The Shabaks Between a Rock and a Hard Place

Nemat Sharif | Exclusive to iKurd.net

A Book by Dr. Saad Saleh
Review and commentary: Nemat Sharif
Publisher: Dar Al-Warsha, Baghdad 2022
Pages: 300

“Today, Shabaks are characterized by their specific geographical location, their mystic Sofi character, identity and language, their long history, community, traditions and customs, all of which make them a special and self-contained ethnic group, which cannot be mixed or fused into another group.” (Dr. Saad Saleh, p. 25)

In the past few months, I have read two books about two groups that do not differ much from each other in social, political, linguistic and perhaps ethnic aspects despite the geographical distance between them, namely Dr. Saad Saleh’s book in Arabic about the Shabaks in Iraq, and the second by Dr. Muhammad Kaya on Zaza (Zaza) in Turkey, in English. My focus here is to clarify some observations in the review of the first book.

First of all, I would like to express my appreciation to the able researcher for his laborious work in studying, analyzing and documenting events over the two decades since the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003. It brought an unprecedented détente in the modern history of Iraq. Ethnic and religious minorities of Iraq rose to the occasion like birds that found their cage suddenly opened, flew in all directions as high as possible. They are gradually return to reality but never to the cage. The Shabaks perhaps lived their zenith in the period in question.

Democracy is essentially an individual and the societal a practice. It is deeply rooted in the conscious of the individual and the group before being a theory in academia and research centers. Iraq did not have a democratic tradition except for the period of monarchy and British Mandate as “democracy” was imposed much like most of the Middle East. Iraqi Democracy is a system of power sharing plagued with corruption, unparalleled banditry and plunder of public resources.

Hence, conflicts of larger parties, neglect and even persecution of minorities in their areas of influence. Elections reinforced the corrupt power sharing system. This situation continues to this day. Therefore, we believe that this book, an analytical study, is an important read for the academia as much as it is for the average citizen in terms of politics, future prospects, and lessons learned, especially for the Shabaks themselves.

Despite the help and guidance of friendly nations to consolidate democracy in Iraq, two decades after the overthrow of the totalitarian regime, the democratic process is still stalled in Iraq, including the Kurdistan region. Ten months after the last elections, a lame duck PM continued and rest and recreational (R&R) governing. . Eventually, the biggest winner stepped aside to allow opposition to form a new government. Time and votes wasted. Is this the democracy Iraqis are looking forward to?

A quick look at the history of American wars shows that it tends to rebuild the occupied state in its own image, bearing the consequences of its economic and military decisions. Examples are the post-war reconstruction of Japan and Germany. Imperial Japan became a democracy and a global economic power in record time. In addition to providing aid to Japan, the US assumed responsibility to defend it to this day.

In addition to the US aid, Japan diverted its own resources to reconstruction, which otherwise would have been spent on the defense budget. In the case of Iraq, the story is different. After the collapse of the regime, the Baath gangs in cooperation with terrorist groups began the so called resistance to distract the United States from the ultimate goal of rebuilding, perhaps doubling or tripling its cost.

Of course the US was also protecting its interests in the region as well as pushing the democratic process forward. The United States sees itself as a sponsor of democracy and human rights. This is not to defend its mistakes, ignorance of culture, customs and traditions of Iraq, and ignoring Iraqis’ pride in their ancient history and struggle.

In general, there were two popular trends, the “resistance”, which was working to restore the former regime, and those who accepted work and cooperation with the coalition forces, including those opposed the former regime, Arabs and Kurds.

As for the majority of Iraqis, including minority groups such as the Shabaks, had very little influence if any within both trends. Minorities found regime change an opportunity as their suffering under the former regime was no less than others. In these turbulent times larger groups failed to recognize minorities whom were seen only to serve the objectives of larger groups. They were categorized as ethnic, religious or sectarians.

Shabaks were viewed by the KRG as ethnic Kurds, and by Iraq as Shiites. As they began to make their own choices, they were viewed either patriots or traitors by one side or the other. Shabaks are in catch 22. This review focuses on the subject of the book, the Shabaks and their relations with their neighbors of other minorities, especially with the Kurdistan Region.

The disputed territories represented the “frontline” between the Kurds and successive Iraqi governments that.

Security-wise, these areas represented an extension of Kurdistan and a zone of influence, but for the Kurds, Shabak areas were and still are considered Kurdish territory but difficult to defend due to its plain topography and control by Iraq which even today considers the area to be the protective belt of Mosul.

In the period following the fall of the Baathist regime, the disputed areas, including the Shabak villages of northern and northeastern Mosul vicinities became the target of terrorist operations.

ISIS directly targeted Shabaks in their villages and in Mosul. Iraqi government failed to protect them. KRG did not/could not move effectively to defend them as Shabaks expected. On the contrary, the KRG policy was to contain the Shabaks without regard to their circumstances and their specificity.

We heard repeatedly Shabaks say that if the attacks were on villages in Dohuk, Sheikhan or areas bordering Erbil, the situation would have been different, and this explains KRG’s indifference to what is happening to the Shabaks. They understood that KRG viewed them as a card in the negotiations with Baghdad and will turn the area over to Iraq sooner than later.

Perhaps the more important reason why the region has not taken a decisive defense policy for the Shabaks is the lack of a population extension of the Shabaks within KRG borders. It then follows that KRG is not sufficiently informed of their conditions and needs. It is not enough to be Kurds only in election season.

Neither KRG nor its associated bodies took the initiative to establish a permanent office for the Shabak affairs to avoid shortage of actuarial data to be informed of their needs, especially in terms of security and services, to at least defend them in the Iraqi parliament.

The Kurdish media in general neglected them unless they are a part of a news item involving the KRG directly. Since there was no radio or television station in Shabaki, what would be the harm to have daily or weekly programs? After two decades of openness and intermingling, the majority of Shabaks are still not fluent in either of the two main dialects in the region. These are some Shabak grievances to name a few.

It is not enough to point the finger only at a particular party. To be fair, it is necessary to point out the reasons and points of view in the Kurdish administered region as well. Attention to the disputed areas (or Kurdish areas outside the region) is mainly concerned with security and services, and that depends on economy.

The Kurdistan economy depends on KRG’s share of Iraq’s budget, oil and border crossing revenues even in periods of prosperity of the Kurdistan economy. Kurdistan was and is still going through a period of reconstruction after years of destruction, persecution and oppression, especially the war and Anfal operations.

The Kurdish economy had to absorb the process of reconstruction while administering government affairs and public life. Priority was given to Kurdistan region, and not to the areas outside of it. These disputed areas, including the Nineveh Plains, were and still are the responsibility of the federal government, especially reconstruction, services and supporting its local economy.

From this point of view, the KRG may be right in its priorities of the region it administers only and not to areas outside it. Politically, the KRG may have been able to take another path, which is to support the Shabaks in choosing their representatives in the Iraqi parliament and to appoint officials in their areas, administrators and otherwise, from the Shabaks themselves without being side-tracked by minor conflicts.

The KRG role was expected to be of an ally, not a competitor. For example, what is wrong with the Shabaks having more representatives in the Iraqi parliament instead of limiting them to the quota of only one seat! The Shabak population ranges from 400,000 to 500,000, and if one seat per hundred thousand, like other population groups, the Shabaks then should have at least four seats.

As for the independent Shabaks or those associated with other parties are free to run in elections as they wish. A Shabak occupying a seat representing their areas is always preferred over appointing/supporting a non-Shabak (i.e. al-Bayati) for that seat in the first election held after the fall of the regime.

In this book, the author uphold his objectivity as an academic, thus limits his analysis to events and their consequences on the region. However, he does not address political standpoints including his own. It doesn’t matter to the Iraqi government and its parties if the Shabaks are Kurds? Obviously they are not Arabs.

Therefore, the sectarian dimension becomes important to win them over to their side. From the Kurdish point of view, the Shabaks are Kurds, so they should support the region in elections and otherwise, regardless of sect and religion. The Kurds are mulit-religious, multi sectarian society.

However, any claim that Shabaks are not Kurds is rejected. Hence the government’s encouragement of Shabaks as a separate ethnicity is accepted as long as they observe being Iraqis and Shiites. (About 65 percent of Shabaks are Shiites, and the rest are Sunnis divided between the Shafi’i and Hanafi schools.)

From this standpoint, we find that the Kurdish Shabak is psychologically torn between national and sectarian affiliations. In order to avoid this violent internal feeling, thus, they escape to a neutral feeling of separate Shabak identity, and dedication to a sense of sectarianism.

A Kurdish Shabak man, Iraq, 2016. Photo: AFP

We believe that there is no harm in that as long as he identifies as Shabak and works to represent and serve their political and services goals and other issues.

As for the Shabaks who are committed to their Kurdishness, democracy enhanced by one man one vote, instead of party lists in elections and in society in general, will be liberating from ethnic, sectarian and other issues. Here we are still at the beginning of our bumpy road, whether in Iraq in general or in Kurdistan in particular.

Shabaks’ feelings in this situation may resemble what the Failis are going through, and despite the clarity of the nationalist vision of most of them, many of them are divided in their political life between sectarianism (most of them are also Shiites) and their nationalist feelings. Many Faili activists work in their own organizations and cooperate collectively (to preserve their Faili identity and work for their causes) with other Kurdish organizations.

The author himself speaks from the standpoint that the Shabaks are an ethnic group independent of the Kurds, despite their size and Indo-European origin. This is important because it colors all the political and social analyses and conclusions resulting from the research.

Despite the thousands of victims, multiple revolutions and uprisings in Turkey, and despite Turkish and international promises of justice for the Kurds, Turkey still do not recognize Kurds or Kurdistan within its borders because it entails recognizing a number of facts, i.e. large parts of southeastern Turkey belong to the Kurdish majority. It also entails recognizing legitimate Kurdish rights as any other nation.

Thus, justice and international law require the participation of the Kurds in governance, whether independently or in some form of autonomy. Implications of this discussion applies to the Shabaks as well, albeit on a smaller scale. This leads us to the author’s views on the origin of the Shabaks, their language, their arrival in the region and related aspect of his valuable research.

It is customary in academic studies for the writer to scan the available information on his subject. In the case of the origin of the Shabaks, we find that much of the available information stems from the imagination and whims of writers and historians except a few who tried in vain, mainly because of lack of information about the Shabaks, their language, society, and of course their origin.

Some of them are tendentious for racist, political and perhaps sectarian reasons. In this article, we need not list opinions that do more harm than good. Shabak is a term that refers to a group of people in the Nineveh Plains who speak one language (or dialect) that facilitates understanding between group members hundred percent, including the Bajalans, regardless of their tribal origins.

Most of them have tribal extensions among Kurdish tribes that speak Kurdish dialects spoken in their areas of residence. Among the Shabaks there are Arab and Turkmen families, who over time have fused with the Shabaks, as with all living cultures around the globe. Shabaks are not the only group treated unfairly by historians.

Some historians, especially Arabs, described the Kurds as children of the jinn whom Prophet Suleiman exiled and contained them in the mountains. What has been said about the Shabaks is still within reason, and has not denied them their humanity. As for their name, it is certainly not derived from the interlacing or intertwining of the fingers. Names do not come out of nowhere. They may change and evolve over time and etymologists study and trace them to their origins.

Originally, the word shamogh, a compound of the words shah (i.e., great, king) and mogh meaning priest, wise man or magician, and all deal with the unseen. (the words magic, in English, and the word magi or ‘majus’ in Arabic, were derived from the same Greek root word for magi) in ancient religions of Mithraism and Zoroastrianism, meaning great or high priest, wise man or magician.

Over time, it has evolved into “Shabak” as we see it today. These priests (moghan in plural form) constituted a religious class and no doubt influential at the time as they left their name in various places in their migration routes and in their areas of residence.

The name Shabak is found in the mountainous areas of Afghanistan, and then in Iran, and in Turkey in the areas of Zaza Kurds. The name appears mostly in areas inhabited or passed through by Kurdish tribes during their migration or internal movements after settling in present-day Kurdistan.

As for their origin, I have no doubt that they are Indo-Europeans who have migrated to the region like other tribes, whether Kurdish or ethnically different. It is clear from the sciences of sociology and anthropology that the emergence of ethnicities is a process of historical social differentiation that takes hundreds of years. We will have more to say about this elsewhere.

In terms of classification of Kurdish dialects, the dialects of Zaza and Shabak are the closest. Perhaps Shabaki is one of the sub-dialects of Zaza, while Bajalani and Horamani belong to the Gurani origin. It is clear that the Shabaki, Bajalani and Horamani dialects are almost identical, while some changes occurred in the dialect of Zaza due to its geographical distance and perhaps mixing with Turkish. (See Izadi, pp. 169-168) Based on the same author’s study of the history of Kurdish migration waves to the region, it is believed that the Zaza (Dimli or Dunbali clans) settled in large areas in Northern Kurdistan (Turkey) and Southern Kurdistan (Iraq) where the Kurmanjs lived high in the mountains, but for nearly a thousand years, their population proliferation was so large that they began to expand their territories until parts of the speakers of this dialect in the south were cut off to form the Shabaks, and to the east of them a group across the Iraq-Iran border, thus the Horamanis. According to him, this explains the original unity of the three dialects.

There are more than three million Zaza speakers in Turkey, half of them Alawites, the other half Sunnis, as it is the case with the Shabaks (Shiites and Sunnis).

Their lifestyle is very similar to what the Shabaks were in the fifties and sixties of the last century as a result of the state exerted pressure forcing them to isolate themselves in order to preserve their culture, language and customs (see Kaya, pp. 107 and p. 147), and this is what happened to the Shabaks in the past.

Therefore, to clarify the Shabaks’ origin more effort and perseverance are needed in conducting field and historical studies, compared to the migrations of other tribes, and linguistically compared to Kurdish dialects and perhaps Persian as well.

Nationalism is the collective feeling of interdependence and belonging to a human group with special qualities and characteristics. Certainly, the Shabaks enjoy this feeling and the specificity of belonging, and this is confirmed by the writer (p. 25). From a political perspective it must be taken into account in dealing with them as a human group and not necessarily as an ethnic affiliation.

Race is an important component of nationalism, but not necessarily the basis for it. The Shabaks are a minority in their surroundings, people and land. The Shabak community, like other minorities in Iraq, especially in the Nineveh Plain, is characterized by fault lines ethnically and sectarian.

A side from a small number of Kakayis/Salrlies, there are no Shabaks who profess a religion other than Islam, but they are bound by friendly relations and understanding with their neighbors, Christians and Yazidis.) With their unity of race, religion, and purpose, Shabaks political participation is therefore vital to ensure a better outlook for their future generations.

Shabaks enjoy an important geographical location, natural resources, and fertile agricultural plains, and form an economic unit linking Kurdistan to central and southern Iraq. In short, they need to develop their economy, focus on providing essential services to all without exception, educate their sons and daughters alike, develop their language (or dialect), and Redouble efforts to develop their media to facilitate cultural interdependence among themselves and with their neighbors.

References
– Izady, Mehrdad R. The Kurds, A Concise Handbook, Taylor and Francis International Publishers, Washington DC, 1992.
– Kaya, Mehmed S., The Zaza Kurds of Turkey, A Middle Eastern Minority in A Globalized Society, I. B. Tauris, London, 2011.

Nemat Sharif, a political analyst, a contributing writer and columnist for iKurd.net.

The opinions are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent the views of iKurd.net or its editors.

These are a non-affiliate links to the Book on Amazon and on bloomsbury.com