The Kurds and the risks of the post-Assad regime

The Kurds and the Challenges of a Post-Assad Regime — Turkish soldiers on a tank hold their position on a hilltop on the outskirts of Suruc, at the Turkey-Syria border, overlooking Kobani, Syrian Kurdistan, Rojava, October 9, 2014. Photo: AP

Shakhawan Shorash | Exclusive to iKurd.net

The now-deposed Ba’ath regime of Bashar al-Assad denied the legitimacy of the Kurds in Syria since the 1960s; they were thus regarded as foreigners, had no rights as citizens, and were not allowed to obtain Syrian citizenship. During the civil war that began in 2011, the Ba’ath regime was opposed to the autonomy of the Rojava region and never recognized it.

With the reductions in Russian forces because of the war in Ukraine and the reductions in pro-Iranian and Hezbollah militias due to the wars in Gaza and Lebanon, a golden opportunity has emerged in Syria for Qatar, Turkey and its proxy groups. Both Recep Erdogan and the Sheikh of Qatar belong to the Muslim Brotherhood, so while Turkey has supported its proxies with weapons and training, Qatar has provided money to implement a new strategy.

As the gap created by the withdrawal of Russian troops has grown over the last two years, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) has launched attacks on other Islamic groups and placed yet others under its control. Turkey has given HTS the advantage and left other groups behind to serve the short-term aims of the strategy: HTS is being prepared for the next goal, which is the control of Syrian territory.

HTS forces comprise former ISIS, al-Nusra, and al-Qaeda members, who are now styling themselves the Syrian National Army; they present themselves as open and moderate Muslims, but their real face will not long remain hidden. With the fall of the Ba’ath regime, Iran’s position in Syria has been destroyed, and the Hamas and Hezbollah militias have been weakened by Israeli attacks. Israel is, for now, one of the winners, but the Sunni regime is a cocktail of Sunni Arab nationalists and Islamic factions, meaning there is no guarantee of a peaceful neighbor for Israel.

The United States must now consider its Kurdish allies, who were their only real allies in Syria and the only force protecting significant territory from ISIS, Russia, and the Iranian militias. The Kurds even established a large prison for ISIS members at a time when other countries did not want to take back their own citizens.

If HTS establishes a moderate Islamic national government, which many Syrians and others desire, this would eventually mean not only ethnic cleansing and demographic change in Kurdistan, just as Turkey and its proxies imposed in Afrin and the border areas in 2018 and afterwards, but also the strengthening of Islamists and the resurgence of ISIS in the region.

The threats to Israel’s interests will re-emerge, perhaps even worse than before, and the loss of U.S. influence in Syria will open space for Iran’s influence to gradually strengthen. Iran controls Iraqi Shiites and can easily reach out to Islamic groups in Syria, and although Iran is a Shiite power, it is ready to help and support Sunni Islamic groups to achieve its goals—Hamas is an example of this.

Turkey, meanwhile, will gain in this vacuum and impose its demands on the area, but there is no guarantee that the various Islamic factions will not begin fighting each other again because not all are under the full control of Turkey.

The elimination of Kurdish autonomy would therefore not only result in the destruction of the modern secular administration in north-east Syria but also deliver a blow to the interests of Israel, the United States, and the free world. The U.S. should not turn its back on the Kurds nor surrender them to the conscience of Turkey and its proxies.

Shakhawan Shorash, BA and Master of political science from Southern University of Denmark and University of Copenhagen. A freelance writer concerning human right, genocide, ethnic conflicts, democratization and similar subjects. Shorash is a long-time contributing senior writer for iKurd.net, See below.

The opinions are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent the views of iKurd.net or its editors.