
Sheri Laizer | Exclusive to iKurd.net
Iran’s Proxies Parade Their Power Over Iraq
In a grotesque miscalculation – the fallout from which has become ever more alarming – the US and British handed Iraq to its enemies openly advancing Tehran’s agenda. The bungled US occupation fuelled Iranian revenge and is now leading to Tehran’s ultimate conquest of Iraq.
On June 26, 2021, Mustafa al-Kadhimi stood among the Hashd al-Sha’abi militia leaders, including Badr Organisation strongman, Hadi al-Ameri, addressing the parade in its dramatic show of thousands of men marching under arms. Iranian and Russian-made weaponry was flaunted from mounts on the back of trucks. (At least four of the Shrine Brigades loyal to Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani (Atabats) refused to participate alongside the pro-Iran majority.[1])
The parade took place in Khalis, Diyala, at Camp Ashraf – a site once home to hundreds of anti-Khomeini activists and their families from Mujahideen al-Khalq (MeK), supported by Saddam. It was an irony not lost on the well informed. Criticism of the militias carries potentially lethal consequences.
Ongoing assassinations of opposition activists are plainly the work of elements linked to the pro-Iran militia commanders but no one is held accountable. These hits have increased in boldness, as well as frequency, since the US first targeted and killed IRGC Quds Forces leader, leader, Qassem Soleimani, and Hashd’s chief commander, Abu Ali al-Muhandis in January 2020. [2]

On 9 May, 2021, Karbala-based opposition activist, Ehab al-Wazni, tragically joined the rising toll of those assassinated, shot dead by unidentified gunmen in the manner that has come to typify the work of the pro-Iran, Hashd hitmen since the October 2019 demonstrations. Al Wazni had also been unsuccessfully targeted in December 2019 as the protests against the corrupt puppet leaders and lack of services escalated. His fellow activist, Fahem al-Tai, was not so lucky. He was shot dead, Iran Basij style, by men mounted on motorcycles with silenced weapons just as al-Wazni was dropping him off at home. “Iran out!” and “The people want the fall the regime!” Al Jazeera reported as hundreds of mourners…carried al-Wazni’s body in Karbala under a sea of Iraqi flags.”.[3]
Human Rights Watch has referred to the current situation in Iraq as a “vacuum of impunity”. Of 81 registered assassination attempts at date of their report from May 2021, 34 attacks had already proven fatal. Belkis Wille observed: “Soon after taking office, Kadhimi established a committee last May to investigate and hold accountable those behind the killings of protesters—but it has yet to publish any findings. There are few other signs that he has made any other progress. Armed groups have become so brazen that gunmen have no fear approaching someone in the middle of the street in a major Iraqi city and shooting them without consequence…” [4]
The bungled US occupation fuelled Iranian revenge and is leading to Tehran’s ultimate conquest of Iraq
The Ba’ath Party was fundamentally secular and opposed rule by the Shi’a clerics – over which President Saddam had warned his jailors that the “black turbans should not be allowed to take power.”
Back in November 200, from the moment that it had become clear to Iraqis that the Americans fully intended to invade their country (following a decade of bombing raids and sanctions), on through to the invasion itself and the setting up of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), tens of thousands of members of Iraq’s professional and middle class, including distinguished military officers fled as fast as they could leave the country. Writers, artists, singers, architects, and professionals from all walks of life also had their positions usurped by unqualified Shi’a opposition elements and were directly threatened then targeted with death.

In the course of the misguided and cynical invasion spearheaded by the US and UK, the CIA-linked post-Ba’ath Iraqi Intelligence Services were staffed with loyalists from the Shi’a opposition parties like al-Da’wa (the Islamic Call) and their first priority was hunting down and striking at former Ba’athists.
The main historic Iraqi Shi’a political formations opposing the Ba’ath administration, including al-Da’wa, the Sadrists, and SCIRI (with their respective armed wings/militias like SCIRI’s Badr Brigade and al-Sadr’s al-Mahdi Army) swiftly infiltrated, and then dominated, the new police force, and the security and intelligence bodies, operating death squads and running the key ministries according to their own aims and ideologies. Brutal, and indeed, gruesome reprisals came to characterise their leadership style.
Any Iraqi citizens that were deemed disloyal to the new Shi’a majority regime, or who had enjoyed Ba’ath Party, Iraqi army, and employment connections within the Ba’ath structures, including blameless administrators, doctors, university staff, teachers, journalists, and even book sellers were identified and their files marked for liquidation.
Shi’a professionals that supported the US invasion and ongoing US military presence were also considered legitimate targets for elimination by those loyal to the aims of the 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran.
Their numerous targets were warned in threatening letters and by text message to abandon their support for the Occupation and swiftly change allegiance. Others were threatened, exposed, or killed outright as the professional class of the Ba’ath infrastructure was purged
Under US directives (the “bungling “Paul Bremer as former US President Obama refers to him in his recent autobiography) the exiles and the generally disaffected, stepped into the shoes of the former administrators and began to plunder the country, filling their pockets in parallel with their bloody acts of revenge.
Irish reporter Richard Downes, assigned to cover events for the BBC in Iraq between 1998-2004, observed on the consequences of the invasion, noting “It appears that all the Shia in the south had the same opinion. They were waiting for cast iron assurances that the Americans wouldn’t abandon them this time. The memories of what they regarded as the broken promises of 1991 were still fresh in their minds…Those assurances never came, but as the second week of the war drew to a close, Ba’ath party members and loyalists were attacked in Suq and killed. Those that survived, fled. The news travelled fast around the refugee camps. The town was now under the control of tribal elders, while representatives of the Shia political parties in exile in Iran made themselves known after decades of secret membership…” [5]
Al-Da’wa: from the Knees of Khomeini
Many al-Da’wa members had secretly agitated within Iraq throughout the Ba’ath decades, and had organised themselves within the Shi’a centres of Islamic learning in Najaf and Karbala as well as Shi’a strongholds like Basra and Shi’a districts of Baghdad. Internal rivalries between them and the other Shi’a groups also played out in a fresh quest for overall power. Supporters of Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani supported the quietest trend that disapproved of clerical involvement in politics, whereas those that supported Ayatollah Khomeini’s vision like SCIRI and its Badr wing, under Hadi al-Ameri, fought to enshrine rule by the clerics under the system of Velayet-Faqih (rule of the clerical jurist), piloted by Khomeini that has dragged Iran back into the Dark Ages over the past forty years.
Al-Da’wa still promotes Khomeini’s vision. Most post-Saddam prime ministers to date have been al-Da’wa members. Nouri al-Maliki spent his years of exile in Iran, opposing Saddam from a position of close proximity to the Supreme Leader and the IRGC leadership. There he forged strong ties with the late Qassem Soleimani, who increasingly came to draw Iraq into Iran’s sphere of control.

Others opposition actors including former PM Haidar al-Abadi, and former Oil Minister, later PM (2018-2019) -a long time Da’wa official – Adel Abdul-Mahdi – had spent their years of exile in the West. Al-Abadi made the most of his time furthering his academic career whereas Adel Abdul-Mahdi had switched from being a Communist to supporting Ayatollah Khomeini, passing his years of exile in France. On this basis, families of the protestors killed by state forces and the militias under his watch have launched a suit against him.
In exile in the West, the Da’wa party’s saboteurs established Ba’ath opposed community groups, including in the United States, and key Western cities, including most significantly Paris and London.
Certain other of the more secular Shia political figures like Iraqi National Congress (INC) figurehead, Ahmad Chalabi, and his rival, Iraqi National Accord leader (INA) Ayad Allawi, had long since obtained status in the West. 6 From there, as dual nationals, they worked to undermine the Ba’ath regime until they were able to return to Iraq and take power. Chalabi exploited his Pentagon connections while Allawi worked closely with the CIA.
The pro-Iran exiles’ tales of persecution at the hands of the Ba’ath regime were ironically accorded a sympathetic ear despite the Islamic Republic being a key foe of the West.
Al Da’wa obtained power through manoeuvering inside the new Iraqi political regime and the security services. It could never be hailed as ‘democracy.’
The deeply flawed and ultimately illegal trial of Saddam Hussein under an Occupying power for the 148 Dujail deaths was also a formalised act of revenge by al-Da’wa. Their underground forces in Iraq had not only tried to kill Saddam Hussein in Dujail but had carried out several assassination missions against his top aides, including an unsuccessful attempt on the life of the Christian Foreign Minister, Tariq Aziz.

Adel Mahdi was also among Nouri al-Maliki’s hand picked 14 officials present at the Kadhimiya execution site of Saddam Hussein at the old Istikhbarat (Military Intelligence headquarters taken over by the US and named Camp Justice7. Others included al-Maliki’s National Security advisor, Mowaffak al-Rubaie, MP, Sami al-Askari, the late Shi’a SCIRI leader, Abdul-Aziz al-Hakim [8] (?), IHT Judge, Munir al-Haddad, and the more dignified Deputy prosecutor, Munqith al-Faroon. backed by eight or so unruly Sadrist guards and executioners. [9] The body was later flown by helicopter to the Green Zone where al-Maliki waited for it like a hunter for a trophy.
The killings and purges have not ceased. Family members of ex-patriate Iraqis, the wealthy, the business sector, the artists and thinkers, political refugees and asylum seekers, that have applied for services from their Embassies are also still being vetted, especially those living in exile in the West. If they have relatives still living in Iraq they are also kept under surveillance. All can be targeted on return to Iraq and killed.
The incoming Justice Minister who took office in 2017, was also allied with the pro-Iran Shia militia. His policies altered domestic and foreign affairs policy. Consular personnel abroad were replaced by pro-Iran staffers ordered to promote a positive image of the Popular Mobilisation Forces abroad and to deny all evidence of human rights abuses committed against Sunnis. Embassy staff were also ordered to vet all Iraqis that turned up for services abroad and to report them back to the Ministry of Interior and Intelligence. [10]
Mustafa al-Kadhimi: swaying with the political winds
Appointment to the office of prime minister has to be agreed by the disparate and rival factions that have formed blocs in order to win seats in the parliamentary elections. These include former Badr Brigade fighters, Sadrists, breakaway AAH fundamentalists, KH loyalists, veteran Iraqi Hezbollah members and recently formed Shi’a militia groups.
The interim Prime Minster, Mustafa al-Kadhimi, was also a former Da’wa party activist that had spent his years in exile in the UK close to the mainstream Shi’a opposition that included secular figures of high profile like those around the centre.
In the new Shia dominated state of Iraq, al-Kadhimi moved from his position as the head of Iraqi Intelligence to interim prime minister. Adel Abdul Mahdi was forced to stand down over the mass slaughter of anti-government protestors during the protests of October 2019. Two other candidates for the premiership failed to form cabinets and were swiftly removed from the running.
Mustafa al-Kadhimi then won the round of internal vote casting. He has been forced into performing an extremely difficult balancing act between the Shi’a militias and strongly pro-Iran elements and the West. His predecessors allowed Iran to gain a very significant footing in Iraq and directly passed intelligence to the Islamic Republic.
Purges increase anew – 2019-2021
Eighteen years after regime change, pro-Western and pro-Ba’ath party professionals remain on the blacklist of the pro-Iran Shi’a parties. Al-Da’wa has ostensibly split into two camps: Nouri al-Maliki is forging ties with the more extreme Shi’a militia groups like Kata’ib Hezbollah and sub groups of the Muqawama (Resistance) [11] in a bid to cling to power for the next elections scheduled for 10 October 2021. Others have broken with al-Maliki but are intent on maintaining the old De-Ba’athification ploys while imposing Ba’ath era laws to their own advantage.
In the run-up to the October 2021 elections, Iran’s puppets are now doing their utmost to exclude any candidate with even distant links to the pre-invasion administration from running. ISHM’s bulletin for 17-24 June reported: “On June 20, IHEC said that candidates with alleged ties to Saddam Hussein’s regime have until June 30 to appeal a recent decision to disqualify them. Last week, the Supreme National Commission for Accountability and Justice sent IHEC a list of 226 candidates who allegedly had ties to the former regime. On June 21, IHEC reversed a decision to disqualify seven candidates following their successful appeals. [12]
Over a million IDPs may remain ineligible to vote as they lack ID documents necessary to obtain voter cards. UNAMI reported that by the end of 2020, 11 million of the 26.6 million voters still had not received the new-style voting cards. Electoral districts have also increased from 18 to 83 adding to fears of potential confusion. [13]
Several of the killers are running for election.
Protestors in Baghdad demanding justice for the dead were also attacked by the security forces. One demonstrator was killed and dozens injured. The came together under the slogan ‘Who Killed me?” and bore banners showing the faces of the dead. Protests also unleashed in Karbala, al-Wazni’s home town and the Iranian Consulate was attacked. Ahmed Hassan, a journalist was also shot in the head and shoulder hours after al-Wazni’s murder. [14]
Al Jazeera reported: “This is a response to a call of Ihab al-Wazni’s family … and to object against a political system that is not truly democratic but pretends to be,” said 27-year-old Laith Hussein of the Baghdad Student Union. “We want to get rid of the parties in power, [we want] real freedom, true democracy and to make radical changes to this system,” added Hussein.” [15]
It must be hoped that his face is not on the next banner for the dead. Such criticism is no more tolerated in today’s Iraq than in Iran. Small wonder when the forces are the same.
Just hours before the PMF’s militaristic parade on its 7th anniversary, three drones laden with explosives – one bearing an inscription with the name of the late PMF commander, Abu Ali al-Muhandis, (AKA Jalal Ibrahim) – attacked Erbil afresh.” Peace be upon you, oh Jamal of Iraq” was inscribed. [16]
These ongoing attacks ascribed to the pro-Iran militias can be interpreted as a clear threat to the stability and durability of Kurdistan and not just the US forces still present there.
Such ongoing threats to Kurdistan’s security – indeed, its very existence – must be taken very seriously. [17] Iran’s agenda concerning the Kurds living within its (artificial) borders is no different to that of its long term intentions towards the Kurds of Iraq.
1 https://twitter.com/HamdiAMalik/status/1408872796999098375
2 https://wordpress-1318350-4815544.cloudwaysapps.com/new-year-new-threat-peace-2020-01-04
3 https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/5/10/iraq-activist-murder-protests-called-as-iran-consulate-targetted
4 https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/05/20/impunity-killings-will-cast-pall-over-iraqs-elections
5 Richard Downes, In Search of Iraq – Baghdad to Babylon, New Island, Dublin, 2006, p. 168
6 https://www.salon.com/2004/06/17/iran_iraq/
7 The Shi’a dominated administration continues to carry out executions by hanging at this same location, often several at a time, again, Iran-style after similarly unfair trials.
8 https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2006/12/20061204-7.html
9 https://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/14/world/middleeast/15iraqcnd.html
10 https://wordpress-1318350-4815544.cloudwaysapps.com/iraqi-foreign-ministry-leaked-2020-01-09
11 Michael Knights notes: “Though widely assumed to represent the top Iran-backed militia Kataib Hezbollah (KH), these parties actually comprise muqawama (resistance) elements who battled the forces of Saddam Hussein and the United States even before the formation of KH. “Partnering with these small and not especially popular “old timers” indicates that Maliki has been reduced to grasping whatever militia alliances he can find in order to regrow his political influence. It also underlines the strengthening alignment between Maliki—the institutional godfather of the muqawama since around 2012—and today’s muqawama politicians.” Read more at: https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/distinguishing-kawader-hezbollah-al-qudama-and-kataib-hezbollah.
12 https://enablingpeace.org/ishm309/?eType=EmailBlastContent&eId=2d3c45b7-b53c-47e8-87d4-24aaa784b345#Headline3
13 https://www.biometricupdate.com/202101/iraq-replaces-outdated-biometric-voter-cards-for-2021-election
14 https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/5/10/iraq-activist-murder-protests-called-as-iran-consulate-targetted
15 https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/5/25/one-killed-as-iraqs-anti-government-protests-resume
16 https://www.kurdistan24.net/en/story/24848-PHOTOS:-Recovered-drones-used-in-attack-in-Kurdistan%27s-Erbil
17 https://wordpress-1318350-4815544.cloudwaysapps.com/iraq-shadow-khomenisim-erbil-2021-03-20
Sheri Laizer, a Middle East and North African expert specialist and well known commentator on the Kurdish issue. She is a senior contributing writer for iKurd.net. More about Sheri Laizer see below.
- Read more
- Part III: Iraq in the Shadow of Khomeinism – Part III: Iraq is NOT Iran! 24.12.2021
- Part II: Iraq in the Shadow of Khomeinism – Part II: Iran’s Proxies Parade Their Power Over Iraq 5.7.2021
- Part I: Iraq in the Shadow of Khomeinism – Part I: Baghdad And Erbil Under Threat 20.3.2021
The opinions are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent the views of iKurd.net or its editors.
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