Iran’s Grip on Kirkuk

Sheri Laizer | Exclusive to iKurd.net

A news roundup

The suddenness of the takeover of Kirkuk and disputed territories on October 16, 2017, five years ago, caught ordinary peshmerga units and Kurdish civilians there by surprise. They did not find about the secret deal done with the pro-Iran militia leaders and Qasem Soleimani until it was too late. Now their grip has slipped ever further into the hands of Iran.

On the Autumn day that Kirkuk fell to Iraqi and militia forces, the New Yorker reported “the main militia that moved into Kurdish territory this morning was Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq (AAH)…The military operation in the Kurdish region is very much a joint Iraq-Iran project; the flag of Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq was planted at one of the Kurdish bases that was taken over.” [1]

The known Iranian presence had of course been a significant deterrent to the peshmerga for them to resist a take-over on any significant scale and a video has since come to light of Qasem Soleimani filmed there as the Iraqi forces and allied militias seized control. [2]

As the Peshmerga were driven out, and particularly the PUK’s 70 Force, only a handful of Kurdish fighters held their ground. 

For deeper background and details on the October 2017 handover of Kirkuk, please see:
– Kirkuk – Wars of Deception And Elections
– Iraqi Kurdistan – “Sold Out!” – Part II
– Iraq – The Cynical Swindle

From the article, Iraq: Cynical Swindle, see for example the section headed, Kirkuk Grubby Hands, detailing something of the complicity of the UK (and BP) from which the following:

Evidence exists of a January 2017 agreement made between the KDP and the Iraqi government to hand Kirkuk back to Iraqi control resulting in British PM, Theresa May, making a loan to Iraq of a sum of £14.2 billion once the handover was accomplished.

Former Iraqi PM Haider al-Abadi was a tool in May’s hands throughout his presidency.The PUK also agreed on the hand over of Kirkuk but were later publicly blamed for it by the KDP. Aza Doğramaci and Jalal Talabani were also party to the agreement, along with Qubad Talabani and his wife, Sherri Kraham, based in Washington DC .69

The loan from the UK via Theresa May was structured in such a way that only UK companies were to be used in the project for which that loan that was made, and BP was given assurances that it would get its hands on Kirkuk…

As the majority fled leaving the civilian population behind, the checkpoints they had been manning were all swiftly abandoned. The PUK peshmerga retreated to the Chemchemal frontline that they had manned in the long war against Ba’ath government forces. Inbound militia units like AAH and Katai’b Hezbollah (KH) then claimed new checkpoints in the most sensitive areas and raised their own flags.

Just two days after the fall of Kirkuk on October 18, Quds Forces under Qasem Soleimani had also set up bases and HQs there. Bas News reported that Shakhawan Abdullah, a Kurdish member of the Iraqi Parliamentary Committee for Defense and Security informed them “Iran’s Quds Force members are embedded with the forces who entered Kirkuk, wearing Hashd al-Shaabi and Iraqi Federal Police uniforms. [3]  

The PMF Northern Axis also swiftly gained full control over Tuz Khurmatu and had a very strong presence at street level. The Axis was led by Abu Ridha Yilmaz al-Najjar, a Shi`a Turkoman loyal to Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis. [4]  Well-known analyst, Michael Knights reporting for the West Point Combating Terrorism Center summarized the position as follows, some two years later in an extremely detailed paper concerning the new groups of militias, Iran’s Expanding Militia Army in Iraq: Special Groups. He detailed:

“In Kirkuk, Shi`a Turkmen militias look to Mohammed Mahdi al-Bayati, another Shi`a Turkoman primarily loyal to Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis. While often identifying organizationally with Badr, Quwwat al-Turkmen (PMF brigade 16, based in Tuz and Kirkuk) looks toward al-Muhandis and Iran first for direction and support. Al-Muhandis has also placed loyalists within Kirkuk’s governor’s office…Iran-backed Special Groups have been particularly active in smuggling and the provision of material support to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. For instance, IRGC-QF leaders have used Tal Ashtah dispersal airfield—just west of Jawwalah (Rashad), 35km southwest of Kirkuk city—for a variety of purposes.

“On October 16, 2017, this is where IRGC-QF intermediaries including IRGC-QF Colonel Haj Ali Iqbalpour (the long-standing Kirkuk area liaison) met with Kurdish and Iraqi leaders to broker the handover of Kirkuk to federal forces. This is also where IRGC-QF launched and recovered surveillance drones to designate targets for the September 8, 2018, precision rocket strike on the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI) headquarters in Koya, in Iraqi Kurdistan, which killed 14 and wounded 42 oppositionists.”

Within months internal divisions were aiding ISIS to make a guerrilla style comeback creating an ongoing security vacuum.

The late Abu Mahdi Al Muhendes – Interpol wanted terrorist

The late Irish journalist, Robert Fisk, had written of the changing fortunes of al-Da’wa party members in Lebanon and Kuwait after the Iraqi invasion of August 1990, observing: “…Nor had one small irony escaped the Lebanese. For when Saddam’s army moved into Kuwait, the seventeen men held prisoner for blowing up the US and French embassies there in 1984 – the ‘Dawa’ members whose liberation had become the principal demand of Terry Anderson’s Lebanese kidnappers – had gained their liberation. All had been enemies of Iraq. Kuwait’s support for Saddam’s eight-year war against Iran had been the driving-force behind their attacks on the embassies. And in the early hours of 2 August, as the guards at Kuwait’s central prison fled their posts, they had escaped. In disguise, several made their way through Iraq to Iran…” [5]

Abu Mahdi al-Muhendes was sentenced to death by a Kuwaiti court in connection with his role in blowing up the Embassies but had already escaped by sea to Iran on a false Pakistani passport soon after the attacks. There he married an Iranian and becoming naturalised. The New Arab had reported back in January 2015:

“Muhandis is accused of the staging attacks on the US and French embassies in Kuwait on 12 December 1983, which killed six people and injured another 80, including citizens of western countries. An investigation conducted jointly by the Kuwaiti and US authorities at the time reportedly uncovered evidence of Muhandis’ involvement, along with 17 others from the Dawa Party, in these attacks. Muhandis and his comrades were sentenced to death but he managed to flee Kuwait to Iran using a fake Pakistani passport. He was blacklisted in the Gulf countries, Egypt and the Arab Maghreb, in Europe and the US. He has spent the past ten years in Iran, Syria and Iraq… He purportedly appeared in several video clips appearing to execute Iraqi soldiers taken captive by the Iranian Army in 1985, during the Iran-Iraq war…He was appointed as a military adviser to al-Quds Corps, tasked with attacking Iraqi forces deployed in Basra, his hometown. In 1985, the Kuwaiti general prosecutor officially charged him of involvement in an assassination attempt on the late Emir Jabir al-Ahmad. Ever since that time, he has been Kuwait’s most wanted fugitive, and on the US blacklist. His name even appeared on the “most wanted” list before that of Osama Bin Laden, al-Qaeda’s former leader, for a time.

“In 1987, Muhandis was officially appointed leader of the Badr Organisation… he was active in al-Tajjamou al-Islami, a group affiliated with al-Quds Corps. He joined Iranian forces in attacks on Iraqi towns in early 1988, attacks that left hundreds of Iraqi soldiers and civilians dead…” [6]

Jamal Jaafar al-Ibrahimi –Basra-born Abu Mahdi al-Muhendes – Iran’s Man

Born of an Iraqi Shi’a father and Iranian mother in 1954, Jamal al-Ibrahimi, AKA Abu Mahdi al-Muhendes returned to Iraq after regime change, becoming an MP in Babel in 2005 under al-Da’wa’s bloc. He swiftly rose higher to become the security advisor to Iraq’s first post-US prime minister, Ibrahim al-Ja’afari, who was later supplanted in internal wrangling by Nouri al-Maliki. [7] Al Da’wa’s Islamic Jihad cell had been responsible for bombing the Iraqi Embassy in Beirut in 1981 under the auspices of Nouri al-Maliki [8] who went on to boast about it in a video yet remains unscathed and in power in Iraq. The New Arab feature cited from above had also reported how “US marines stormed his residence in east Baghdad after his true identity was revealed, but he managed to flee again to Iran after spending several months hiding and being pursued by the US.” [9] He returned to Iraq after the formal US military withdrawal in 2010 or short stays.

Fast forward to 2014 and the rise (and eventual fall) of ISIS, al-Muhendes, also nicknamed the ‘engineer’ had become the actual spokesman and leader of the PMF despite his formal designation as ‘deputy leader’. He was also the leader of Iran-backed, Kata’ib Hezbollah. [10]

Since his assassination by US forces on January 3, 2020, the name of the Baghdad Airport Road has been changed to ‘Martyr al-Muhendes street’ and his portraits, whether alone or montaged into heavenly embrace with Qasem Soleimani, sanctify him as a heroic Shi’a martyr, and are now posted far and wide across the capital all the way to Kirkuk but at no time was there any suggestion of al-Muhendes being an Iraqi patriot – he was always Iran’s man.

He has been succeeded by two others to lead the PMF, Abu Fadak and Akram Ka’abi have succeeded him in his twin roles [11]

New Kirkuk-based “Abu Mahdi al-Muhandes Force”

The PMF has formed a new unit in al-Muhendes’s name in Kirkuk, the Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis force. It trained for three months at Kirkuk Airport and began duty there on October 24, 2022, as a so-called ‘emergency response force’:

Abu Ridha al Najjar, Shi’a commander of the Northern Axis – who continues to be powerful in disputed Tuz Khurmatu and Kirkuk [12] told Kirkuk Now: “Abu-Mahdi al-Muhandis paid great attention to Kirkuk province. He graduated from the Ahl al-Bayt Religious School and learned most of what he knew from Qasem Suleimani, that’s why we decided to name this base after him.”

According to Jawdat al-Assafi, the media official for the Northern Front of the PMU, the force consists of 500 soldiers. “All of them are said to be residents of Kirkuk province from different ethnic groups and sects. Al-Assafi claimed that part of this force will be stationed inside the headquarters of the Northern Front of the PMU for emergency response. “It will perform the functions of a rapid response force, and our goal is to stabilize Kirkuk,“ he said [13]

Naturally, when these PMF commanders speak about ‘stabilizing’ the disputed areas it is according to the PMF’s vision of what stability means and its determination to maintain its authority and that of Iran while increasing their independence from the Iraqi government. This policy is directly changing the character of the northern area.

The Shi’a forces have also established a prison inside Kirkuk airport itself where the al-Muhendes force has control, along with SWAT. [14] The Kurds correctly see these developments as further moves by Iran to push them out. In the long term.

Iran’s Foreign Minister, Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, a regular sight in Baghdad: “border security” on the agenda

On February 21, 2023, Iranian news reports said that former Iraqi PM, Mustafa al-Kadhimi, visited Tehran for talks with Iran’s Foreign Minister, Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, ahead of his visit to Baghdad, focused on Iraq’s mediation between Iran and Saudi Arabia. He reportedly told Kadhimi that Tehran was in favor of reopening Iran’s embassy in Saudi Arabia and vice versa. Kadhimi  also had meetings “about regional and international affairs” with Iran’s President Ibrahim Raisi and Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf Iran’s Speaker of Parliament during this, his second visit to Iran since Mohammed al-Sudani took over the premiership from him on October 27, 2022.

The next day, Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, met with al-Sudani, Abdul-Latif Rashid, and Iraqi Speaker Mohammed al-Halbousi. At a joint press conference afterwards Iraq’s Foreign Minister, Fuad Hussein, said the discussions included border security, Iraqi debt over energy imports, and a recent visit to Washington “as it related to the Iranian side.”

Iran increases its hold over Iraq in key spheres

The same sources noted that Abdollahian spoke of a “comprehensive document for strategic cooperation” that a senior joint committee was working on. He also revealed that water boundaries were a core element of the discussions, which included “redrawing the Thalweg” line of Shatt al-Arab based on the 1975 Algiers treaty.

Abdollhian stressed that Tehran “supports the resolution by the Iraqi parliament concerning the expulsion of U.S. forces from the country”, and urged Iraq to expedite legal action concerning the January 2020 assassination of Qasem Soleimani and Abu Mahdi al-Muhandes. [15]

After the Sudani led cabinet was formed on October 27,2022, thanks to the PUK vassal, Latif Rashid, stepping into the role of president, the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs in Baghdad was taken over after former Hashd spokesman, Saber al-Asadi. [16] The Hashd also gained control of other important ministries strengthening their power further under al-Sudani. Al Sudani has since also authorised the Hashd to run a trading company named after al-Muhendes. The National exposed last year how “The new al-Muhendes company will operate with a capital of 100 billion Iraqi Dinars (about $67 million)” according to a government statement. The Hashd also has a little reported role in private security at Iraq’s grand Al Faw port project …[17]

The PMF – Iraq’s IRGC and Basij all rolled into one

Kamaran Palani writing for Al Jazeera reported on the highly visible PMF presence in the north of Iraq in an article published on May 8, 2021: Iran-backed PMFs are destabilizing Iraq’s disputed regions

It read “…Apart from gaining influence over local communities through military presence and recruitment, pro-Iranian PMFs have deployed shadow administrations, building security, social, political and economic structures that rival and undermine formal ones. They have engaged in not only the control of the movement of people and goods but also in “taxing” local businesses. They have also gotten involved in religious affairs, controlling Sunni religious sites and endowments and supporting newly created Shia endowments…[18]

Before the assassination of al-Muhendes Knights had noted: “In Tuz Khurmatu, where Badr failed to rein in criminal Shi`a Turkmen mafias backed by al-Muhandis, oil was being extracted from the producing wells in Pulkhana field and smuggled into Iran (and thereafter to the Gulf) by local Turkmen militias. The field—sitting astride an area contested by the Islamic State, Shi`a Turkmen forces, and multiple Kurdish groups—has created strange bedfellows who mutually profit from the still-contested area, and this has given outlaw groups breathing space to survive outside the reach of Iraqi government and coalition forces.”

In July 2018, Rudaw had remarked on the forced Arabisation increasing since the takeover of these areas: “…Arabization after the October 16 has started from the villages around Daquq and Tuz Khurmatu and it will include areas near Prde, Shwan, and Qarah Anjir,” Mulla Farman, a member of the national council of the Change Movement (Gorran), told Rudaw. “Those Arabs who attack the Kurdish villagers are those Shiites who were brought to Kirkuk during Saddam Hussein’s rule and now they have the support of Hashd al-Shaabi and the federal army. They have even changed the Kurdish name of villages,” Farman added…Kurdish residents of Mardan, a village near Khanaqin, have also been forced to evacuate amid a wave of ISIS killings. They also suspect Shiite paramilitias are trying to push them out. [19]

Former ISIS fighters from the Sunni Kerwei or Karawi tribe in the disputed area of Jalawla were reported as having been redeployed by AAH Shi’a militia forces under Qais al-Khazali. KRG sources said they would never be allowed to return to Jalawla. [20]

Kirkuk International Airport opened on the 5th anniversary of the seizure of Kirkuk: 16.10.2022

Officially opened on the 5th anniversary of the Iraqi government seizing control of Kirkuk from the Kurds, the Kurdish language was intentionally omitted from the ceremony. Bas News reported: “Iraqi Transport Minister Nasser Al-Shibli on Sunday inaugurated the first-ever international airport in the disputed city of Kirkuk with the Kurdish language ignored… even though Kurdish is an official language of Iraq and the Kurdistan Region based on the country’s Constitution, the name of the Kirkuk airport has been written in Arabic and English alone.

“This comes as the Kurdish language has been increasingly ignored in official institutions in Kirkuk and other disputed areas since October 2017, when the Iraqi Army and Hashd al-Shaabi militias took control of the region…[21]

Turkish Airlines is the first international carrier to have begun direct flights there, demonstrating its politico-economic interests in Kirkuk and its potential to boost direct co=operation with the Sunni Turkmen. [22]

The airport is also useful to Iran in addition to Basra Airport for it allows Iran and the pro-Iran forces to avoid the KRG’s Erbil and Sulaimaniya Airports for air access to the north of Iraq.

By road, the distance from Kirkuk Airport, via Kifri to Kalar, to the Iranian border is just over two hours’ drive with a further lap of some five hours to Kermanshah in the Kurdish heartland. It must be wondered if this will also lead to further persecution of Iran’s Kurds.

Iraq – also arming Sunni Arab tribes in Kirkuk

A KDP official told KDP media organ Bas News that the Sunni Arab Albu Hamdan tribe is being armed by the Iraqi government in Kirkuk province along with the Albu Mafraq in Daquq and Naem Ubeid in Hawija. He claimed that ‘arming the Arab tribes comes at a time when the indigenous Kurds are being marginalized and neglected even when IS attacks their villages.’

The Albu Hamdan tribe was armed in response to a demand made by the head of the tribe for arms in the name of “general mobilization” using the pretext of ISIS, just as the Shi’a militias had done to legitimise the PMF early on.

Shafaq News reported back in May 2020 that the Emir of the Albu Hamdan tribe, Sheikh Maytham Ali al-Hamdani made an urgent appeal to all Arab tribes in southwest Kirkuk to protect the province from ISIS. He was also reportedly driving Kurds out from mixed ethnic villages including Albu Hamdani. He posted on Facebook: “I call you to support the armed forces with all its types under the banner of Iraq. We are all soldiers in the service of Iraq and our regions.”…[23]

The same tribe also has members active with ISIS. On November 3, 2022, Shafaq News Agency reported that Iraqi air strikes killed ISIS leader, Ahmed Marei Saleh Abdullah Khalifa Al-Hamdani, in Kirkuk governorate: “Al-Hamdani is from the village of Rabida, of the Dibs district in Kirkuk, and worked as a commander of a military detachment within the Albu Hamdan sector – Kirkuk state, within the so-called “Salman Al-Farsi Brigade – Al-Qadisiyah Division… he held the position of the military official of the Albu Hamdan sector – Kirkuk – “the Wilayat of Iraq” until mid-2019, after which he served as the deputy military official of the Albu Hamdan sector – Kirkuk, “the Wilayat of Iraq.” ” [24] Curiously the same source claimed that the “site of the airstrike is a military point belonging to the Peshmerga forces and that terrorist elements used it as a temporary hostel.”

Thousands of Kurds who fled from Kirkuk, Tuz Khurmatu and the disputed territories in 2017 have still not returned home five years on.

Whilst the status of Kirkuk and the disputed territories remains unresolved, de facto control by the pro-Iran forces appears ever more permanent.

Sheri Laizer, a Middle East and North African expert specialist and well known commentator on the Kurdish issue. She is a senior contributing writer for iKurd.net. More about Sheri Laizer see below.

The opinions are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent the views of iKurd.net or its editors.

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