Why Assad Won

Syrian president Bashar al-Assad. Photo: PD

Manish Rai | iKurd.net

President Bashar Al-Assad is starting to look that he will survive the uprising, even in the estimation of some of his staunchest opponents. It is a reality that almost everyone agrees to that the Syrian regime has revealed an extraordinary ability to survive. Despite the blows it has sustained in the initial phases of the conflict it has not collapsed and has even succeeded in preserving the cohesion of its civilian government systems, military forces, and security systems.

More important, President Assad is in control of the regions that appear to be critical for a functional Syrian state entity: the capital city of Damascus, other major urban centres (Aleppo, Homs, and Hama), the Syrian-Lebanese border region, and the coastal region. Even once the staunch critics of President Assad like- United States, European Union, Turkey and Saudi Arabia are reassessing their positions regarding the future of Bashar al-Assad’s rule in Damascus.

In the beginning of the Syrian uprising, it appeared Assad’s ruling bargain was unravelling and it was only a matter of time before he met a similar fate like Ben Ali, Mubarak, Saleh and Qaddafi. But all these assumption has now proved to be totally wrong. Let’s look at the factors which has contributed in strengthening the position of President Assad.

Support of the Allies– Without doubt, the most decisive factor in the turning of the tide in Syrian conflict was immense support of allies of the regime i.e. Russia, Iran and Hezbollah. The expanded interventions of Russia and Iran into the Syrian Civil War have shifted the trajectory of the conflict in favour of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. Russia has overwhelmingly used its air campaign as a tool to weaken the mainstream armed opposition battling against the regime. Iran reinforced the regime with thousands of fighters from its foreign proxies as well as the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Moreover Hezbollah provided its elite fighters to supplement the regime forces. Hezbollah complemented the Assad regime through light infantry, reconnaissance and sniper fire. It also provided additional training and combat manpower at a time when pro-regime forces are stretched from years of fighting.

Strategic Deployment– Since the initial phases of the conflict President Assad generated reliable forces by selectively deploying units, raising pro-regime militias, and pursuing a clear and hold strategy in major urban areas using indirect fire. Syrian regime hedged against defections by deploying only the most loyal one-third of the Syrian Army around its core territories and major urban centres.

Support of Minorities– President Assad enjoy firm support of all the minorities in the country. Christians, Alawites, Druze and Ismaelites supports the regime because they consider that only regime can provide security to the minorities in the country.

Control over Damascus– The elimination of the opposition threat to the Syrian capital of Damascus formed the core component of the Assad regime’s military strategy. Durable control over the formal seat of government and the home of several million Syrian citizens provides the Syrian regime with a solid claim to domestic and international legitimacy.

Air Power– Syrian regime dedicated air force had become the most significant instrument in regime’s all major military campaigns against the rebels. Aside from logistics and reconnaissance, the Syrian Air Force has been used primarily to strafe and bomb rebel held areas. Declared “inoperational” by most of foreign observers already at the start of Syrian uprising in 2011, the Syrian Arab Air Force not only remains operational but severely damaged the rebels.

Control over population– Control over the majority of the surviving Syrian population provides opportunity to tap manpower reserves to aid the regime’s fight and also restricts civilians from joining the Syrian opposition. The regime also benefits from enduring economic activity that generally no longer exists in rebel-held areas.

Division among the rebels– Rebel infighting has plagued the Syrian opposition since the start of the uprising against the regime in 2011. Division among the rebels was mainly because of local rivalries as well as ideological differences between jihadists and more nationalist groups. This obviously benefited the regime.

Manipulated rise of Islamic State– Assad strategically responded to the Islamic State invasion of Syria. From the beginning when IS took control of oil production facilities, the regime has continued to buy from these same facilities, literally feeding IS funding. Furthermore, Assad believes that IS doesn’t pose direct threat to Damascus. So he focuses his military forces on rebel groups rather than on IS, essentially allowing the organization to conquer some areas in the north of Syria, recruit sympathizers, and terrorize the rest of the population. But the President does not ignore the imminent threat of IS.

Just days after Russia began its airstrikes, he warned during an Iranian TV interview that failure in Syria’s campaign against IS would “Destroy the Middle East”. This combination of inaction against IS and public statements about the dangers it poses only serves to increase levels of concern, both in Syria and in the international community, demonizing IS and elevating Assad as the more reasonable leader.

Assad has won the most critical battles of the entire war. But there is something else that is also clear that the war itself will not end. Indeed, the Syrian conflict post-Aleppo will not only continue, but could evolve in myriad ways that even the most knowledgeable Syria analyst will find difficult to predict. The opposition is still heavily armed. So we’ll still see that for quite a while. The big question is how quickly we get to that guerrilla-style warfare and where the regime is going to go next.

Manish Rai, is a columnist for Middle-East and Af-Pak region and Editor of geo-political news agency, Views Around. He is also a contributing writer for iKurd.net. See below.

The opinions expressed in this commentary are solely those of the author.