
Why Iranian Kurds Should Be Wary of the Shah’s Return
Kawa Dasture | Exclusive to iKurd.net
Translated by iKurd.net from Kurdish Awene
Today, the greatest threat facing Eastern [Iranian] Kurdistan comes from Reza Pahlavi, the son of the former Shah of Iran. Under his hand and the influence of his allies, a form of Persian nationalism is taking shape under the name of Iran, one that spreads symbols of intimidation at this very moment.
This article seeks, as quickly as possible, to demonstrate that the fear this evokes is neither exaggerated nor excessive. Supporting evidence is presented, and potential solutions are proposed, though the question should have been brought sooner into public discourse and friendly dialogue.
Why is the son of the former Shah and his emerging movement a threat to the Kurds and other peoples of the Middle East?
The first and most significant reason, in my view, lies in the nature of the nationalism his allies now express, which is, in fact, far more advanced than the traditions they inherit. This Persian nationalism, under the guise of protecting Iran, is rooted in ethnocentrism with deep historical foundations.
It views every nation in the Middle East with contempt, judges people primarily by race, invents mythological and imaginary histories to justify its dominance and superiority, and exalts Aryan blood and identity. If the elites and intellectuals feel no shame, they align closely with the principles of Nazism. This nationalism presents itself in a quasi-religious form, which could be described as the contemporary Iranian faith.

The threat is evident. After the rise of Persian nationalism during the reigns of Reza Shah and Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, especially through SAVAK [The Bureau for Intelligence and Security of the State], it emerged both as a faith intertwined with the monarchy and as modern political Islam, which ultimately gave rise to the Islamic Republic.
Today, after half a century, Iranian leftists are weakened, if not entirely absent, and political Islam in Iran remains under scrutiny. These weakened discourses have now been replaced by another ideology, a new Persian nationalism under the banner of Iran.
Persian nationalism today functions almost as a dominant faith, akin to a revived Iranian monarchy. It continues the legacy of the old Iranian faith and projects a possible future, even if the son of the Shah and his representatives do not regain political power. Iran is now fully engaged in shaping itself around this new faith, ethnocentric nationalism.
The second reason this political discourse is threatening relates to the model the Shah’s son and his circle imagine. Driven by nostalgia for the previous era, they seek to revive the bloodline and legacy of the monarchy. This Iranian ethnonationalism envisions Iran as superior to the great civilizations of the world, reflecting an enduring illusion of grandeur.

According to this narrative, Iran’s civilization, as exemplified in the Shah’s era, rivals the world’s greatest civilizations. It recognizes no equal, French, Japanese, German, or American, but directs aggression and envy toward Turks and Arabs. In this vision, there is no space for the Kurds, except as servants of the imagined empire. This perspective also extends to Kurds outside Iran.
In this political discourse, the experience of the failed Islamic Republic is frequently invoked to reinforce the notion that the only path to Iran’s “happiness and greatness” lies in returning to the monarchy. There is no self-criticism or lesson drawn from past failures. Iranians erred in attempting the revolution of 1979; today, the Islamic Republic’s history is seen as proof that the monarchy must be restored, replicating the same methods as before.
The third reason for concern relates to the engagement of modern thinkers with the idea of monarchy. In principle, and according to modern political philosophy, monarchy is flawed because it rests on the decision of a single ruler rather than collective legitimacy. Yet engagement with the idea of monarchy does not excuse ignoring the previous points. A thinker can consider monarchy without losing sight of the threats outlined above.
At this critical moment, non-participation becomes a revolutionary act. The duty of revolutionaries is to refuse participation in actions that facilitate the creation or spread of a nationalist ideology that endangers others. In political philosophy, non-participation is itself a form of action.
By refusing to partake in initiatives that strengthen this form of nationalism, individuals enact a revolutionary responsibility. Those who actively resist these policies perform an even greater act than mere non-participation.
However, at this time, caution is required. Arguments that suggest the Islamic Republic’s failures justify accepting anything else are flawed. Simply claiming, “Whatever exists must be allowed,” ignores historical context. If what existed before was worse, submission is no solution.
The current revolutionary movements in the East have not seriously confronted this question, as their focus has been limited to immediate bloodshed, regardless of consequences. Such arguments may even facilitate threats that could grow larger. Thus, even genuine early protests can appear repetitive. Considering contemporary events in Iran, non-participation remains the primary revolutionary duty.
The complexity of the Kurdish position is significant. The revolution in the East is often framed as a two-player game, the Islamic Republic versus its opponents, with the Kurds participating in all their diversity.
In reality, the Kurds are in a three-player game: the Islamic Republic on one side, the Shah’s son and his allies on another, and the Kurds as a separate entity. Any support, direct or indirect, risks compromising the Kurds’ own future, because only they can shift the balance.

The time has come for every Kurd to recognize that threats we face may be those we inadvertently create ourselves. If, at this moment, Western [Rojava, Syrian Kurdistan] Kurdistan, in Aleppo or elsewhere, falls victim to Syria’s new regime, worse than its predecessor, the same scenario could unfold in the East, where a new ideology may prove even more threatening than the old one.
History teaches us that if the Kurds had not initially allied with the Islamic Republic against the monarchy, their actions might have furthered the Shah’s objectives.
Now, history repeats itself, and the Kurds must ally with current opponents, this time against all previous allies. I hope we never witness a future in which the Kurdish revolution again divides over whether an alliance with the Islamic Republic is preferable, because removing the Shah’s branch, at any cost, is a necessity.
Until Kurds and the Zagrosians can actively shape their political future in Iran, every Kurd who has recently participated in royal celebrations must return to the state previously known as “revolution imposed upon us.”
How the Kurds will participate in Iran’s future is another discussion and requires separate analysis. For now, each Kurd must ask themselves, “Am I acting for myself and my future, or am I handing it over to someone else?” The answer to this question is foundational.
This article was originally published in the Kurdish language in Awene Newspaper on January 11, 2026.
The opinions are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent the views of iKurd.net or its editors.
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