Stealing Syria

Sheri Laizer | Exclusive to iKurd.net

Just like the Swiss national dish of cheese fondue, where all partaking plunge their forks into the same pot, so too did the Astana and Sochi accords allow each party with vested interests in Syria to continue devouring the country.

The wording of the accords – and the demands of the key players – the Syrian government, Russia, Iran, and Turkey (not to mention their various armed proxies) showed how the main emphasis was for each actor to continue to reap the benefits of his involvement with little practical focus on the welfare of the Syrian population. Now, exactly the same is happening through the formal rounds of handshaking with conquering HTS leader, Ahmed al-Sharaa.

Born to a Syrian family on October 29, 1982, Ahmed al-Sharaa was only 19 when 9/11 occurred but he felt the Arabs approved. A couple of years on at the age of 20 he is rumoured to have boarded a shared minibus-taxi travelling from Damascus to Baghdad as the United States threatened invasion to throw in his lot with the Sunni resistance.

His father, Hussein Ali al-Sharaa, was born in Fiq in the Golan Heights (1946-) to a landowning family displaced by the 1967 war with Israel and had strong secular pan-Arab ideals. Of Nasserite Arab Nationalist persuasion Hussein al-Sharaa had opposed Hafez al-Assad’s domination of the country and his subversion of the original ideals of Ba’athism in his autocratic Neo-Baathist version. Hussein left the country after a stretch in prison and completed his university studies in Iraq.

He also went on to support the PLO guerrillas in Jordan. With an increasingly large family to care for he went on to work for a time as an oil engineer in Saudi Arabia where he was granted residency as an opponent of Assad senior. His wife was an educated woman of good family and a geography teacher by profession. The family returned from Saudi Arabia to Syria in 1989, settling in the upper-class suburb of Mezzeh where Hussein al-Sharaa is said to have opened a real estate agency.

Hussein al-Sharaa had graduated in economics from Baghdad University. He reportedly warned recently against his son’s plan to privatise Syria’s public sector saying they posed “economic” and “sovereignty” risks, according to Shafaq news. Al Sharaa senior referred to Syria’s state-owned enterprises as a “national asset built over decades,” and warned against selling them off to address inefficiencies, arguing that “the issue is not with the public sector itself, but with the mismanagement that has plagued it.” Rather, he argued, these enterprises need restructuring to improve efficiency, cut waste, and boost economic output,” while raising concerns over job security, and the fate of thousands of workers if privatisation proceeds.

At the same time he criticised several opposition figures, accusing them of “dishonesty and self-serving narratives.”1 2 He went on to criticise several for having arrived on the scene with American and Israeli support. His accusations included the General of the Ahmed Rahhal Brigade highlighting how he had spent years being critical of the armed Syrian opposition but once they achieved victory his rhetoric changed to speak as if he was the guardian of the revolution, adding that those who had brought about change had a clear vision and a road map to guide Syria towards a new future without the props of anyone.

Nidal Maalouf also came up for criticism noting that he had provided some good analysis but had become strident after the victory of the revolution because he did not accept the new administration, his position based on personnel impressions rather than objective motives, making unproven accusations.

Ahmed, the ‘interim president’ of the new Syria is the youngest of four brothers, Maher, Hazem and Salama and one of seven children born to his father, and mother, Awad, a geography teacher. None of the couple’s other children had Wahhabist leanings as he displayed from early on. His sisters include Shahenda and another daughter – currently out of the limelight.

Maher, an elder brother (aged 52) is married to a Russian-Syrian dual national named Tatiana Zakirova and has just been appointed as his brother’s secretary-general to the (transitional) presidency.3 Maher completed his degree as a medical doctor in gynaecology in Voronezh. He flew to Izmir, Turkey in July 2022 and did not return to Russia but became Deputy Health Minister in the Salvation Government’s administration in Idlib. He had worked in Syria between 2004-2013 before returning to Russia during the civil war.

Another of Ahmed’s elder brothers, Hazem, born in 1975, now a successful international businessman with degrees in law and in economic sciences 5 accompanied Ahmed on his ‘state’ visit to Turkey with his wife, Latifa al-Droubi, and was also at his side in Saudi Arabia.

His brother-in-law, Khaled Hashish Salameh (married to his sister Shahenda), had previously worked for the Baath Party’s Daraa branch. According to Palestine Branch Intelligence files he was detained at some point by Branch 265 for possessing ammunition but was released on April 1, 2013.

Another brother, Salama, was reportedly kidnapped by an armed faction on February 28, 2014, and his fate remains unknown. 6

Although as yet unproven it is said Ahmed had enrolled at Damascus University in the Faculty of Medicine and had studied there for two years between the ages of 18-20 before leaving for Iraq during his third year to join AQI or the Iraqi resistance against the American invasion. He fell out with his father over his life choices and left home permanently.

Imprisoned in Camp Bucca 7 near Um Qasr on the Shatt al-Arab, a 40 sq. km prison operated by the Americans 8 where at the height of the Occupation some 24,000 prisoners were physically contained he came in close contact with the late Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi, and pledged allegiance to Osama bin Laden.

He then became one of al-Zarqawi’s confederates and was also in contact with Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in prison between 2006-2011. Camp Bucca was run like Guantanamo Bay and was situated in the desert near the border with Kuwait.

According to the New Arab at that time, citing Hamid al-Saadi,  a member of the prisoners’ affairs committee between February 2005 and September 2007… “Mujahideen and suicide bombers were living in cells that were like tins of sardines, then released. That’s what Bucca prison was, many of them went in nationalists and came out Islamists.”9 In 2015 it was demolished.

On regaining his liberty Ahmed became the Emir of Nineveh for ISIS. Once the Arab Spring reached Syria he discussed returning there with ISIS leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, and setting up Jabhat al-Nusra (the Front for the Conquest of Syria). He broke with ISIS and in 2013, al Nusra was confirmed as the Syrian front for Al-Qaeda.

Wife: Latifa al-Droubi

In 2013, Ahmed married Latifa al-Droubi, the relative of a Koran reciter, Sheikh Abdul Ghaffar al-Droubi based in Jeddah where he died in 2009.  She has a degree in Arabic language and literature that may or may not include Koranic studies. They have three sons, the eldest, Mohammed, showing that al-Sharaa’s former nom de guerre is just his name in the Muslim system as Abu Mohammed al-Golani, his grandfather and father having been displaced from Golan by the Israelis in the six day war.

Al- Sharaa broke amicably with Al Qaeda on 28 July 2016. His announcement was made in the presence of Al Qaeda leaders in a tactical decision that would enable al-Nusra to affiliate with other Syrian rebel groups that did not wish to be affiliated with AQ, thus also acquiring more local legitimacy in the Syrian arena. They rebranded, dropping the AQ label but pursuing the same path.10

Abu Maria al Qahtani – death of number two man of Jabhat al-Nusra and HTS

Born in 1976, Abu Maria al Qahtani, al-Sharaa’s deputy and rival, and a member of the Shura Council was assassinated on April 4, 2024, after being detained for six months by HTS for suspected treason. Al-Qahtani, also called Abu Hamza, was born as Muyassar ibn ‘Ali al-Jubouri, also sometimes nicknamed al-Harari after the nearby town of Harara, where he moved from his birthplace in al-Rasif near Mosul. He had gained a Bachelor’s degree in Islamic law from Baghdad University and a diploma in economic studies. 11

In October 2011, he played a role in the founding of Jabhat al-Nusra Front (later Tahrir al-Sham) following on from eight years of working inside al-Qaeda-in-Iraq (AQI), where he became the deputy to al-Sharaa. He went on to serve as one the Nusra Front’s ‘jurists’ operating as the Emir for eastern Syria in the armed conflict of 2012. Between 2014-2015 as ISIS achieved its peak of control, he criticised the group’s extremists and in 2022 called for the dissolution of Al Qaeda such that he came to be dubbed the Subduer of the Kharajites. He had a long history in jihadist actions.12

Al-Sharaa has since been accused of being behind the assassination of Abu Maria al-Qahtani. Al Qahtani died from his explosive belt going off while he was in Idlib.13

(Tanzim) Hurras al-Din – Organisation of the Guardians of the Faith

On February 27, 2018, Hurras al-Din was formed merging seven extremist Sunni factions in Syria and was later joined by some ten or so smaller groups loyal to Al Qaeda and its ideology, led by mainly non-Syrian AQ veterans. On April 12, 2018, it pledged formal allegiance to Ayman al-Zawahiri, Al Qaeda’s Emir at the time.

The launching of Hurras al-Din was publicly announced in continuation of al-Qaeda’s vision of jihad seeking the creation of a new caliphate across the Levant and broader Middle East.15

Syrian born, Samir Hijazi aka Faruq al-Suri (Amir) was the leader of Hurras al-Din, a former military commander with the Al Nusra Front and a veteran of both Afghanistan and Iraq. The US Rewards for Justice imposed a 5-million-dollar bounty on his head in exchange for his capture in February 2019. 16

He trained fighters for AQI between 2003-2005. Hijazi operated between Iraq and Syria until 2008 when he attempted to move to Lebanon. However, upon relocating, he was arrested and sentenced to five years in a Lebanese prison.17

Hurras al-Din was effectively weakened by the al-Nusrah Front led by Ahmed al-Sharaa (Mohammed al-Jolani) as al-Qaeda’s (AQ) formal representative in Syria. AQ loyalists opposed the al-Nusrah Front’s decision to break with AQ and merged with other groups opposing the Assad Government.

The Front then rebranded as Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) under the leadership of al Sharaa whose nom de guerre as Abu Mohammed al-Jolani originated from his grandfather’s origins in the Golan Heights from where the family was displaced by Israel after the 1967 conquest of the Six Day War, as he explained in an interview with PBS back in 2021.

A Tunisien leader, Sayif al-Tounsi, a former member of both the Al Nusra front and of HTS suspected of involvement in the massacre of 23 Druzes at Klab Laouza of June 10, 2015 was killed in an American drone strike on Idlib on September 14, 2020. [15]

US Central Command (CENTCOM) forces had also “conducted a precision air strike in HTS’s stronghold in northwest Syria, killing Wasim Tahsin Bayraqdar, a senior leadership facilitator of the terrorist organisation Hurras al-Din,” the military said in a statement. He was the brother of the new HTS -led religious endowments minister, Samer Bayraqdar. The Syrian Islamic Council, which is made up of mainstream Muslim religious figures, offered their condolences to the minister following the strike.18

Abu ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Makki (Shura member, released from HTS detention in April 2022, was killed by the US on August 23, 2024.

Hurras al-Din announced its dissolution on January 28, 2025, after Assad was toppled but had told its fighters to remain armed. 19 Analyst Aymenn al-Tamimi told The New Arab of 29 January 2025: “… the idea seems to be that its members should be willing to move to other fronts if required or perhaps participate in efforts alongside Syria’s Sunnis in combating external threats”. 20

The UK funded Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) opined that Hurras al-Din “announced its dissolution so as not to enter into armed conflict with HTS.”

Haya’t Tahrir al-Sham

HTS was the largest group of fighters in the so-called Operation Deterrence of Aggression. Formerly Jabhat al-Nusra, then Jabhat Fateh al-Sham, its allied factions included Jabhat Fateh al-Sham, Liwa al-Haqq, Jabhat Ansar al-Din and Jaysh al-Sunna. In Idlib it amassed some 30,000 fighters and took control over resources including water and oil, as well seizing control over the petrol stations.

HTS also cemented ties with local tribes and elements that had sent fighters to Iraq. Its main civilian body, the Salvation Government formed an Idlib Tribal Council in January 2018.

HTS needed the backing of the local tribes. Early on in these relations the Washington Institute’s Aaron Zelin warned: “If Washington or other Western governments opt for reaching out to the group, they must do so with eyes wide open to the implications of that decision. Not only would they be letting HTS off the hook for its terrorist transgressions and extremist activity, they would also be empowering a group that is deeply unpopular among pro-democracy activists and other local elements. 21

HTS General Security Service raids and arrests in Idlib in May 2024 (Source report from SOHR)

The General Security Service of HTS was reported to have arrested a member of the People’s Assembly, while he was trying to enter northern Syria coming from the (former Assad) regime’s area, and taken to one of HTS’s security centres. An activist from Killis town in the Idlib countryside was also arrested.

According to SOHR, the detainee had been active in demonstrations against the regime since the beginning of the outbreak of the Syrian revolution, but had also participated in demonstrations against the HTS leader. He was subjected to threats and harassment by HTS security forces.

During his arrest, he was assaulted in front of his family and was then taken to the security branch of HTS. Another activist, a member of the Al-Karamah Initiative, was arrested by the Public Security Service, after calling for an open sit-in in front of police stations in the centre of Idlib city.

On May 25, 2024, SOHR reported that members of the HTS General Security Services stormed several houses in Jisr Al-Shughour city and arrested three civilians for “participating in protests against HTS” after they raided their houses, and took them to the security centre amid security mobilization by members of HTS. 22

HTS crackdown on opponents, 2025

The Shi’a head of al-Mustafa Mosque was suspended by HTS, February 20, 2025

On February 19, SOHR sources reported that HTS security services arrested Sheikh Adham Al-Khatib soon after having arrived in his office in the Shi’a Saeeda Zeinab neighbourhood of Damascus. They also arrested his son and bodyguard and conveyed the three men to the security centre, triggering deep resentment among the Shi’a community.

Individuals close to the Sheikh suggested that his arrest owed to the speech he gave during the previous Friday prayer when he criticized the indifference of the HTS security services to complaints by the Shi’a community after the illegal seizure and forcible eviction of their houses forbidding them to take their personal property with them and the failure of the security services when dealing with the rise in kidnapping.

No official statements were given for the reasons behind the three arrests despite the Shi’a community demanding their immediate release and an explanation for the detention of the Sheikh. SOHR sources reported that HTS security forces in Damascus enforced a decision to suspend Adham Al-Khatib from his clerical duties at Al-Mustafa Mosque – Sidi Miqdad – Al-Mustafa Complex (Al-Andalus neighbourhood) in Babbila on February 20, but the congregation opposed the decision.

Sheikh Al-Khatib called on local residents to continue to hold prayers at the mosque and affirm its ownership by the Shia community, through a Shia cleric leading the prayers. However, in this context, General Security Service vehicles manned with machine guns were deployed around the mosque and entered it by force overwhelming the Shia worshippers and removing Shia religious images and symbols from it.

The Shia community argued that Shia endowments are not subject to the HTS led Ministry of Endowments in matters of appointing or dismissing imams. They maintained that such decisions fall under the authority of the religious leadership office. 23

HTS Military council holds a military parade in Al-Suwaidaa countryside amidst revenge killings

February 24, 2025 SOHR

The newly formed military council held a parade in Sadd Al-Ain area of Al-Suwaidaa, attended by dozens of armed fighters. Residents in Baka village announced their having joined the council, reflecting the growing military movement in the region.

January – February murders

SOHR had documented 168 murders and numerous revenge killings as retaliatory actions carried out in different Syrian provinces since early 2025, which left 305 fatalities, including seven women and a child.

Damascus: Ten fatalities, including one woman, and a person whose death was based on their sectarian affiliation.

Rif Dimashq: 29 fatalities, including one woman, and two persons whose deaths were based on their sectarian affiliation.

Homs: 119 fatalities, including two women, among them 78 people whose deaths were based on their sectarian affiliation.

Hama: 73 fatalities, including one woman and a child, among them 42 people whose deaths were based on sectarian affiliation.

Latakia: 25 fatalities, including one woman, among them 16 people whose deaths were based on their sectarian affiliation.

Aleppo: 12 fatalities.

Tartus: 17 fatalities, including a woman, among them were 11 people whose deaths were based on sectarian affiliation.

Idlib: Nine fatalities.

Al-Suwaidaa: Three fatalities, among them a person whose death was based on sectarian affiliation.

Deir Ezzor: One fatality.

Daraa: Seven fatalities. 24

March 2025 murders

144 sectarian based civilian deaths in March 2025, not including the massacres of Alawaites in Latakia, Tartus, Banias, Homs and Hama. See detailed reports of these massacres.

At least 745 people were killed of a growing number of Alawites reaching some 1000 people by mid-March. Videos showed women being made to crawl while they and children were tortured and killed. Christians were also targeted and killed. 25

Amnesty International’s Secretary General Agnès Callamard said, “The perpetrators of this horrifying wave of brutal mass killings must be held accountable. Our evidence indicates that government affiliated militias deliberately targeted civilians from the Alawite minority in gruesome reprisal attacks – shooting individuals at close range in cold blood. For two days, authorities failed to intervene to stop the killings. Once again, Syrian civilians have found themselves bearing the heaviest cost as parties to the conflict seek to settle scores.” 26

March Murders cont.

Damascus: 4 males

Rif Dimashq: 23 males

Homs: 31 males, one woman and a little girl.

Hama: 19 males

Latakia: Nine males, one woman and two children.

Aleppo: 9 males

Tartus: 29 males

Deir Ezzor: 3 males

Daraa: 12 males. 27

April, SOHR

Deteriorating security situation owing to proliferation of arms amongst civilians and tribes.28 A resurgence of ISIS has also been noted.

April murders

Eight civilians were murdered across Syria in the first four days of April in areas under HTS “government” control, including two women and a child.29

Several civilians were killed by gunmen in Deir Ezzor. Others were killed for their affiliation with the Kurdish-led SDF.

SOHR has documented 49 operations carried out by ISIS, including armed attacks and explosions targeting military and security forces, in areas under the control of the Autonomous Administration since early 2025. According to SOHR statistics, these operations left 17 fatalities. 30

Al Sharaa and his Foreign Minister, Assad al-Shaibani not welcome in Iraq

Having a background of violent crime when in Iraq with Iraq having since been brought under the control largely of the pro-Iran Shi’a bloc within the Coordination Framework (CF) and the Hashd al-Shabi forces, Ahmed al-Sharaa is said not to be welcome there, nor is his ex-Al Qaeda Foreign Minister, Assad al-Shaibani. According to the EPIC ISHM bulletin of Feb 27-March 6, 2025, (Shi’a) Militia Threats Derail Nascent Diplomacy with Syria.

“On February 27, Iraqi Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein said that Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani postponed an anticipated visit to Baghdad because of “a campaign on social media” that expressed negative views about the visit. Meanwhile, news reports said that Iran-backed militias have made threats to assassinate Shaibani or Syria’s interim president, Ahmed al-Sharaa, if either were to set foot in Baghdad.

Publicly, former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, a powerful figure in the Coordination Framework, said during a televised interview that Sharaa was not welcome in Baghdad. Shaibani was scheduled to visit Baghdad in late February to discuss Syria’s possible participation in the Arab League summit meeting that Baghdad is expected to host in May.”

However, the KDP’s President of the Kurdistan Region, Nechirvan Barzani showed no such hesitation in strongly gripping al-Sharaa’s hand in illustration of common interests such as the defeat and dissolution of the Syrian Democratic Forces dominated by the Kurdish YPG, a rival to the KDP.

The KDP enjoys good relations with Sunni Turkish leader, Recep Tayipp Erdoğan whose wife, Emine, warmly received Al Sharaa’s wife, Latifa al-Droubi on a ‘state visit’ to Ankara.

Media commentator Khaaama.com opined: “By including his wife in official functions, he (al-Sharaa) seeks to present a modern, balanced image of Syria’s transitional government.” 31

The meetings took place at the 4th Antalya Diplomacy Forum held between 11-13 April ran under the name of ‘Reclaiming Diplomacy in a Fragmented World’ based on further entrenching Turkey’s role across the region.

Al Sharaa also sat centre stage during part of the conference fully legitimised by AKP dominated Turkey. 32 The two leaders share an active interest in crushing the Kurdish YPG. In their February meeting in Ankara at a joint news conference:

Erdogan said Turkey was ready to partner with Syria’s new leadership, particularly when it came to fighting the armed group ISIL (ISIS) and Kurdish fighters based in northeast Syria. “I would like to express our satisfaction for the strong commitment my brother Ahmed al-Sharaa has shown in the fight against terrorism,” Erdogan said.

“I told al-Sharaa we are ready to provide the necessary support to Syria in the fight against all kinds of terrorism, whether it be Daesh or the PKK,” he added, referring to the Arabic acronym for ISIL and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party. 33

The former ISIS Emir and Al Qaeda affiliate is no longer to be branded as a terrorist. But his cabinet includes only one Kurd who is not from the region and none of the other minorities. It has been rejected by the SDF for that reason.

Meanwhile, the hardest hit suburbs of east Aleppo (al Firdous and al-Salheen) and east Damascus are still in ruins, heaped high with garbage and largely without services.

While al-Sharaa touts the Sunni fraternity, ever since 2018 funding for the provincial councils had largely been cut and the former Interim Syrian Government was undermined by this approach.

Sheri Laizer, a Middle East and North African expert specialist and well known commentator on the Kurdish issue. She is a senior contributing writer for iKurd.net. More about Sheri Laizer see below.

The opinions are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent the views of iKurd.net or its editors.

Copyright © 2025 Sheri Laizer, iKurd.net. All rights reserved

Syria: The Triumph of Terrorism