil between 5-7 May. “The USK will go forward as before,” he said. “Kurdistan does not belong to anyone’s family.”

But in the present case with Syria, Donald Trump cannot be trusted over relations with the Kurds looking at his track record. He is responsible for the slaughter and destruction in Rojava and Kurdish Afrin that ensued after he gave Erdoğan a free hand during his last term in office insisting the Americans were there for the oil.

Trump is close to Erdoğan and recently met with al-Sharaa, the Islamist conqueror of Syria and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. A declassified US Intelligence report concluded that Bin Salman approved a plan to either capture or Saudi opposition journalist Jamal Khashoggi after he was lured to the Saudi Consulate in Istanbul on 18 October 2018). He was strangled and his body dismembered. 11

The previous Trump administration had suppressed the report. Supporting a fundamentalist Islamist who has already begun the crackdown on women and minorities since seizing power on 7 December 2024 is irresponsible as is lifting sanctions.

Erdoğan is not sincere about peace: he still relies on the rhetoric of ‘terrorism’ calling the ‘initiative’ a ‘terror-free Turkey’ omitting recognition of decades of Turkish state terror against the Kurds. By so doing he lays the blame solely on the Kurdish side – the victims of state repression carried out in parallel with denial of their distinct identity and culture and occupation, destruction and seizure of their lands.

It seems that Trump has Alzheimer’s when it comes to recent history and that any facts can be distorted to fit his goals.

Turkey’s Number Three, former MIT chief now Foreign Minister, Hakan Fidan, is another player with much Kurdish blood on his hands. He had been liked with arming ISIS and various Turkish-run jihadists in Syria when he headed the Intelligence Agency.

These men and their predecessors have been using the rhetoric of “terrorism” since the mid 1990s – before that, Kurdish rebels were called ‘eshkiya – brigands and then once the PKK took up armed resistance on 15 August 1985, they were called ‘separatists.’ ‘Terrorists’ is a relatively recent term but one they do not use for the jihadists, including Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, with scores of civilian deaths on their hands.

Facial Recognition Technology in use against Protesters

Advanced psychological warfare technology is employed by Turkey’s Intelligence Agency (MIT) including enhanced facial recognition technology. Having got wise to it, dissenters have taken to donning goggles, animal masks and fake ears when they gather to protest and express their outrage against various of Erdoğan’s edicts. These include the arrest of his rival and would-be contender for the presidency, Imamoğlu, and more recently still, the exploitation of Abdullah Öcalan, who his detractors now call ‘Abdullah Bahçeli’ for falling under Devlet Bahçeli’s sway.

Last November, Eurasia Review published a report headed Turkey’s Intelligence Agency Emerges as Erdoğan’s Foreign Policy Weapon. It asserted that MIT has been turned into a ‘powerful foreign policy tool under Erdoğan. It went on:

The expanded scope and sophistication of Turkey’s intelligence and clandestine operations have become integral to its foreign and security policy… clandestine intelligence operations have increasingly become a tool of and reflect Turkey’s evolving geopolitical position… and the implications these increased clandestine activities have for regional and international dynamics and highlights the critical interplay between enhanced intelligence activities and Turkish foreign policy objectives.

Key Points:

1. Under Hakan Fidan’s leadership, MİT transformed from a military-dominated agency to a civilian-led organization with expanded foreign operations capability.
2. MİT developed paramilitary capabilities after the 2016 coup attempt, enabling direct military actions independent of Turkey’s conventional forces.
3. The agency has orchestrated major clandestine operations in Syria, Libya, and Azerbaijan, using Syrian rebels as proxies in regional conflicts.
4. Recent leadership changes, with Fidan becoming Foreign Minister and Kalin heading MİT, signal continued expansion of aggressive intelligence operations.12

Running Öcalan like a hare

At the end of February 2025, the pro-Kurdish HDP 13 successor in waiting, the DEM party made public a letter from Abdullah Öcalan. In this letter, he urged the PKK to disarm and disband. Many people viewed it with suspicion as another political ploy by Erdoğan to prolong his term in office. Öcalan had not had independent access to the outside world for a very long time and had also been deprived of contact with his lawyers since August 7, 2019 as well as his relatives. 14

Three other detainees also held on Imrali Island in the F-Type isolation prison, Ömer Hayri Konar, Hamili Yıldırım and Veysi Aktaş were also illegally prevented from seeing their lawyers but in their case since 2015 when they were moved to the island.

The European Association of Lawyers for Democracy and world Human Rights presented a petition to the Turkish Ministry of Justice in September last year (2024) emphasising:

A special and discriminatory form of isolation has been applied in İmralı Prison since February 15, 1999. The ban on lawyer visits has been in effect continuously for 8 years since July 27, 2011, until May 2, 2019. In 2019, 5 lawyer visits took place. After the last lawyer visit on August 7, 2019, the ban was resumed.

It has to be stated that Öcalan has not been heard from since a last short phone call took place on March 25, 2021. This constitutes a worrying circumstance. As lawyers closely following affairs in Turkey, we are well aware of the political and social impact of this situation.

In its report on its 2019 visit to the İmralı Prison, published on 5 August 2020, the CPT considered the total ban on Öcalan’s and the other three inmates’ contacts with the outside world as a type of incommunicado imprisonment. The CPT stated that such a state of affairs was unacceptable and contravened relevant international human rights instruments and standards.

The continuous interference with the right to defense and the state of isolation imposed on Öcalan and the other inmates have prompted statements by international law organizations such as ELDH, AED, and Lawyer for Lawyers and critical reactions by a wide network of lawyers on different occasions.

We would like to remind you that on January 22, 2024, 1330 lawyers registered to 35 different Bar Associations applied to the Bursa Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office with the request to have lawyer visits with Mr. Abdullah Öcalan, Mr. Hamili Yıldırım, Mr. Ömer Hayri Konar and Mr. Veysi Aktaş by putting an end to the illegal ban on lawyer visits in İmralı Prison. Additionally, Veysi Aktaş, despite completing the execution of his 30-year sentence on April 28, 2024, has not been granted the legally mandated parole right. His release has been postponed for 1 year by the Decision of the Observation Board. His lawyers have also been completely excluded from this process.

The ban on lawyer visits to İmralı Prison clearly violates the United Nations (UN) Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (Nelson Mandela Rules) updated in 2015, the recommendations of the CPT and Turkey’s Execution Law (Law No. 5275). States have an obligation to ensure that detainees and prisoners are able to exercise their rights regardless of their identity and the nature of their sentence.

It is also a violation of the rights and privileges of lawyers as set out in the United Nations Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers, in particular Basic Principles 8 and 16…15

The long periods during which Abdullah Öcalan has been restricted to contact solely with his Turkish jailors has often cast doubt upon his ability to lead the PKK or make correct evaluations of the political situation.

The Turkish government has not set forth any concrete steps that it would take in response to the proposed PKK disarmament – something that was first demanded when Öcalan was captured and which failed to materialise owing to the lack of reciprocal assurances from the Turkish side. Again, as before, the very long running Kurdish demands are being passed over relying on the rhetoric of terrorism. Such is the present position. On March 18, Reuters reported:

Turkey’s pro-Kurdish party said that President Tayyip Erdoğan’s ruling alliance had offered no clear steps during closed-door talks on Monday meant to advance a peace process after Kurdish militants pledged to disarm.

In an interview late on Monday, Gulistan Kilic Kocyigit, the DEM Party’s deputy parliamentary group chair, said government officials outlined their stance in broad terms but remained vague on addressing the party’s democratic demands…

“They used phrases like ‘a terror-free Turkey’ and ‘the country must swiftly rid itself of this issue.’ They suggested that if weapons are silenced and the PKK dissolves, the democratic space in Turkey will expand,” Kocyigit said.

“But there was no specific roadmap or clear commitment on what steps they are willing to take,” she told Reuters…16.

While deploying the rhetoric of ‘peace’ the crackdown on Kurds and liberal Turks in civil and political life in Turkey continues unabated as it has ever since the ‘coup’ of July 2016 – and this in parallel with increased Islamisation and Erdoğan’s Neo Ottoman adventurism across the region.

Elected Kurdish and liberal mayors were again removed from office and replaced by Turkish appointed ‘trustees.’ It is not only the pro-Kurdish chain of parties that are coming under fire but the main opposition Republican People’s Party, the CHP, and left-wing and human rights groups.

The AKP uses the same terminology of ‘terrorism’ to undermine legal political representation throughout the country, as also towards Iraqi Kurdistan and the autonomous Kurdish area in Syria.

The popular mayor of Istanbul, Ekrem Imamoğlu, was recently removed from office on false accusations. He was taken to the Vatan Anti-Terror Branch. Large scale protests at once erupted. The Council of Europe has called for his immediate release in the following terms.

“The Assembly calls for ‘immediate release’ of Mayor of Istanbul, whose arrest and detention ‘appear politically-motivated’ Furthermore, PACE “strongly condemns the unjustified arrests and detentions of demonstrators”, as well as “the disproportionate use of force by the law enforcement authorities” during protests that followed the arrest of Mr İmamoğlu, and the ill-treatment of protesters held in custody. It recalled that the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of expression could only be restricted “under certain conditions provided for in the European Convention on Human Rights” – to which Türkiye is a State Party – and that these restrictions must be prescribed by law and “necessary in a democratic society”.

In the face of these “worrying developments, which represent a retreat from democratic values and go against the will of the Turkish people”, PACE called on the Turkish authorities to “fully respect the rights to freedom of expression and assembly, as well as other human rights in the context of the ongoing protests”; to stop any disproportionate use of force against protesters; to release those who have been detained “on unfounded charges”; to release all journalists detained because of reporting on protests; to allow the media to provide the public with necessary information; and to ensure a fair trial for all those detained in this context.

Finally, PACE urged the Turkish authorities to implement without delay the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights Osman Kavala, Selahattin Demirtaş (No. 2) and FigenYüksekdağ Şenoğlu and Others, by releasing activists and/or politicians detained on politically-motivated charges and “conducting a comprehensive reform of the justice system to fully guarantee the independence of the judiciary”. 17

Citizens cannot safely criticise Erdoğan and the AKP government. As in the COE statement above, the judiciary acts as an extension of the political arm of the AKP rather than upholding the law and uses repressive measures concerning freedom of expression to prosecute people for their views. Laws have been subverted by the political agenda of the AKP since the ‘coup’ which saw so many judges (and civil servants as well as military officers) sacked and replaced with people loyal to the government while locking up many thousands of others. 18

A one-sided ‘Peace’ Initiative – Just as after Öcalan’s capture in 1999

The ‘peace’ initiative appears to be little other than a pretext for increased Turkish state control to end Kurdish resistance.

The so-called ‘Peace’ Initiative is one-sided. It is going nowhere fast despite the media hue and cry. The constant incursions of the Turkish army into northern Iraq and Syria are a very considerable aspect of the problem, exposing the difference between Erdoğan’s actions and his words over seeking any ‘peaceful’ solution. Instead, he seeks to consolidate Turkish influence even further in Syria through his alliance with al-Sharaa, clearly approved by Trump.

Erdoğan has formalised his affiliation with former Al Qaeda Syrian affiliate, Hayat Tahir al-Sham – HTS and its leader, Ahmed al-Sharaa. The increasing curtailment of rights and freedoms in Syria and the beginning of gender segregation along with attacks by Muslim gunmen on non-Sunni minorities sets alarm bells ringing for the short term but Trump is not listening. His own anti-equality measures at home are of the same kind.

The fact that the AKP dominated government with its MHP support base continues to promote enmity with the HDP, DEM, the CHP and shows it to be doing little other than paying lip service to a sincere notion of ‘peace.’ Recep Onursal, writing for the Just Policy think tank observed in a detailed editorial on April 22, 2025: In Turkey, Peace as Pretext: Erdoğan’s Kurdish Initiative an Authoritarian Logic Behind Arresting His Main Opponent.

The shocking – though arguably not surprising – arrest of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s main rival, Istanbul Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu, might have seemed in contradiction to Erdoğan’s budding rapprochement with another longtime source of opposition, the Kurds. Yet İmamoğlu’s arrest only sharpens the contradictions at the heart of Erdoğan’s strategy.

In fact, the arrest fits squarely within Erdoğan’s longstanding governance playbook. He is once again using his hegemonic grip on State institutions to reshape the political field to his advantage. This move against İmamoğlu on March 19 would not have been possible without first sidelining or neutralizing the Kurdish political movement. Having reopened a negotiating channel with jailed Kurdish leader Abdullah Öcalan, Erdoğan then created a calculated ethical dilemma for Turkish and Kurdish actors with İmamoğlu’s arrest – and likely with other anti-democratic moves that the president might pursue in his search for a way to gain a currently unconstitutional third term in office: Kurdish leaders now must choose between remaining silent and risking their moral legitimacy and electoral support among both Kurdish and non-Kurdish voters, or speaking out and risking a fracture in already fragile negotiations.19

The analyst wisely predicts that if these mechanisms do not serve Erdoğan’s goals, he will simply abandon them as he did over his tactical rapprochement with the Kurds in 2015.

A report on Ronahi noted that armed militias operated in collaboration with Turkey have joined the forces of the HTS. Ahmed Al-Sharaa had said that the people of Afrin would be able to return to their homes, but they have not been able to because of the Turkish presence.

Al Sharaa cannot demand that Turkey pulls its armed factions out of the region. “Others forcibly displaced from Girê Spî and Serêkaniyê are also unable to return. These areas remain under the occupation of the Turkish army and are controlled by its affiliated armed groups.

In Afrin and across these regions, there is no safety for civilians or their property. Abductions, ransom demands, torture, and threats continue without pause. For years, people’s homes and property have been seized and looted, and their return has been systematically blocked. This is not about the presence of the PKK.

The policy being pursued here is clearly rooted in anti-Kurdish hostility…if an organization is ready to disband, why is it still being treated as a threat? And why are Syrian Kurds being targeted in the process? This clearly shows that the real issue is not the PKK. The problem is the intent to destroy the Kurdish people and deny them any form of political status, all under the guise of fighting the PKK.” 20

Abdullah Öcalan is a pawn in the hands of his enemies. The PKK will achieve nothing by dissolving and surrendering their weapons but is likely to see more prisoners being taken alive, others ‘neutralised’ and Kurds still labelled as ‘terrorists’ until Turkey also crushes the YPG.

Israel’s hand crosses Trump’s cards

Finally, another regional player, Israel is opposing the HTS-Turkey-Saudi-Trump alliance over Syria declaring itself a friend to the YPG and the Kurds while Trump is trying to supplant his former allies by asking jihadist leader, al-Sharaa to take over the ISIS prisons controlled by them, the Roj Camp and al-Hol.

The damage done by recent American interference in the Middle East is incalculable. Trump is also playing right into Sunni Islamist Erdoğan’s hands in freeing Al Sharaa from all censure. He “thanked Saudi Arabia’s de facto leader, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, who organised the meeting, as well as Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan — a key supporter of the new Damascus government — for his role in the encounter.”21

Turkish state media rolls out the agenda

Turkish state media sources are now claiming no outside agencies like the UN are to be involved and instead: “The weapons handover will be overseen by Turkish intelligence officials at locations in Türkiye, Syria and Iraq, who are expected to register the arms and the identity of the fighters in coordination with the Syrian and Iraqi authorities…The Turkish Armed Forces will resolutely continue its efforts to clear areas where the terrorist group may have shelters, land mines and storage for explosives, to ensure that the PKK would not pose a threat to Türkiye any longer…”22 It was supported by KDP leader, Massoud Barzani, along term foe of the PKK.

It doesn’t sound like ‘peace’ to me.

Sheri Laizer, a Middle East and North African expert specialist and well known commentator on the Kurdish issue. She is a senior contributing writer for iKurd.net. More about Sheri Laizer see below.

The opinions are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent the views of iKurd.net or its editors.

Copyright © 2025 Sheri Laizer, iKurd.net. All rights reserved

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