The Barzani State? When a Political Party Owns the Institutions

The then-Prime Minister of Iraqi Kurdistan speaks to journalists on August 7, 2015..
Video from Rudaw TV

Iraqi Kurdistan’s Public and Government Buildings in Private Hands? The Barzanis Own a Key Government Building in Erbil — What If the KDP Loses Power?

Sara Hussein | Exclusive to iKurd.net

In a 2016 televised interview that continues to raise eyebrows, Nechirvan Barzani—then Prime Minister of the Kurdistan Region—stated that the buildings used by top Kurdish government institutions are not government-owned, but belong to the ruling Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP).

“This place where we are now—the Prime Minister’s office—is the property of the KDP,” Barzani said. “Other buildings are as well. We even compensate the PUK [Patriotic Union of Kurdistan] for that. These spaces are used by the government and the presidency, and we also host foreign delegations here. But if your question is whether I personally own them—the answer is no.”

This acknowledgment suggests that key state institutions in the Kurdistan Region operate from properties owned by a single political party. It raises fundamental concerns about state sovereignty, public accountability, and the separation between party and government.

A Deeply Divided Region

Iraqi Kurdistan remains politically and geographically split. The KDP, led by the Barzani family, controls the Erbil and Duhok governorates, while the PUK, led by the Talabani family, dominates Sulaymaniyah. Each party commands its own militia, security forces, and administrative networks, creating what many observers call a “state within a state.”

Although Peshmerga forces are funded and supported by international partners, they remain loyal to their respective political parties rather than to a unified Kurdish military command.

This party-based control extends to public infrastructure. While official state buildings should legally belong to the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and its institutions, many—including the Prime Minister’s office and presidential palaces—are under the effective ownership of the KDP.

Can Power Truly Change Hands?

This situation prompts a critical question: if a non-KDP party were to win a future election, would the KDP relinquish control over these government assets?

Skeptics argue that without ownership of administrative buildings, access to real authority is limited. The current structure risks undermining the legitimacy of any non-KDP government and puts democratic transition in jeopardy.

The Barzani State? When a Political Party Owns the Institutions — Then-Iraqi Kurdistan Parliament Speaker Yusuf Muhammad Sadiq at the 2016 Sulaimani Forum, Kurdistan Region of Iraq, Mar. 16, 2016. Photo: NRT

A notable example occurred in 2015 when the Speaker of the Kurdistan Parliament, Yusuf Mohammed Sadiq from the Gorran Movement, was barred from entering Erbil by KDP-controlled security forces. Sadiq called it a “coup against legitimacy.” That crisis effectively shut down the parliament for over two years.

The root of that conflict was President Massoud Barzani’s refusal to step down after his term ended in 2015. Though legally barred from running again, Barzani insisted he would stay in power until Kurdish independence was achieved. He only stepped aside in late 2017, following a failed independence referendum. Still, Barzani remains a powerful figure behind the scenes.

Today, his son Masrour Barzani serves as Prime Minister, while his nephew Nechirvan Barzani is President—reinforcing the family’s grip on power.

Who Owns the Palaces?

Beyond elections, a more concrete issue looms: ownership of government buildings. Many of the palaces and offices currently used by top officials, including the Prime Minister and the Presidency, are reportedly owned by the KDP—not the state.

KDP leader Massoud Barzani — Massoud Barzani, tribal leader and the head of KDP party, Iraqi Kurdistan, 2018. Photo: PA

Some of these properties, critics say, were inherited or taken over from former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein’s regime. The question arises: If the KDP loses control, would the Barzani family vacate these buildings? Would a new president be allowed to govern from palaces still under KDP ownership—or be expected to rent them?

Such unresolved issues highlight the structural obstacles to a functioning democracy in the Kurdistan Region, where political power remains closely tied to property, militias, and financial networks controlled by one ruling family.

Oil, Wealth, and Control

Critics have long accused the Barzani family of using state resources for personal gain. The family reportedly controls numerous oil fields, commercial enterprises, and luxury properties in the U.S., UAE, and Europe. Observers say their political dominance is closely tied to economic control, which further complicates democratic governance.

Meanwhile, protests in KDP-held areas such as Erbil and Duhok are heavily restricted unless they align with party interests. Independent voices and opposition parties have struggled to operate freely.

A Way Forward?

The idea of unifying Kurdish military forces and institutions under a non-partisan, state-run structure has been proposed many times. But little progress has been made. Analysts believe that unless political parties surrender control over security forces and government property, true democracy in the Kurdistan Region will remain out of reach.

As one analyst put it, “Until government buildings belong to the government, and the military answers to the people—not parties—we cannot speak of real democracy in Kurdistan.”