Kurds and Chronic Insecurity: A Psychosocial Analysis

Dr. Nizar Gzali | Exclusive to iKurd.net
Translated by iKurd.net from Kurdish Awene

The situation of the Kurds in Syria and the region represents a fragile model of what political psychology calls the chronic instability of stateless nations.

The Kurds do not only experience the typical political struggle over land, but also a profound internal tension connected to identity, meaning, and trust in the world.

Many live in a persistent cycle between giving and denial, exploitation and abandonment, hope and disappointment.

This paper begins with the premise that the difficult situation of the Kurds is not merely political, but deeply rooted in the internal structure of Kurdish society. Repeated historical experiences of betrayal and disappointment have left not only visible scars on maps, but also the strongest internal imprints. This has created a historical pattern that cannot be broken through conscious psychological effort, highlighting the importance of this phenomenon in both political and military contexts.

Within this framework, Predictive Behavioral Trauma (PBT) emerges as key to understanding the Kurdish situation in Syria. Political trauma literature shows that societies that base their existence on fragile alliances become increasingly vulnerable to betrayal, especially when the partner is weak, and trust, protection, and control are uncertain. This explains the Kurdish experience during the ISIS conflict, when their military and security contributions were often denied by allies, while most of their political rights and leadership were rejected.

This reliance on international and regional allies was not a one-time event, it created a deep internal trauma within Kurdish society. Established trust in international institutions became conditional, and Kurds often felt used, only to be abandoned later. Over time, this political trauma transformed into hypervigilance, sometimes blending with political paranoia. The fear is not simply of betrayal itself, but evolves into an internalized expectation, a quiet conviction that “every ally ends in betrayal.” This belief becomes an automatic prediction, both psychologically and politically.

Beyond that, the Kurds experience what could be called a paradox of agency. On the international level, they are recognized as an ethical and military force with a central role in counter-terrorism, yet simultaneously they are denied legitimacy as a political actor.

This paradox produces a dual identity, lawful fighter on one side, perceived as illegitimate on the other. It becomes a case of moral exploitation, where Kurds are expected to be victims, while their political demands are treated as a burden or curiosity. Over time, this generates meaning fatigue, where struggle loses clear purpose and transforms into a sense of being trapped in a deteriorating cycle.

A Syrian government Islamist militant, Rami Yousif al-Dahsh from Urfa, holds the braid of a Kurdish female YPJ fighter after killing her in Raqqa, Syria, January 2026. Photo: iKurd.net/screengrab/video/X

In Syria, this situation is prominent enough to be described in terms of victim-combatant psychology. Kurds carry a historical memory burdened with trauma, while simultaneously pursuing a modern struggle for self-determination. This duality produces a deep internal tension, unhealed trauma leaves them ready for future suffering. When self-reliance becomes internalized as identity, it transforms into a long-term condition, not a liberating force.

Beyond forms of self-governance, loss of external decision-making power strengthens the sense of internal lack of control, one of the key contributors to community-wide psychological damage. This sense not only complicates political resilience, but also deeply disrupts internal self-mastery, leaving human fate highly dependent on others’ decisions.

This experience cannot be separated from the broader fragmentation of Kurds in the region. The division of Kurdistan across four states is not just a geographic outcome, but a fragmented collective self, as political psychology describes. Internal divisions, party loyalties, and regional attachments sometimes replace national identity and weaken historical memory, placing the Kurdish psyche in a long-term state of internal fragmentation.

In response, Kurdish society has developed mechanisms for internal protection. Trauma has been politicized and continuously reproduced, shaping political imagination and making any attempt to escape cycles of trauma feel like betrayal in memory. Forms of small-group narcissism emerge, where minor achievements are magnified and criticisms are perceived with heightened sensitivity.

Among Kurds in Rojava, another layer of this internal crisis appears, a persistent survivor’s guilt and a fractured identity between incomplete integration with new communities and a national-political connection that lacks clarity. Political activity often turns into symbolic gestures, driven by nostalgia and loyalty rather than a long-term strategic approach.

In Iraqi Kurdistan, the situation is even more fragile. While daily life may seem stable, a strong internal anxiety about the future persists. Fear of repeated betrayal remains silent in people’s hearts, especially when society experiences political stagnation, repeated party failures, and loss of elite trust.

A deeper concern emerges, “normalizing the betrayal of our allies or losing trust in them,” a feeling that “the world is not with us,” becomes an internalized reality. This is more threatening than immediate political danger, because it undermines internal cohesion.

Former Iraqi Prime Minster Nouri al Maliki, December 2025. Photo: iKurd.net/Shams TV video/YT

In the broader Iraqi context, the question arises, can what happens to the Kurds in Syria act as a pre-warning for Shiites in Iraq? A message suggesting political fragility and alliance failure could open doors to uncontrolled intervention.

Considering past events, including the re-election of Nouri al-Maliki as Prime Minister, the risk increases. Could some Shiite groups feel the need for individual agency, drawing from these experiences to influence governance? And could this be applied either as a sectarian project or a broader centralized power move without resolving systemic regional imbalance?

Simultaneously, another urgent question arises, can the ongoing changes in Syria and the rise of sectarian-political forces serve as a model for a new Sunni political project in Iraq, possibly with regional backing?

Ultimately, the most pressing question remains, are the Kurds valiant fighters but historically destined to struggle in a proxy role? Is their international image that of an “idealistic yet powerless actor,” admired in crisis but abandoned when seeking rights? And if this pattern repeats, is the problem purely political instability, or is it also an internal and political failure, affecting Kurdish survival within this imposed role?

These questions do not have easy answers. They reveal that what happens today is not just a Kurdish issue, but a central regional question for the future of the entire area. The answer lies not only in statements or battlefield outcomes, but in the capacity of all actors, Kurds and non-Kurds, to recognize this moment as a final psychosocial warning, not merely another violent incident.

Dr. Nizar Gzali, PhD in Internal Studies, Director of the Center for Internal and Social Research at EPU.

This article was originally published in the Kurdish language in Awene Newspaper on January 22, 2026.

The opinions are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent the views of iKurd.net or its editors.