ERBIL, Iraqi Kurdistan region,— As the parliamentary elections approach in Iraqi Kurdistan region, widespread voter disillusionment is becoming increasingly evident, with many planning to abstain from voting.
According to a report by AFP, this growing sense of frustration is particularly common among younger citizens and the working class, such as Sanaa, a 33-year-old Kurdish seamstress who, like many others, has lost faith in the political elite that has dominated the region for decades.
This is largely due to its strong ties with Western nations, particularly the United States and European countries. However, beneath the gleaming high-rises of the regional capital, Erbil, and the region’s modern infrastructure, a sense of dissatisfaction and distrust runs deep among its residents.
Sanaa, like many others, believes that the political system has failed to address the pressing needs of the people. “There’s no more trust,” she explained, choosing to remain anonymous to speak freely about the political landscape.
The two dominant political factions—the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) led by the Barzani family, and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), controlled by the Talabani family—have held sway over the region’s politics since its semi-autonomous status was established in 1991.
Yet, according to Sanaa, neither party has made significant strides in improving the lives of ordinary citizens. “I won’t vote because they do nothing,” she added, her voice heavy with frustration as she navigated Erbil’s bustling markets. “We have no money, everything is expensive, and they don’t care about what matters to us.”
The upcoming parliamentary election, now set for October 20, 2024, was originally scheduled for earlier this year but has already been postponed four times due to political infighting between the KDP and the PUK. The KDP emerged victorious in the 2018 elections and has since ruled in alliance with smaller parties. However, voter turnout was just 59 percent, a figure expected to drop further if more voters, like Sanaa and her family, stay away from the polls.
The parliamentary elections in Iraqi Kurdistan, initially scheduled for October 2022, are now set to take place on October 20, 2024, following multiple delays.
In a region with around six million inhabitants, nearly half—2.9 million—are registered to vote. However, political analysts are warning of growing disenchantment with the established parties. In the heart of Erbil, banners and flags of the KDP dominate the public spaces, symbolizing its continued hold over the city. In contrast, the PUK maintains its influence in the region’s second-largest city, Sulaimani, where their flags and banners are similarly prominent.
Political observer Shivan Fazil, a researcher with expertise in Iraq at Boston University, noted that disillusionment with the region’s ruling parties has deepened over time. “People’s living conditions have deteriorated over the last decade,” Fazil explained, citing high unemployment, particularly among the youth, as a critical concern. “Many young people are even risking dangerous journeys to migrate to Europe in search of better opportunities.”
Compounding the dissatisfaction is the unreliable payment of wages to the region’s 1.2 million civil servants. These salaries serve as a crucial lifeline for many households. Delayed payments have fueled resentment toward the ruling class, with many blaming the Kurdistan Regional Government’s (KRG) strained relationship with Baghdad for the ongoing issue.
The KRG and Iraq’s federal government have long been at odds over control of the region’s oil revenues, which has exacerbated financial instability.
The KDP and PUK face a daunting challenge in retaining the votes they secured in previous elections. Sarteep Jawhar, a political expert and dissident from the PUK, pointed to voter dissatisfaction driven by a lack of public services and security concerns.
Turkish military operations targeting Kurdish militants from the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) have resulted in regular bombings in the region, further exacerbating fears among the local population.
This rising frustration with the status quo has given opposition parties, such as the New Generation movement, a unique opportunity.
Additionally, a new political faction led by Lahur Sheikh Jangi Talabani, a former member of the Talabani clan, is gaining traction and could draw support away from the traditional parties.
Another major setback for the ruling elite has been the halt in oil exports from the region. The KRG previously relied on these exports, which were managed independently of Baghdad, as a significant source of income.
However, over a year ago, an international arbitration ruling favored the federal government in Baghdad, effectively cutting off the region from this vital revenue stream.
The newly elected Kurdish parliament, which has been reduced to 100 seats from its previous 111-member structure, will face the difficult task of electing new leaders, including a president and prime minister. Both positions are currently held by KDP members, Nechirvan Barzani and Masrour Barzani, respectively.
Despite the challenges ahead, some, like 52-year-old Mustafa Mahmoud, still plan to vote for the KDP, though with tempered expectations. “We’ve seen some changes, but they haven’t met our hopes,” Mahmoud admitted while sipping tea in a café in Erbil. He stressed the need for improved security and economic reforms, especially more job opportunities for young graduates, many of whom remain unemployed despite holding university degrees.
As Kurdish voters prepare to head to the polls, the question remains: Will their choices reflect hope for a new direction, or a deepening disillusionment with the region’s entrenched political elite?
Iraqi Kurdistan is not a fully unified region; it is both politically and geographically divided between two major political factions. The KDP controls the governorates of Erbil and Duhok, while the PUK governs Sulaimani.
Each of these political parties maintains its own independent security apparatus. While the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) is granted authority under the federal constitution to manage internal security forces, the reality is more fragmented.
The KDP and PUK command additional local militia forces, known as Peshmerga, alongside separate police units that technically fall under the Kurdish Ministry of Interior’s control. Moreover, the KRG’s internal security services, known as Asayish, are also split along party lines, with each faction running its own Asayish and intelligence networks.
This division extends beyond politics and security into economic management, especially regarding the region’s substantial oil revenues. Iraqi Kurdistan has long been considered one of the most corrupt parts of Iraq.
Watchdog organizations, Kurdish lawmakers, and leaked reports have pointed to the mismanagement of billions of dollars in oil revenue.
Both the Barzani and Talabani families face regular accusations of corruption, with claims of misappropriated funds and self-enrichment that have only fueled the growing discontent among the region’s population.
The Barzani clan, often referred to as the “Kurdish oligarchs,” has faced consistent accusations from critics and observers regarding nepotism and the accumulation of substantial wealth from the oil business at the expense of the wider population.
According to analysts, Massoud Barzani continues to wield significant influence behind the scenes. His son, Masrour Barzani, currently serves as the prime minister of the Kurdistan region, while his nephew, Nechirvan Barzani, holds the presidency.
(With files from AFP | Agencies)
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