Iraq in the Shadow of Khomeinism – Part I: Baghdad And Erbil Under Threat

Sheri Laizer | Exclusive to iKurd.net

Dragon tongues of fire leap up the walls; the window panes shatter; long fingers of flame run down the fading portraits of Mullah Mustafa Barzani and his surviving heir, Massoud. The mob chants slogans of hate, singing the praises of the Hashd al-Sha’abi militias, and of the late IRGC forces commander, Qassem Soleimani, beating the air with their banners as the building is engulfed and the flag of Kurdistan goes up in smoke. Accelerants have been used to ensure that the conflagration presents no chance of being extinguished.

This is the work of Khomeini’s ideological successors – the heirs to his message of sect-based murder and destruction of civil society in advancing the dictatorship of the clerics.

Splinter groups of the pro-Iran militia brigades in Iraq, known as the fasiliya, (to distinguish them from state-contained groups) are responsible for the recent rocket strikes on the seat of the Kurdish parliament in Erbil, including the targeting of Erbil International Airport anew last month.

A smouldering hostility is being fuelled in Baghdad against the Kurdish administration, and particularly the KDP, spearheaded by the extremist brigades comprised of Khomeini loyalists.

When the KDP’s office was attacked on October 17, 2020, in the Badr-dominated quarter of Karrada, east Baghdad, an extremist splinter of the formal Hashd al-Sha’abi forces, Rab’Allah (God’s Fellows), claimed responsibility. They shared propaganda attacking a massage parlour in a Karrada hotel on their Telegram link. The disturbing video shows many of them clad in black balaclavas and wielding batons. They are also accused of the shooting and wounding of activists, Omar Farouk and Akram Adhab in Talbiyah, who had criticised them on social media just the day before. Adhab had written: “Baghdad is a prison run by Rab’allah. They practice their hobby of constantly abusing people.” [2]

Many of the government-paid, Hashd al-Sha’abi militia groups are no better than ISIS.

According to figures provided by Hisham Dawoud, an advisor to Prime Minister, Mustafa al-Kadhimi, some 560 protesters and members of the security forces have been killed to date since the October 2019 protests. Rudaw had earlier reported that many activists had fled from Baghdad to Erbil in search of safety after receiving threats from the militias. [3] Now Erbil appears increasingly to be targeted by them.

KDP official, Hoshyar Zebari, had publicly blamed Hashd al-Sha’bi (without naming any particular faction) for operating outside the law. He had justifiably called on al-Kadhimi’s government to “clean up” the militias from the Green Zone. If Kadhimi fails to rein the militias in and the continue to unleash terror on the streets his premiership will fail and the militia forces will be seen to triumph. There would be no swift turning back from that point, just as in Iran, the Basij back the IRGC in containing all dissent by force.

On February 15, 2021 Erbil city came under renewed rocket attack, swiftly claimed by a new Shi’a militia shadow, or splinter, group, Awliya al-Dam (Protectors of the Blood). They threatened the KRG for taking the “wrong path” in supporting the US – and Turkish – occupations, circulating messages sympathetic to Qassem Soleimani and Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, demonstrating their affiliation, and vowing to continue to exact revenge for the deaths of the “leaders of victory”. [4]

The fortnightly EPIC Iraq Security and Humanitarian Monitor report finely detailed the murderous assault as follows: “An International Coalition source said that 14 rockets were fired towards the airport, with three rockets landing at an air base used by the Coalition and eleven rockets landing throughout the residential areas surrounding the complex. The strikes against the U.S. base killed one Filipino civilian contractor and injured nine others including a U.S. soldier. The rockets striking throughout the city damaged the Chinese consulate and the Naz city apartment complex, injuring three civilians. …Late in the night, Kurdish Counterterrorism Services discovered the rocket attack launch site on a road between Erbil and al-Gwer, recovering a damaged Kia outfitted with missile launcher tubes and several 107mm rockets still loaded. Kurdish authorities noted that the methods of the rocket strike matched those of a previous missile attack on Erbil Airport in September…” [5]

Khomeini supporters’ fifty-year experience of sedition: State budget includes military and propaganda operations in Iraq (and Lebanon)

Iran had first witnessed these same tactics in the early 1970s. Khomeini’s supporters had failed to bring down the monarchy during their first attempt that saw Khomeini sent into exile, but by 1978, banks and cinemas were being torched, without heed for those within, and Western businesses were targeted with violence or destruction. The mob rampaged through the streets bringing death to the country.6 Now it is the turn of Iraq – in service of the same ideology.

Since the late 1970s when Ayatollah Khomeini’s aides first seduced the West into believing that Ruhollah Khomeini aimed to bring about a positive revolutionary change in Iran, the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran has systematically undermined civil society, locking up and hanging its opponents, in undaunted pursuit of Khomeini’s Velayet –e Faqih – the concentration of power in the hands of the clerics – nothing less than a Shi’a style jihad.

A year after the KRG lost control over the disputed territories – largely thanks to Iran and the Fasiliya pro-Iran militias – Policy Brief produced a graph showing just how the Islamic Republic of Iran had spent its annual budget. Qassem Soleimani, while IRGC leader, dished out millions in cash to his allies. US$16 billion went on funding the militias, from which $150 million was given to those in Iraq. Lebanese Hezbollah enjoyed $700-800 million and another $100 million had gone to Hamas and Islamic Jihad, amongst others. [7]

A year after Soleimani’s demise, his daughter, Zeynep, has established a fund in her father’s name (bonyad) to promote his words and ideology. The IRGC itself will receive a 58% increase on the previous year. Iran’s Ministry of Defense is also to see a 75% increase in its funding, receiving 379,400 billion tomans. I The army is to receive a 53% increase, and SEPAND (The Organization of Defensive Innovation and Research) formerly headed by the late nuclear scientist, Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, is to enjoy a 500% increase in its budget, rising from 40 billion to 245 billion rials.

More than 34 billion tomans are to be allocated to the further dissemination in print of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’s words…[8]

The last Shah of Iran, Mohammad-Reza Pahlavi, was systematically discredited through the black (clerics) and red (socialists) joint dissemination of false statistics and black propaganda. Iraq’s Shi’a leaders in Da’wa, SCIRI and Badr similarly stage managed their claims in the West against the Ba’ath regime. What has resulted in the cases of both Iran and Iraq has been a far more socially, environmentally and metaphysically destructive regime than what went before.

In the run up to the toppling of the Shah, Ruhollah Khomeini and Yasser Arafat joined forces against the popular, liberal Shi’a leader, Musa al-Sadr. Agents of the pair conspired with Muammar Gaddafi to detain al-Sadr in Tripoli. Al-Sadr went to Libya – despite warnings – in order to work out his differences with Khomeini. This was supposed to have taken place under the auspices of one of Khomeini’s aides, Mohammad Beheshti – but Beheshti never showed up in Tripoli nor intended to. Instead, according to one of Arafat’s lieutenants, Ali Hassan Salameh, Beheshti asked Gaddafi detain al-Sadr because he constituted “a threat” to Khomeini. Libya was funding both Khomeini and MeK at the time. Al Sadr had warned that Khomeini’s writings were “the juice of a sick mind” and had wished for the Shah to see the text that contained the concise thoughts of Khomeini in Arabic calling for the overthrow of the monarchy and the establishment of an Islamic government.9 They had him killed.

Saddam Hussein had also personally telephoned the Shah and offered to have Khomeini dealt with while the radical cleric was still in exile in Najaf. However, by all accounts, the Shah could not take it upon himself to agree to the proposal. He paid for this discretion with the loss of his crown and the destruction of the democratic advances he had most recently achieved. Iran soon slipped back into medieval chaos in the hands of the clergy, just as is now being witnessed in Iraq. Khomeinism is to blame.

Arms to the militias

In 2017 – the same year that Iraq’s internal boundaries changed following the Kurdistan independence referendum – a valid political action, Amnesty International was warning about the strength of arms coming into the hands of Iran’s key proxies:

• ‘Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq,
• Kata’ib Hizbullah,
• Badr Organization,
• Harakat Hizbullah al-Nujaba,
• Harakat Ansar al-Aaufiaa,
• Kata’ib Hizbullah,
• Kata’ib Imam Ali
• Kataib Jund al-Imam
• Kata’ib Sayyed al-Shuhada,
• Liwa Ali al-Akbar,
• Liwa al-Zulfiqar,
• Saraya Ansar al-Aqida,
• Saraya Ashura,
• Saraya al-Jihad,
• Saraya al-Khorasani,
• Saraya al-Salam
• Saraya Ashura

The report observed that “visual evidence” also suggested that US equipment was being deployed by many of these same militias.

The Peshmerga encountered US Abrams tanks directly at the bridge from Altun Kopru leading up the highway to Erbil. Had those tanks rolled on over the bridge and taken the Kurdish capital it would have been a fait accompli.

Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada had gotten hold of one of the Abrams tanks as early as February 2016. US manufacturer, General Dynamics suspended maintenance on the tanks after they were seen ain use amongst the Iran-backed groups in Iraq. [12] The goal of these groups was not – and is not – just the routing of ISIS, but the fulfilment of broader objectives – Iran’s control over Iraq, including the Kurdistan region, continuing in an unbroken swathe through Syria and Lebanon. This is not just some Western propaganda.

On Oct. 2, 2017, Iranian forces had appeared along border, “reportedly as part of a previously announced combined drill with Iraqi national forces and militia in retaliation for the independence vote. Authorities in Tehran had already kicked off military exercises near the boundary on Sept. 24, 2017 a day ahead of the poll in Iraq’s semi-autonomous Kurdish region, ostensibly as part of the annual Sacred Defense Week to commemorate the Iran-Iraq War…Ali Akbar Velayeti claimed Massoud Barzani was a “middleman for Zionists” and an independent Kurdistan would be a second Israel.” [13]

The view of the KDP’s arena of influence as supported by Israel has not changed. It is reinforced by the pro-Iran units of the Popular Mobilisation Forces.

Since driving the Kurdish forces from Kirkuk, although the CTS (US-trained Counter-Terrorism Service) took over outward command, the PMF militias were ever ready in close backup.

The Peshmerga unit hitherto based in western Kirkuk, which positioned itself to defend access to Kurdistan near the Altun Kopru (Pirde) bridge, noted the presence of Iranian IRGC forces and “mercenaries” [14] along with the Iraqi CTS, Federal Police and PMF in the operation.

The Peshmerga actively clashed with the joint forces, eliminating two tanks, one an Abrams tank, an armoured vehicle and over twelve Humvees, according to Rudaw soon after.

According to the European Asylum Support Office (EASO) the Iraqi army’s 5th and 20th divisions were also present to seize control of the city before the Federal police and militia took over.

The 61st Brigade of the Special Operations division of the Iraqi Army was deployed in the governorate in February 2019, as was the 14th division which took positions in Zab sub-district of Hawija district and some parts of Dibis district and the predominantly Shiite Turkmen 16th and 52nd PMU brigades affiliated with the Badr Organisation, AAH, Kata’aib Jund al-Imam and KH. They designate the disputed area the ‘northern axis.’ [15]

The history of Kirkuk is one of dispute, but Iran’s goals over the region are being advanced openly.

Among the chief protagonists in fielding Ian’s advance are Iraqi traitors, Hadi al-Ameri, Qais al-Khazali, and the various commanders trained by the late Qassem Soleimani.

The same methods are at work simultaneously in Lebanon, Syria and Yemen.

Demonstrators also face the same high risks of being eliminated one way or another – the sniper’s gun or the assassin’s bullet – and let us not forget arson and rocket attacks.

Badr

Hadi al-Ameri’s Badr organization, formerly, the Badr Brigade, is the oldest of the Iranian proxies active in undermining the status quo in Iraq. Ameri spent Iraq’s war with Iran supporting Iranian forces against his own countrymen in the service of Khomeinism.

On his return from exile following the coup against Saddam, Badr was empowered to fill the shoes of Iraq’s transport minister and did so between 2010–14. The Badr Organisation remained active in the Ministry of Interior and penetrated the Federal Police force.

A senior Badr official, Qasim al-Araji, had been arrested by US forces in January 2007 for his involvement in the ‘smuggling and distribution of explosively-formed projectiles (EFPs)’16  that were being deployed against US-led coalition forces, but as with several other Shi’a warlords, al-Araji went on to successively reposition himself in the political arena, serving as Minister of Interior between 2017–18. Araji’s predecessor in this same post, Mohammad al-Ghabban, had also been a Badr Organisation official, and with Hadi al-Ameri securely in control. [16]

Al Sadr

Prior to the name changes of Moqtada al-Sadr’s organisation, the al-Mahdi Army operated death squads and infiltrated the security forces. Despite these crimes against humanity, Moqtada al Sadr was not charged with them. Nor did he pay any price for his indictment under an older arrest warrant that remained exactly as Iraqi judge, Raed al-Juhi, had signed it back in April 2004. That was for al-Sadr’s involvement in the assassination of rival cleric, Abdul-Majid al-Musawi al-Khoie. Al-Khoie’s son openly condemned Moqtada al-Sadr saying: “My father’s murder was not a mysterious assassination carried out in pitch-black darkness but was rather shamelessly executed in broad daylight under the watchful eyes of hundreds of witnesses. It was the testimonies of some of these witnesses, who saw my father being dragged to Sadr’s office, and then to a nearby roundabout where he was killed, that led to the arrest warrants being issued for Sadr and a dozen of his lieutenants and followers…[17]

Moqtada al-Sadr, also since turned politician, had led two uprisings against US forces in Iraq in 2004 when Saddam Hussein was still alive and held securely in US custody.

By 2008, the Mahdi Army was reported to have become 60,00 men strong. The group still stands accused of the execution of thousands of mainly Sunni men. France 24 reported: “In 2006, at the height of Iraq’s communal bloodletting, a Pentagon report said the Mahdi Army was the greatest threat to the country’s security, even greater than Al-Qaeda… At that time Mahdi Army death squads reportedly carried out sustained campaigns of violence — kidnapping, torturing and brutally killing members of the minority Sunnis Arab community across Iraq, especially in Baghdad…[18]

In 2008, al-Sadr changed the group’s name to “Supporters of the Madhi (al-Mumahidun).”

In June 2014, another name change ensued and his militants became known as the misnamed “Peace Companies” (Saraya al-Salam), ostensibly to legitimise the Sadrists’ entry to the battle against ISIS.

But al-Sadr plays his cards at his own choosing, standing with the protestors against corruption when it suits him, and attacking them when it doesn’t.

Qais al-Khazali – Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq (AAH)

Qais al-Khazali openly threatened the KRG at the time of the independence referendum. Since them, his militiamen and splinter groups, escaping punishment for now through the formation of ghost forces and hit squads. Khazali also adopted political guise to serve Iran and his own interests. The US has belatedly added his name to their list of foreign terrorists just after the death strike on Qassem Solemani and lynchpin of Hashd al-Sha’abi, al-Muhandis [19].

AAH is jointly guilty of the December 20,2020 rocket attacks on the US Embassy in Baghdad. Al-Khazali had also denounced the visit to Iraq to urge a ceasefire of Qassem Soleimani’s successor, Esmael Ghani.

As the Jamestown Foundation observed in a recent paper on the attacks: The tactic of using these ‘shadow militias’ became prevalent throughout 2020, with dozens of groups such as Ashab al-Kahf and Sarayat Qassem al-Jabbarin seemingly emerging out of nowhere to claim responsibility for attacks targeting U.S. assets. [8] The confusion surrounding the use of these groups allowed Kata’ib Hezbollah and AAH to distance themselves from those attacks and hence complicate U.S. retaliation… To compete with Kata’ib Hezbollah, the October 2020 ceasefire presented al-Khazali with a fantastic opportunity. By rejecting the ceasefire and defending the right for the ‘shadow militias’ to continue launching attacks, Kata’ib Hezbollah’s position came to be seen as isolated and weak. In comparison, AAH’s support for the continued attacks, despite Iranian attempts to reel them in, allowed the group to position itself as a heroic defender of Iraqi sovereignty…” [20]

Kata’ib Hezbollah (KH)

Kata’ib Hezbollah (KH) was founded by the late Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis but KH did not openly claim him as its leader. However, since his demise, KH has been led by Ahmad al-Hamidawi, designated by the US as an international terrorist on February 26, 2020.

Hamidawi reportedly joined KH in 2007, shortly after the group’s founding and reportedly received political, military, and intelligence training from the IRGC and was soon promoted to KH’s Shura Council. As a KH commander, Hamidawi played a central role in planning attacks against American and Iraqi government security forces between 2007 and 2011.

From October 2019 onwards, Kata’ib Hezbollah’s snipers operated a shoot to kill policy, targeting the anti-corruption protestors massing in Baghdad. More than 6,000 people were wounded and over 100 lost their lives. KH is responsible for the rocket attack on the K1 military base outside Kirkuk on December 28, 2019, as also of orchestrating attacks by the extremist rabble advancing on the US Embassy in the Green Zone in January 2020.

These acts of mob retaliation came in the wake of the US attack on KH’s bases that killed several KH militants. Since that date, KH has been linked with the further attack on the US military base north of Baghdad at al-Taji, although this has formally been claimed by a shadow splinter group, Usbat al-Thaereen (League of the Revolutionaries).

KH threatened Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi in June last year after several of its mercenaries were arrested. [21] The murder of critic and commentator, Husham al-Hashemi, outside his own home on July 6, 2020 is attributed to KH.

Threats against Mustafa al-Kadhimi personally, as also of enlarging the conflagration in Iraq, were repeated by KH’s leaders in December 2020 and in particular by Abu Ali al-Askari shouting: “The region is boiling on a hot tin and the possibility of an all-out war exists, which requires restraint to deny the enemy the opportunity, by not being the initiator of it,” referring to the escalating tension between Tehran and Washington. Al-Sakari warned: “Our alliance with the brothers in the resistance factions, whether local or foreign, is a solid alliance and what calls them calls us. We are committed to defending them within the framework set and decided upon between us…[22].

The late Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, chief orchestrator of the Hashd, Hadi al-Ameri of Badr and AAH under al-Khazali had all threated the KRG before and after the independence referendum. When they moved into position to take Kirkuk, Iran also moved its tanks and artillery forward to the border with Kurdistan. [23] The Turks under Erdogan’s pro-Salafist administration did likewise.

Traitors to Iraq turned Ministers

Other long term traitors to Iraq, Da’wa’s Nouri al-Maliki, and the SCIRI/ISCI leadership that contested al-Sadr politically in the last parliamentary elections, lost out to Sadr’s Sairoon Alliance bloc that took 54 seats – the highest tally. Badr’s Fatah bloc also took 47 seats and the Victory Alliance under Da’wa leader, Haider al-Abadi, came third with 42 seats. All are warlords with blood on their hands. I address this issue in detail in a further article.

In a civilised country, it would be a matter of law – and public consensus – that men responsible for mass murder be banned for life from running for election.

The visible frontline: Threats to Kirkuk and the KDP-KRG

In one of his 2019 reports, Hashem al-Hashemi had written about the presence of the Second Operation command and Counter Terrorism Forces around Kirkuk’s city centre as well as in Hawija, along with two Brigades of the Iraqi Army that had been stationed at the south and west, and southwest Kirkuk in December 2019 during the peak in protests in Baghdad.

In a Tweet exchange between well-known Iraq commentator, Michael Knights and Hamdi Malik, the reasoning went as follows: “What Hosham said was known to many – that Soleimani waltzed around in Iraq like he owned the place, and that Qaani can’t disrespect Iraqi in the same way. Hosham was simply telling the truth, which is a dangerous thing for Iraqis to do, especially when they do it on @bbcpersian”

Replying to

• @Mikeknightsiraq
• @WashInstitute
• and 2 others

Hadi Ameri once said we obey imam Khomaeini if he say peace then peace if he say war then I go to war, abu mahdi muhandis said I’m proud to be sulaimani’s & Iran’s soldier, Akram Al Kaabi said Tehran is capital of muqauama, Mahmoud Rubaii from AAH said our spiritual…. Leader is imam Khamenei & we don’t hide it, & by end of the day Husham Dawood is the one who getting sacked for stating the obvious & telling what 99% of Iraqis are already aware of!!!

To date, the attacks on the KRG by the pro-Iran militia have been blatantly focused on the stronghold of the KDP rather than the PUK.

The PUK stronghold is currently being spared in favour of harassing the KDP – and US interests in Kurdistan – but for how long?

The PUK: Unpatriotic disunity of Kurdistan

The PUK teamed up with Khomeini early into the Iran-Iraq war. The party also worked closely with Da’wa’s exiles long before Saddam was brought down by the West.

With the PUK doing Iran’s job in repressing its own population, as well as the Kurds of Iran, there has been no cause for the Iran affiliated militias to attack the PUK whether in Kurdistan or in Baghdad. Bafel Talabani heeded Solemani’s warnings to abandon Kirkuk soon after his father was buried.24

Qassem Soleimani was an ally and not an enemy of the PUK. There is no need for Iran to attack the PUK.

Many of the senior PUK elite are immersed in private business with Tehran as well as facilitating the narcotics routes from the Iranian border via Kurdistan through official channels. Deputy Prime Minister, Qubad Talabani – heir to the PUK leadership – and Kosrat Rasoul, among the top dogs, enjoy lucrative business interests with Iran. Their public and private sector patronage fiefdoms are known to all.25 Masrour Barzani has used parliamentary reports to try to check the illegal activities at the Perwezkhan and Basmakh border crossings from which the PUK derives significant income. [26]

Mahmoud Sangawi, the PUK’s Garmian region commander, (linked with the murder of critical journalist Kawa Garmiani [27]), built castles in the air of praise for Qassem Soleimani. In an interview with Iran state allied Tasnim News Agency in Sulaimaniya, he boasted of his collaboration with Soleimani against ISIS in Jalawla and Khanaqin as well as of his own successes, including “receiving the second highest number of votes within the PUK’s most recent fourth congress. “After the battle against Daesh, I once again visited him at the house of Kak Kosrat Rasul. There was a meeting in order to address the situation in Tuz Khurmatu. Qassem Soleimani was a high-ranking commander, and had the power to give long-distance orders without going to the battlefield. But he was present in all battlefronts, and stayed with us until we liberated Jalawla, Saadiya and the other areas…The news of his martyrdom was so saddening for me. He was a hero in his country, and the Iranians should be proud to have such man. We regard him as a great person.”

Sangawi also opined: “ If only Solemiani were a Peshmerga” [28] But to what end? For their part, the long suffering Peshmerga are too often sold out by their own commanders, regularly left without their salaries and increasingly deprived of honour. Those Peshmerga that sought to defend Kirkuk paid heavily whereas those that fled eastwards via Chemchemal included a certain PUK commander who gathered up all the arms he could and sold them on after the fall of Kirkuk for private gain.

In May last year, Facebook closed several accounts linked to the PUK’s Zanyari intelligence agency for publishing provocative content against the KDP. [29]

Sangawi’s views on Iran are publicly shared by Kurdistan Socialist Democratic Party chief, Mohammed Haj Mahmoud, a hefty warlord of the old school, whom in interview with Tasnim News Agency, in the mourning period following the assassination of Soleimani, recalled, “I remember that we and a number of other parties were holding talks with Hajj Qassem at a meeting, and we requested support from him in the elections. Hajj Qassem only said, “I pray for the best for you and wish you luck.” We were also accompanied by two of our clerics. I told him (General Soleimani) in jest, “Haji, if there is a need for a prayer, these clerics of ourselves would pray for us.” [30]

Mahmoud had known Soleimani for over twenty-five years having first met him during military exercises with SCIRI (against the Ba’ath Party) back in the dawn of the Islamic revolution, that he praised. [31]

These men have erected a giant metaphysical statue to Solemani’s memory – just like Hezbollah has done with the construction of the physical bust of ‘the martyr’ in in its south Beirut heartland to the consternation of other sects. Open critics have also received death threats.

The KRG’s own suppression of criticism

Critics of the KDP and PUK are also at risk of rough treatment and death or of receiving long prison sentences, as were meted out in February 2021 to five journalists and activists32. The two main parties continue to curb debate and freedom of expression and also need ‘cleaning up’ to echo Zebari’s call concerning the militias. [33]

Protestors in Kurdistan face an overly heavy-handed response instead of being listened to, [34] just as they have elsewhere in the country. They remain deprived of equal access to energy resources and employment.

On this same subject, Al Jazeera noted last year: “In statements, various officials admitted for the first time that mafias were in control of the energy sector and that needed to change. For years, the KRI has suffered from the fragmentation of public authority due to deep partisanship, which has led to the emergence of multiple centres of power, especially in the regions controlled by the PUK – namely Sulaymaniyah province…”

Just as during the build-up to the Islamic Revolution in Iran between 1977-1979 [35], the tactics of subversion of pre-existing state institutions, mass incitement of religious extremism, and the physical destruction of property, are in full force. Critics of the current system, dominated by the Shi’a and, variously, the Kurdish warlords in their respective fiefdoms, all face harsh retaliation. These forces also target one another in unending internal rivalry.

On the eighteenth anniversary of the invasion of Iraq – and the systematic destruction of the old order (March 19, 2003-March 19, 2021) Iraq’s leaders have advanced little along the road to providing a better life for their fellow men.

Iraq has increasingly come to resemble Iran and Lebanon – not only in the sect-based composition of its present government – but increasingly, in the attempted domination of both the political and security spheres in the advancement of Khomeinism by the Shi’a leaders.

Sheri Laizer, a Middle East and North African expert specialist and well known commentator on the Kurdish issue. She is a senior contributing writer for iKurd.net. More about Sheri Laizer see below.

• Read more
• Part III: Iraq in the Shadow of Khomeinism – Part III: Iraq is NOT Iran! 24.12.2021
• Part II: Iraq in the Shadow of Khomeinism – Part II: Iran’s Proxies Parade Their Power Over Iraq 5.7.2021
• Part I: Iraq in the Shadow of Khomeinism – Part I: Baghdad And Erbil Under Threat 20.3.2021

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